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Over the last decade, audit committee member compensation has shifted from a 
cash compensation structure toward a more equity-based compensation structure, with 
members on the audit committee holding substantially large equity positions. Although 
contrasting viewpoints exist as to whether more equity-based compensation aligns with 
shareholders’ interest, empirical evidence suggests that the form of compensation has an 
impact on financial reporting quality and audit committee members’ objectivity. Despite 
these results, to date there is no authoritative guideline on the appropriate compensation 
structure for audit committees.  
Non-audit services (NAS) have also been at the forefront of regulators’ attention 
in the last decade due to the economic bond that arises between the external auditor and 
the client, as a result of NAS purchases. Although regulators have not provided 
convincing evidence that NAS impair auditor independence, investors perceive that NAS 





Given that audit committee members are responsible for approving the purchase of NAS, 
which has the potential to impair auditor independence, and that compensation has the 
potential to influence audit committee members’ objectivity, this study examines the 
extent to which the structure of the compensation provided to the audit committee 
member influences their approval of NAS purchases in the post-Sarbanes-Oxley period. 
Specifically, the study examines how cash and equity-based compensation (stock awards, 
and stock options) influence audit committee members’ decision to purchase NAS from 
the external auditor.  
The analyses show that compensating audit committee members with cash is 
associated with fewer purchases of NAS. Stock option compensation, in contrast, is 
associated with greater purchases of NAS, while stock award compensation is associated 
with a reduction in NAS purchases, when greater proportions of NAS are procured. In 
addition, equity compensation does not lead to a reduction in NAS. 
When examining the effect of the CEO on the NAS purchase decision, the 
findings reveal that the CEO has the ability to influence the proportion of NAS 
purchased. When CEO power is high, the audit committee purchases greater proportions 
of NAS. Lastly, when the audit committee has greater power than the CEO, the audit 
committee mitigates the CEO’s influence and reduces purchases of NAS. 
This study has practical implications for regulators, as it not only contributes to 
the debate on the ban on NAS, but provides insight into how the form of compensation 
plays a role in managing the potential threat to auditor independence, associated with the 





structure that better aligns audit committee members’ interests with those of 
shareholders’. 
Keywords: nonaudit services, auditor independence, audit committee compensation, CEO 
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 Since the financial scandals that occurred at the beginning of the 21st century, 
auditor-provided non-audit services (NAS) have stimulated a lot of discussion amongst 
regulators, researchers and practitioners (Abbott, Parker, Peters, & Raghunandan, 2003; 
DeFond, Raghunandan & Subramanyam, 2002; Frankel, Johnson, & Nelson, 2002; 
Naiker, Sharma, & Sharma, 2013). Taking a regulatory perspective, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) argues that NAS have the potential to impair auditor 
independence because the economic bond that arises between the client and the auditor 
makes the auditor financially dependent on the client (SEC, 2000b, 2003). In particular, 
“The rapid rise in the growth of non-audit services has increased the economic incentives 
for the auditor to preserve a relationship with the audit client, thereby increasing the risk 
that the auditor will be less inclined to be objective” (SEC, 2000b, Section III.C.2.a).  
Regulators claim that audit firms are more willing to compromise their 
independence and objectivity and are less likely to confront management when they 
derive the economic rents from selling NAS to clients. As a result, this economic bond 
may lower the quality of the audits and result in poor financial reporting quality 
(Ashbaugh, LaFond, & Mayhew, 2003; Frankel et al., 2002). In an effort to reduce 
impairment of auditor independence, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) limits the 





pre-approve certain allowed NAS. The SOX also requires audit committees to disclose 
separately the amount of audit and NAS purchased from the auditor (SOX, 2000b). 
Regulators have indicated recently that NAS continue to pose a threat to auditor 
independence and audit quality, and are especially concerned with the increase of NAS 
provided by audit firms. In a discussion held among practitioners, regulators, and 
academics, at a round table hosted by the NYU Stern Vincent C. Ross Institute of 
Accounting Research (on November 26, 2012), Dr. Seymour Jones, Director of the Ross 
Institute, made the following opening remark: 
 “In the last year, all four [major audit firms] had a degree of 
condemnation from the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
(PCAOB) because all had gone back into consulting again,…how did they 
get so big given the prohibition against most consulting services outside 
the scope of auditing that was given in 2002?” (Seymour, 2012). 
 
In September of 2012, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Limited revealed that revenue 
from their financial advisory group had increased by 15% and its consulting revenue had 
grown 13.5% while audit fees had only increased modestly by 6% (Hoffelder, 2013). 
Robert Hertz, a member of the PCAOB Standing Advisory Group also commented at the 
roundtable that NAS have the ability to affect the competence of the people conducting 
the audit (Hertz, 2012).  
A year later, the discussion of NAS continues to capture the PCAOB’s attention. 
At the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) 2013 Conference on 
Current SEC and PCAOB Developments (held on December 9, 2013), several remarks 
were made concerning the increase in NAS by audit firms and the implications on 







“It seems that while in the early 2000 audit firms were disposing of their 
consulting practices because of regulatory constraints and restraints, more 
than ten years later, the same firms now believe that similar consulting 
practices can achieve greater growth under firm ownership 
notwithstanding the significant regulatory changes over the last decade” 
(Beswick, 2013). 
 
He then expressed concern that this increase in NAS continues to affect investors’ 
perceptions of auditor independence and confidence in the quality of the audit.  PCAOB 
Chairman James Doty also indicated that NAS have increased more than 15 percent per 
year at some firms while audit fees have declined, which has weakened the strength of 
the audit practice. “After nearly ten years of inspecting the audits of issuers, the PCAOB 
has identified hundreds of engagements, that did not meet PCAOB standards in 
significant respects” (Doty, 2013). More recently, the $8.2 million fine KPMG settled 
with the SEC in January 2014 for having provided NAS to their clients (ElBoghdady, 
2014) clearly indicates that NAS remain a concern because of their potential to impair 
auditor independence and affect audit quality. Therefore, the PCAOB intends to hold 
further round-table discussions in 2015 on the issue of NAS and audit quality (Tysiac, 
2013). 
The threat of impairment of auditor independence is also of primary concern to 
regulators in the European Union, who deem NAS to affect auditor independence. 
Recently, on April 16, 2014 the European Parliament passed regulation prohibiting audit 





to their clients. In addition, those services which are not prohibited by regulation have to 
be approved in advance by the audit committee (EU, 2014, Title II, Article 5).1  
Contrary to the SEC’s and PCAOB’s viewpoints on the NAS issue, the viewpoint 
of the auditing profession is that prohibiting NAS results in reduced audit effectiveness 
and efficiency as auditors do not benefit from economies of scale and the knowledge 
spillover acquired through the provision of NAS (EY, 2013; Kinney, Palmrose, & Scholz, 
2004; Knechel & Sharma, 2012; Knechel, Sharma, & Sharma, 2012). 
To address these different viewpoints, researchers have empirically examined the 
association between NAS and auditor independence but their findings have been 
inconclusive (Ashbaugh et al., 2003; Sharma, 2013). Using audit quality measures 
(earnings management, financial restatements, and going-concern opinions) several 
scholars have found that NAS does not compromise auditor independence (Ashbaugh et 
al., 2003; Chung & Kallapur, 2003; DeFond et al., 2002; Raghunandan, Read, & 
Whisenant, 2003) while other researchers indicate the purchase of NAS impairs auditor 
independence (Ferguson, Seow, & Young, 2004; Francis & Ke, 2006; Frankel et al., 
2002; Kinney et al., 2004; Sharma, 2011; Sharma & Sidhu, 2001). The assumption of 
using audit quality measures to test auditor independence in the above studies is that 
auditors with a higher level of independence and objectivity will constrain management’s 
efforts to prepare misleading financial reports. 
Despite the mixed empirical findings in the literature, the perception shared 
among regulators and investors continues to be that NAS impairs auditor independence 
                                                          
1 The regulation also imposes mandatory audit rotation as a means of reducing the threat to auditor 






(Francis & Ke, 2006; Krishnan, Sami & Zhang, 2005; Naiker et al., 2013). Given this 
shared perception and that past studies have mainly examined the relationship between 
NAS and audit quality (DeFond et al., 2002; Raghunandan et al., 2003; Sharma & Sidhu, 
2001), it is necessary to examine factors that may be influencing audit committee 
members’ decision to purchase NAS. A number of studies have addressed how factors 
such as firm characteristics, audit fees and agency costs are associated with the purchase 
of NAS (Abbott et al., 2003; Antle, Gordon, Narayanamoorthy, & Zhou, 2006; DeFond 
et al., 2002; Lee & Mande, 2005; Whisenant, Sankaraguruswamy, & Raghunandan, 
2003). However, only one study, Naiker et al. (2013), has examined how audit 
committees may be associated with the purchases of NAS following SOX-driven 
reforms.  
Naiker et al. (2013), theorize that the presence of a former audit partner on the 
audit committee can either (i) undermine the audit committee’s independence because of 
a former partner’s affiliation with the audit firm, or (ii) enhance the audit committee’s 
independence because former partners are concerned about protecting their own as well 
as their alma mater’s reputational capital. The authors find that former partners procure 
less NAS from the auditor.2 Their study, however, does not examine how economic 
incentives available to the partners, such as their compensation as an audit committee 
member, may play a role in the decision to purchase NAS. Examining the association 
between economic incentives and NAS is important because the first step in addressing 
auditor independence stemming from NAS is to evaluate the potential risks to the 
                                                          
2 Gaynor, McDaniel, and Neal (2006) perform an experiment that examines whether audit quality 
and public disclosure influence audit committee members’ pre-approval of joint provision of NAS and 





decision to purchase NAS. If the compensation paid to audit committee members can 
weaken the committee’s objectivity and independence (Sharma & Sharma, 2011), then 
the compensation may be biasing the audit committee members’ decision to purchase 
NAS, thus resulting in potential impairment of auditor independence.  
No prior research has examined the impact of compensation on audit committee 
members’ decision-making process to purchase NAS. This study therefore examines the 
association between the structure of the compensation paid to the members on the audit 
committee and their approval of NAS purchased from the independent external auditor.  
The board of directors is the primary governance mechanism within the firm and 
has the responsibility of monitoring management, and overseeing shareholders’ interests 
(Brick, Palmon, & Wald, 2006; DeZoort, Hermanson, Archambeault, & Reed, 2002). 
According to Jensen (1993), the board of directors often fails to monitor management 
effectively due to information asymmetries and differences in board culture. When these 
factors are compounded with excessive compensation, they are likely to limit the board’s 
ability to accept constructive criticism, and thus, promote a culture where directors are 
looking out for their self-interests. In this vein, Brick et al. (2006) posit that highly-
compensated directors are more likely to be under the influence of management and 
hence less likely to question management’s decisions, even if those decisions harm 
shareholders’ interests. In particular, they claim the use of excessive compensation may 
be “symptomatic of an environment of cronyism where board members and management 
do not protect shareholder interests” (Brick et al., 2006, p. 404). 
Audit committee members are primarily charged with providing “oversight of the 





audit committees suggests that members on the audit committee take their oversight 
responsibilities seriously (Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson, & Neal, 2009; Gendron & 
Bedard, 2006; Gendron, Bedard, & Gosselin, 2004), however the form of compensation 
has been shown to bias audit committee members’ judgments, and their oversight of the 
financial reporting process (Bedard & Paquette, 2009; Klein, 2002; MacGregor, 2012). 
Two conflicting views on equity compensation have emerged from this research: 1) 
equity compensation motivates committee members to more effectively monitor 
employees and prevent managerial opportunism (Beasley, 1996; Klein, 2002; Vafeas, 
2005); and 2) equity compensation aligns committee members’ incentives with those of 
management, which has the effect of weakening the committee’s oversight effectiveness 
(Bedard & Paquette, 2009; MacGregor, 2012; Yang & Krishnan, 2005).   
Recent studies on director compensation indicate an increase in equity pay since 
1998 and suggest that this form of compensation is not contributing to effective 
governance (Linck, Netter, & Yang, 2009; Sharma, 2011). For example, Linck et al. 
(2009) examine a sample of 8,000 companies over the period 1998-2004 and find that the 
median total director pay rose by 85% from $57,514 in 1998 to $112,723 in 2004 (p. 
3299). More significantly, equity-based pay, which represented 50% of the overall pay in 
1998 increased to 60% of total pay in 2004 (Farrell, Friesen, & Hersch, 2008; Linck et 
al., 2009), thereby indicating a trend towards more equity-based compensation. Using 
these compensation figures as a benchmark, and based on its financial year ended 2000 
proxy statement, Enron’s audit committee members’ excessive compensation in 2000 
likely contributed to the demise of the company. According to Enron’s 2000 proxy 





the median pay in 20013). Furthermore, the remuneration was composed of $86,826 in 
cash, restricted stock valued at $21,054, and primarily stock options valued at $309,807. 
Approximately 79% of the total compensation paid to members on the audit committee 
was in equity, with 74% of total compensation in the form of stock options (Enron, 
2000). The large amount of compensation coupled with the high proportion of equity 
compensation suggests that the compensation structure may have played a role in the 
weak oversight and low monitoring by Enron’s audit committee. 
WorldCom audit committee members were also excessively compensated, 
primarily with equity-based pay. A review of their 2001 proxy statement reveals that 
stock holdings comprised 81% of their total compensation and that the average director 
compensation was $191,000 (WorldCom, 2001), well above the median director pay of 
$74,448 during 2001 (Linck et al., 2009). On average, each WorldCom audit committee 
members received an annual fee of $35,000 payable in the form of cash or restricted 
stock and $156,250 in stock options (WorldCom, 2001). Here again, the compensation 
structure seems to have influenced the quality of oversight provided by the audit 
committee. 
Policy makers and regulators also argue that the form of compensation may harm 
auditor independence and weaken oversight. For example, subsequent to the Enron 
scandal, the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations performed an 
investigation on the causes of Enron’s demise and in a report issued to Congress on May 
7, 2002 made several comments regarding Enron’s excessive compensation of the board 
                                                          
3 According to the Report of the Blue Ribbon Commission of the National Association of 






of directors: “Three experts at the May 7 hearing criticized the compensation paid to the 
board members, noting that $350,000 per year was significantly above the norm and that 
much of the compensation was in the form of stock options which enabled board 
members to benefit from stock gains, without risking any investment loss” (Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations, 2002, p. 52). Governance experts hired by the 
Subcommittee also “urged companies to reconsider awarding excessive board 
compensation and urged them to award compensation in the form of stock rather than 
stock options” (Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 2002, p. 53).  
Despite the obvious lack of monitoring displayed by the board at Enron and 
WorldCom as a result of excessive and equity-based compensation, there currently exists 
no authoritative guideline on how members on the audit committee should be 
compensated. This is unfortunate because audit committees play an important role within 
an organization, as they are charged with the responsibility of providing independent 
oversight of the accounting and financial reporting process, and similar to external 
auditors, are accountable to shareholders. When performing this role it is critical that 
audit committees be independent, objective and safeguard the interests of the 
shareholders.  
Recognizing that equity-based compensation may impair auditor independence 
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) provides guidance on 
equity ownership for external auditors (AICPA, 1972). According to Section 101 of the 
Statements on Auditing Standards (SAS), “Independence shall be impaired if during the 
period of the professional engagement, a partner or professional employee of the firm, his 





percent of a client’s outstanding equity securities or other ownership interests” (AICPA, 
1972, SAS 1, Rule 101.02-1). In order to minimize the likelihood for impairment of 
auditor independence, audit personnel are restricted in their ability to own equity and are 
not permitted to have any financial ties to the client companies they audit (AICPA, 2013). 
In contrast, SOX provides no formal guidance on how audit committee members should 
be compensated in order to ensure objective decision-making. If compensation paid to 
auditors can impair auditor independence and requires regulation, it raises an intriguing 
question as to why audit committee compensation is not regulated, given that audit 
committees are required to be independent and they perform a function very similar to the 
external auditor, in addition to monitoring the performance of the audit and the auditor’s 
independence.  
Two main inferences can be made from the above discussion. First, investors still 
perceive that NAS impairs auditor independence. Second, the nature and level of 
compensation can influence audit committee members’ independence and objectivity. 
Relative to these two inferences however, the interplay between NAS and audit 
committee member compensation has not been investigated. Prior research on audit 
committee compensation has primarily focused on its effect on financial reporting quality 
(restatements, earnings quality) (Archambeault, DeZoort, & Hermanson, 2008; Magilke, 
Mayhew, & Pike, 2009) while past research on NAS has mainly examined whether NAS 
impairs auditor independence using audit quality as the context (DeFond et al., 2002; 
Frankel et al., 2002; Naiker et al., 2013). 
A recent meta-analysis on NAS and financial reporting quality suggests that the 





that have not been examined (Habib, 2012), such as antecedents to the purchase of NAS. 
Since the audit committee is responsible for approving NAS purchases from the auditor, 
and prior studies have not examined the role of the audit committee member in mitigating 
the potential threat of NAS on auditor independence, this study is the first to provide 
empirical evidence that the compensation structure influences audit committee members’ 
purchase decision of NAS.  
Based on a sample of 3,675 firm-year observations for the period 2010-2012, I 
examine whether total compensation, cash, stock option and stock award compensation 
have the ability to influence the audit committee’s purchase decision relating to NAS. 
Results of the primary tests indicate that total compensation and stock award 
compensation are not significantly related to the proportion of total non-audit fees to total 
fees (audit and non-audit fees) (FEERATIO). In contrast, both the size and proportion of 
stock option compensation is positively and significantly related, while only the size of 
cash compensation is positive but marginally significantly related to (FEERATIO). These 
results suggest that including more stock option compensation in the audit committee’s 
compensation structure may be detrimental to auditor independence. Total compensation 
is not significant because of the countervailing effects of types of compensation. 
Additional tests using three other measures of NAS (LOG_NAF, NAF_TO_AF, 
and UNEXP_NAF) as dependent variables were performed in order to validate the main 
findings. The results show, in contrast to the main findings, the proportion of cash 
compensation is negatively and significantly related to the level of NAS purchased from 
the auditor, while stock option compensation continues to be positive and significant, 





compensation encourages the audit committee to aggressively purchase NAS that can 
consequently threaten the independence of the auditor.  
The results are subjected to various sensitivity tests including partitioning the 
sample into low and high quartiles of NAS purchased, low and high quartiles of 
FEERATIO, low and high sub-samples of CEO power, and the CEO’s influence on the 
audit committee. Generally, the results are sensitive to these partitions. For example, at 
higher levels of compensation (quartile 4), stock option compensation is positively and 
significantly related, but cash compensation is not related to FEERATIO. When CEO 
power is high, results suggest audit committee member compensation in the form of stock 
options is positively related to purchases of NAS. In addition, when the CEO has the 
potential to influence the audit committee, audit committee member compensation geared 
toward more option compensation again is positively related to NAS purchased from the 
auditor. These results imply that the CEO can influence the purchase of NAS when the 
audit committee is compensated largely using stock options. 
This research makes several important contributions to the corporate governance 
literature and has practical implications for regulators. This is the first study to provide 
empirical evidence on how the form of compensation influences the audit committee’s 
purchase decision of NAS. Furthermore, it provides insight into how the audit committee 
may manage the impairment of auditor independence associated with the purchase of 
NAS. Results show the form and structure of compensation affects audit committee 
members’ NAS purchase decision. It indicates that greater compensation in the form of 
stock options may not be effective for managing potential threats to auditor independence 





more appropriate form of equity compensation, as it is not subject to economic incentives 
associated with exercising stock options for a financial gain. Future research may want to 
consider how the various forms and structure of audit committee compensation is related 
to various measures of audit quality, financial reporting quality, and investors’ 
perceptions of firm’s financial reporting. 
Stock option compensation paid to the audit committee therefore, may not align 
the interests of the audit committee with those of shareholders, contrary to the 
recommendation of the National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD, 2001). Cash 
compensation, in contrast, seems to motivate audit committee members to be more 
objective and purchase fewer amounts of NAS, perhaps as a means of reducing the threat 
to auditor independence. From a regulatory perspective, the findings suggest that 
prohibition of NAS alone may not be sufficient; the management of threats to auditor 
independence associated with NAS may require regulators to consider the type of 
compensation provided to members on the audit committee.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In Chapter 2, I review prior 
literature and propose hypotheses. In Chapter 3, I discuss the research method that is used 
to test the relationships between the various forms of audit committee compensation and 
the purchase of NAS, as well as the data collection process. Chapter 4 presents results of 
the hypotheses testing as well as results of additional tests. Chapter 5 concludes with a 









LITERATURE REVIEW & HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Audit Committee Independence and Agency Theory 
Corporate scandals have heightened public scrutiny and placed enormous pressure 
on organizations to strengthen their corporate governance in an effort to minimize 
unethical behavior, as well as stimulated the creation of legislation to improve 
organizational transparency and impartiality. The most significant piece of legislation 
geared towards addressing some of these issues is the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX, 
2002). In particular, the passage of this Act has significantly impacted the role of 
members on the audit committee by imposing greater responsibilities in an effort to 
enhance audit committee oversight and increase auditor independence.  
The SOX Act mandates that audit committees be composed of at least three 
members all of whom are independent members, possess financial literacy, and at least 
one committee member be designated a financial expert (SOX 2002, Section 202). 
Independence, as defined by the SOX Act, means that audit committee members must be 
independent members. Furthermore, the SOX Act mandates that audit committee 
members approve not only the hiring of the external auditor but also any audit and NAS 
procured from the external auditor as a means to reduce threats to auditor independence 





reporting process within the organization. Finally, the audit committee has the 
responsibility of determining the compensation paid to the external auditor as well as the 
authority to dismiss the external auditor. 
Two competing theories can be used to explain the rationale for the creation of 
audit committees; agency theory and institutional theory. Agency theory, which assumes 
that managers are opportunistic (Fama & Jensen, 1983), posits that audit committees are 
created to monitor managerial opportunistic behavior and ensure that management 
decisions are consistent with the best interests of shareholders. In contrast, institutional 
theory posits that audit committees are created primarily as a symbolic or ceremonial 
entity in order for the organization to gain legitimacy and do not provide any type of 
effective oversight of management or of the financial reporting process (Beasley et al., 
2009; Cohen, Krishnamoorthy, & Wright, 2010). 
Predominantly, past empirical research has found more support for the agency 
perspective suggesting that members on audit committees tend to take their oversight 
responsibilities seriously (Gendron et al., 2004; Gendron & Bedard, 2006) and “strive to 
provide effective monitoring of financial reporting and seek to avoid serving on 
ceremonial audit committees” (Beasley et al. 2009, p. 66). In addition, independent audit 
committees are associated with greater financial reporting quality (Abbott, Parker, & 
Peters, 2004; Klein, 2002). For example, audit committees that meet more frequently, are 
larger in size (Klein, 2002) and have financial experts provide more effective oversight 
(Abbott et al., 2004; Carcello & Neal, 2003). More independent audit committees also 
tend to promote auditor independence and are less likely to select an audit firm where key 





Despite the SOX Act requiring all audit committee members to be independent 
and financially literate as a means to enhance oversight and provide effective governance, 
it is surprising that it does not provide any guidance on how audit committee members 
should be compensated. The likely reason for this lack of guidance has been the New 
York Stock Exchange’s (NYSE) belief that the type of audit committee compensation 
does not impair independence (NYSE, Section 303, 2004). This credence is inconsistent 
with that of standards setters at other regulatory institutions. For example, the external 
auditors’ primary role is to attest to the quality of the financial statements prepared by 
management. In order to ensure a high level of quality and maintain auditor 
independence, the AICPA guidelines for external auditors prohibit external auditors from 
receiving any form of equity compensation as this form of compensation can bias the 
auditor and impair independence (AICPA, 1972). Although these AICPA guidelines refer 
to auditors specifically, audit committee members also oversee the financial reporting 
quality and arguably, should be held to similar standards, as their form of compensation 
may also influence their decision-making process.  
Just as external auditors are accountable to shareholders, the audit committee is 
accountable to the shareholders and must maintain independence and protect the interests 
of the shareholders. Audit committees have a charter that clearly delineates their 
responsibilities, such as hiring and firing the external auditor, determining the 
compensation of the external auditor, overseeing the internal auditor, approving the 
purchase of NAS fees and overseeing the financial reporting process. Recently, the 
structure of compensation has been shown to influence audit committee members’ 





with cash are less biased in their financial reporting decisions than audit committee 
members paid with equity. Rickling and Sharma (2013) report that the greater the equity 
in the audit committee members’ compensation structure, the greater the likelihood of 
firms beating analysts’ forecasts of earnings by a larger margin. Conversely, when cash 
compensation is greater, the likelihood of firms managing earnings to exceed analysts’ 
forecasts by a larger margin decreases.  
These results suggest that the structure and amount of compensation may 
influence the audit committee members’ objectivity and oversight, just as the 
compensation structure is influencing external auditors in performing their 
responsibilities. Given that auditors and audit committees are accountable to the 
shareholders, provide monitoring of the accounting and the financial reporting process, 
and both seem to be influenced by the structure and amount of compensation, the 
disparity between external auditors being restricted from receiving equity compensation 
while audit committee members having no such restrictions creates an interesting 
institutional paradox that motivates this study. This dissertation, therefore, examines how 
the structure of compensation of members on the audit committee influences their 
decision-making process related to purchasing NAS from the auditor. 
 
Board of Director Compensation  
 Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that the role of the board of directors is to monitor 
management and safeguard the interests of the shareholder, as conflicts of interest exist 
between management and shareholders. Furthermore, they suggest that the inclusion of 





management and reduces agency costs. Along with having independent directors on 
boards, it is critical that the interests of the directors on the board are aligned with those 
of shareholders in order to ensure effective oversight of management. One mechanism 
often used to align the interests of the directors with those of the shareholders is to offer 
compensation packages which encourage directors to adopt a stronger shareholder 
oriented perspective (Dalton & Daley, 2001; Linn & Park, 2005).  
There are two contrasting viewpoints on the structure of director compensation. 
One viewpoint suggests that equity compensation (i.e. stock holdings, stock options) 
motivates independent directors to focus on short-term performance and wealth 
appreciation since their pay is tied to the firm’s performance. Such compensation can 
result in ineffective monitoring of management and a lack of quality of the financial 
reporting process (Barrier, 2002; Linck et al., 2009). In contrast, a second perspective 
indicates that greater equity compensation promotes a focus on long-term rather than 
short-term performance (Daley & Dalton, 2002; Rickling & Sharma, 2013) and motivates 
directors to “perform their governance duties more effectively and reduce agency 
conflicts between management and shareholders” (Rickling & Sharma, 2013, p. 1). 
Siding with the second perspective, the National Association of Corporate Directors 
(NACD, 2001) supports the position that greater equity compensation encourages 
directors to be more objective and has therefore recommended a threshold of at least 50% 
of equity-based compensation, in the form of stock options and restricted stock grants, for 





short-term versus long-term stock options as a form of equity compensation.4 The NACD 
argues that the greater the equity compensation offered, the better directors’ interests are 
aligned with those of shareholders.  
In line with the NACD’s perspective, there has been a rise in the equity 
component of director pay since the early 1980s as a result of the increased 
responsibilities and risks associated with the expanded governance requirements imposed 
by SOX (Linck et al., 2009). Compensation of board of directors has dramatically shifted 
from a more cash-based compensation structure in the late 1980s to a greater equity-
based compensation structure in the twenty-first century (Becher, Campbell, & Frye, 
2005; Yermack, 2004). Historically, directors received a cash retainer, meeting fees and 
pension benefits as compensation in the early 1980s, however, the compensation 
structure has slowly shifted toward paying directors a percentage of their retainer fee with 
some form of equity such as restricted stock or stock options (Linn & Park, 2005; 
Yermack, 2004) and offering more equity-based compensation as a proportion of total 
compensation (Ryan & Wiggins, 2004). In 1998, 41% of director compensation was 
equity-based (Linck et al. 2009) in comparison to 2006 where the equity-based 
compensation increased dramatically to 62% of outside director compensation (Sharma, 
2011).  
Literature on director compensation has primarily examined firm outcomes of 
compensation in an attempt to identify the appropriate compensation structure that aligns 
the interests of directors with those of shareholders. The results have been mixed. Daley 
and Dalton (2002) performed a meta-analysis on 229 studies on director compensation 
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and found no evidence that equity compensation is associated with firm performance. 
Subsequently, Ryan and Wiggins (2004) examined the association between director 
compensation and board of director independence using a sample of 1,018 firms in 1997. 
They find that equity-based compensation increases with the percentage of independent 
directors on the board and decreases as more insiders join the board. The greater the 
equity-based compensation, the greater the incentive to monitor management as 
directors’ interests are aligned with shareholders’ interests. Furthermore, they find that 
equity compensation in the form of shares or options has the ability to improve 
monitoring of management.  
Two other studies examine the relationship between director compensation and 
financial outcomes and offer similar results to Ryan and Wiggins (2004). Linn and Park 
(2005) investigate the relationship between outside director compensation and investment 
opportunities using a sample of firms from 1995 to 2001. They find that firms with 
greater investment opportunities pay a higher level of compensation to their directors and 
pay more heavily with stock-based compensation plans. This compensation practice 
serves to incentivize directors to increase the value of investment opportunities and align 
their interests with those of shareholders. Fich and Shivdasani (2005) examine the impact 
of compensating outside directors with stock option plans on firm value using a sample of 
774 firms over the period 1997-1999. They find a positive association between the 
presence of a stock option plan for outside directors and firm value, thereby suggesting 
that stock-option plans incentivize directors to monitor management and create 
shareholder value. In summary, these studies indicate that compensating directors with 





dependent on achieving their growth objective (Fich & Shivdasani, 2005; Ryan & 
Wiggins, 2004).  
More recently, empirical research on director compensation has produced 
contradictory findings. Cullinan, Du and Wright (2008) performed a study on the 
association between outside director stock option compensation and the likelihood of 
misstatements. Using 105 misstated firms and a matched sample of 105 non-misstatement 
firms, for the period 1992 to 2001, the authors find support for the view that 
compensating outside directors with stock options limits their monitoring effectiveness5. 
Consistent with this view of limited monitoring, compensating directors with stock 
options and stock awards has also been found to be positively associated with the 
likelihood of a firm’s actual earnings beating analysts’ forecasts of earnings by a larger 
margin (Rickling & Sharma, 2013), and firms recording higher levels of total accruals as 
a means of managing earnings (Boumosleh, 2009).  
The use of stock options as a means of compensation has also resulted in back 
dating option scandals. This practice involves awarding stock options which are back 
dated to coincide with a date in which the share price is lowest. As the price of the share 
rises after issuance of the stock options, directors and executives stand to gain from the 
increase in share price. This unethical practice led U.S. regulatory authorities to 
investigate over one hundred public companies in 2006 for back dating stock options and 
resulted in approximately $5 billion in combined profits being eliminated through 
financial restatements (Corporate Watch, 2007).  
                                                          





Several studies indicate that stock option backdating occurs when director 
monitoring is weak and management has influence over the board of directors (Bebchuk, 
Grinstein, & Peyer, 2010; Collins, Gong, & Li, 2010). Furthermore, directors fail to 
prevent stock option backdating because they gain from the benefits of stock 
appreciation. Recently, scholars note that firms that provide a higher proportion of 
compensation in the form of stock options have a higher likelihood of backdating 
(Efendi, Files, Ouyang, & Swanson, 2013; Collins et al., 2010). 
Whether equity compensation better aligns the interests of directors with 
shareholders is still an open empirical question based on the mixed empirical findings. 
However, investors and regulators’ perceptions seem to be that equity pay better aligns 
the interests of directors with those of shareholders since directors on the board focus on 
the firm’s long-term value and share in the risks of equity ownership.  
 
Audit Committee Compensation 
Given the latest explosion of research on director compensation and the lack of 
conclusive findings, scholars have recently turned to examining whether the 
compensation structure influences audit committee members’ objectivity and their 
oversight responsibilities of the financial reporting process. Similar to director 
compensation, the limited research on audit committee compensation primarily focuses 
on examining the relationship between the compensation structure and financial 
outcomes. The type of compensation (cash versus equity) has been found to influence the 
effectiveness of audit committee oversight and various accounting outcomes such as 





Wang, 2010), the likelihood of financial restatements (Archambeault et al., 2008), 
perceived earnings quality (Flynn, 2008), and audit committee members’ objectivity and 
aggressiveness towards financial reporting (Magilke et al., 2009). Research on the effect 
equity-based compensation has on financial reporting quality has been much more 
extensive than cash-based compensation and has mainly examined the use of stock 
awards and stock options, with minimal attention to stock holdings.  
Flynn (2008) was the first to examine the effect cash and equity compensation has 
on investors’ perceptions of earnings quality. In an experimental setting, forty eight 
nonprofessional investors, acting as audit committee members, were asked to resolve a 
financial reporting dispute between management and the external auditor. The 
participants were provided with different compensation packages and were asked to 
identify the amount of the audit adjustment that would likely appear on the firm’s 
financial statements. Participants compensated with a fixed flat fee proposed a higher 
audit adjustment amount than those compensated with equity. The reasoning underlying 
this finding is that equity-based compensation motivates investors to expect a smaller 
adjustment to net income (greater reporting bias) in order to meet earnings expectations. 
Investors thereby perceive a lower level of earnings quality when the compensation is 
tied to performance.    
Two archival studies examine whether stock option compensation of members on 
the audit committee is associated with restatements and financial misstatements and have 
found results similar to Flynn (2008). Using a sample of 153 restatement and 153 non-
restatement companies for the period 1992 to 2002, Archambeault et al. (2008) examine 





incidence of financial restatements, and find that both short-term and long-term stock 
options are positively associated with the likelihood of financial restatements. This 
implies that higher cash compensation paid to independent members on the audit 
committee reduces the incidence of financial restatements. Archambeault et al. (2008) 
imply, but do not examine, that cash is a more appropriate form of compensation for 
independent members on the audit committee. Similarly, Cullinan et al. (2008) examine a 
matched sample of 105 restatement and non-restatement companies for the period 1992-
2001 and find that outside director stock option compensation is positively associated 
with financial misstatements.  
A second experimental study examines the influence of compensation type on 
audit committee member judgments. Magilke et al. (2009) study the effect cash and 
stock-based compensation has on the objectivity of students acting as audit committee 
members. They find that participants that receive only cash compensation are more 
objective and least biased in the financial reporting process, finding support for Flynn’s 
(2008) findings. In contrast to Archambeault et al. (2008), who find both short-term and 
long-term stock option compensation are positively associated with financial 
restatements, Magilke et al. (2009) indicate that audit committee members who are paid 
with unrestricted stock or vested stock options (a short-term form of compensation) 
prefer more aggressive financial reporting while those compensated with bonuses tied to 
future unvested stock options (long-term compensation) are more conservative.  
Subsequent to Magilke et al. (2009) two other studies have found that equity 
compensation is associated with weak monitoring. Persellin (2009) examines whether 92 





the auditor in an accounting dispute when compensated with stock options. They find that 
audit committee members compensated with stock options are more likely to side with 
management. Cullinan, Du, and Jiang (2010) investigated the association between stock 
holdings and stock option compensation and internal control weakness reports for the 
period 2004-2005. Using a matched sample size of 243 companies with internal control 
weaknesses and unqualified opinions they find that firms that offer stock option plans to 
their members on the audit committee are more likely to report internal control 
weaknesses, while stock-based compensation is marginally significant. The findings on 
stock option compensation suggest that this form of compensation misaligns the interests 
of audit committees with those of shareholders as it undermines audit committee 
members’ incentive to provide adequate oversight of the financial reporting process.  
Keune and Johnstone (2010) and Campbell et al. (2012) have also contributed to 
the investigation of audit committee compensation. Keune and Johnstone (2010) examine 
the effect of both short-term and long-term stock options on the likelihood of waiving 
proposed adjustments. Using a sample of 477 aggregated misstatements and 952 
disaggregated misstatements for the period 2003 to 2006, they find that audit committee 
short-term stock option compensation is associated with a greater likelihood of waiving 
proposed audit adjustments (similar to Archambeault et al., 2008; Magilke et al., 2009) 
while long-term stock options are associated with a lower likelihood of waiving 
adjustments (similar to Magilke et al., 2009). Subsequently, Campbell et al. (2012) 
examine the association between audit committee members’ compensation (mix of cash 
and non-cash compensation) and the likelihood of meeting/beating analysts’ earnings 





observations from 2006 to 2008. Their findings reveal no association between cash 
compensation and these two forms of earnings management. They conclude that audit 
committee members who receive their annual compensation in the form of cash are more 
effective in performing their oversight duties. In contrast, stock option compensation is 
positively associated with discretionary accruals and meeting or beating earnings 
forecasts. Overall, stock options create an incentive to focus on short-term financial 
results, while non-option compensation (stock awards) has no significant effect on 
earnings management.  
More recently, Bierstaker, Cohen, DeZoort and Hermanson (2012) examine in an 
experimental setting whether the audit committee members’ type of stock option 
compensation influences their support for the external auditor in a management-auditor 
dispute. Using a sample of 56 experienced public company audit committee members, 
they find that long-term stock option compensation results in audit committee members 
having greater support for the auditor, and that perceived fairness to shareholders 
mediates that relationship. Consistent with prior research (Keune & Johnstone, 2010; 
Magilke et al., 2009), the authors find that audit committee members compensated with 
long-term equity are more objective and provide greater audit committee oversight. 
Strikingly different are the results on short-term stock options in which the authors find 
no support for the auditor in the accounting disagreement and no difference with cash-
based compensated audit committee members’ decisions.  
Finally, Rickling and Sharma (2013) examine the association between director 
compensation on the audit committee and the magnitude with which firms exceed 





committee members are primarily compensated with equity and that greater equity-based 
compensation is positively associated with the likelihood of exceeding analysts’ 
forecasts. They suggest that cash compensation may be a better tool for aligning 
members’ interests with shareholders’ interests as it thwarts attempts to manipulate 
earnings in order to increase stockholder wealth.  
In summary, the current body of research on audit committee compensation 
indicates that the compensation structure of the audit committee influences the quality of 
financial reporting. Cash-based compensation seems to be positively associated with 
more effective oversight of the financial reporting process since the compensation is 
fixed and provides little financial incentive for audit committee members to be less 
objective (Campbell et al., 2012; Magilke et al., 2009; Rickling & Sharma, 2013). Stock 
awards and stock options, in contrast, appear to encourage audit committee members to 
focus on stock price increases and firm performance at the detriment of effective 
oversight of the financial reporting process (Archambeault et al., 2008; Campbell et al., 
2012; Persellin, 2009; Rickling & Sharma, 2013).  
Besides providing oversight of management and the financial reporting process, 
audit committee members also have the responsibility of hiring the external auditor to 
provide attestation services as a mechanism for overseeing the quality of the financial 
reports. Despite the prevalent research on audit committee compensation, scholars have 
not examined how audit committee compensation affects compensation paid to the 
external auditor. This is an important topic because the compensation structure has been 
shown to bias the external auditor and impair their independence (AICPA, 1972) and 





to the quality of the audit may originate from compensating external auditors for 
providing NAS.  
 
Non-Audit Services (NAS) 
Prior to the passage of SOX in 2002, audit firms generated a substantial amount 
of revenue from the sale of NAS which, according to the SEC, had the effect of creating 
an economic bond between the client and auditor since the auditor becomes financially 
dependent on the client (Frankel et al., 2002; Naiker et al., 2013; SEC, 2000b). 
Furthermore, since NAS may involve the auditor performing managerial tasks which may 
be subsequently audited by the auditor, there is the potential to impair auditor 
independence with these types of consulting services (SOX, 2002). In an effort to 
maintain auditor independence Section 201 of the SOX Act requires audit committee 
members to pre-approve certain types of NAS (US. SEC, 1999b) and requires disclosure 
of audit fees and the types of NAS fees paid to the auditor.  
 There has been much debate as to whether the regulation and ban of certain NAS 
has served to improve auditor independence and audit quality. Regulators argue that the 
regulation of NAS has curtailed financial scandals and reduced firms’ incentives to obtain 
huge consulting fees at the expense of ineffective audit quality (Kinney et al., 2004). In 
contrast, academics and the accounting profession insist that limiting NAS provides 
disadvantages to the audit since firms cannot benefit from audit efficiencies, economies 
of scale and knowledge spillovers acquired through the provision of NAS (Knechel & 





In order to examine whether NAS does impair auditor independence scholars 
have investigated the association between NAS and various proxies for audit quality, as a 
measure of independence, since independence is a state of mind that cannot be observed 
(Sharma, 2013). Restatements (Kinney et al., 2004; Paterson & Valencia, 2011; 
Raghunandan et al., 2003), going concern opinions (DeFond et al., 2002; Sharma & 
Sidhu, 2001) and earnings management (Frankel et al., 2002; Habib, 2012; Krishnan, Su, 
& Zhang, 2011; Sharma, 2013) have been used as contexts to study auditor 
independence, with the mixed empirical findings providing weak evidence that NAS 
impair auditor independence.6  
Notwithstanding the mixed findings on the association between NAS and auditor 
independence, investors perceive that NAS impair auditor independence and financial 
reporting quality (Francis & Ke, 2006; Higgs & Skantz, 2006; Khurana & Raman, 2006; 
Krishnan et al., 2005). Four studies have examined investors’ perceptions of NAS. 
Khurana and Raman (2006) examine whether investors perceive that audit and non-audit 
fees affect the credibility of the financial reports issued by Big 5 auditing firms. Using a 
sample of 2,163 firms for the period 2000 – 2001, they find that higher NAS fees are 
perceived as threatening auditor independence and lowering the financial reporting 
credibility of the audit firm. Consistent with this perception, Francis and Ke (2006) and 
Krishnan et al. (2005)7 also find that high levels of NAS are perceived negatively and 
reduce investors’ confidence in the quality of reported earnings. Finally, Higgs and 
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7 Francis & Ke (2006) examine a sample of 3,133 firms for the period 1999-2002 and find there is 
a negative market reaction to the disclosure of firms paying high NAS fees to the auditor. Krishnan et al. 
(2005) examine the association between NAS and firm earnings response coefficients (ERCs) in the first 
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Skantz (2006) examine the association of earnings response coefficients (ERC) and NAS 
fees for 1,313 firms that filed proxy statements between January 1, 2001 and February 4, 
2002. Their results show investors perceive high NAS fees reduce financial reporting 
quality due to the strong economic bond that is created between the client and the auditor.  
A limited body of research has examined the association between governance 
variables and the purchase of NAS from the auditor. Research in this domain can 
primarily be categorized into three areas: 1) corporate governance characteristics, 2) 
client non-governance characteristics, and 3) audit committee characteristics.  
Corporate Governance Characteristics (excluding audit committees). Mitra and 
Hossain (2007) specifically examine whether the level of shareholder stock ownership 
influences the purchase of NAS. Using a sample of 335 manufacturing and 
merchandising firms with fiscal year-end December 31, 2000 the authors find that when 
the level of stock ownership is low, there is a low level of monitoring as investors are 
primarily concerned with short-term returns and are therefore, more willing to tolerate 
higher purchases of NAS. In contrast, when the level of stock ownership is high, 
shareholders are more interested in enhancing firm value and, therefore, improve their 
monitoring efforts. This increased monitoring motivates shareholders to recommend the 
purchase of less NAS.  
Client Non-Governance Characteristics. Using a sample of 3,110 U.S. firms from 
2000 to 2006, Krishnan and Yu (2010) find that NAS are driven by client size, the 
complexity of the firm, auditor type, investment opportunities and client performance. 
Larger firms, with complex operations are more likely to purchase more NAS while 





provide more NAS to their clients. The authors also find evidence of knowledge spillover 
from audit services to NAS and vice versa.  
A second study by Whisenant et al. (2003) examines whether client and auditor 
characteristics determine audit and non-audit fees. Using a sample of 2,666 proxy 
statements filed between January 2001 and August 2001, the authors find that audit fees 
and NAS are jointly determined by client characteristics, the type of auditor and the 
length of the auditor-client relationship. 
Audit Committee Characteristics. Four studies have focused on audit committee 
characteristics and their association with the purchase of NAS. Abbott et al. (2003) 
examined whether audit committee characteristics are associated with the purchase of 
NAS. Using a sample of 538 companies that filed proxies in 2001, the authors’ findings 
suggest that audit committees that are independent and meet at least four times a year 
purchase less NAS from the auditor. Audit committees that are independent appear to be 
more objective and more concerned with providing good oversight. This oversight 
concern results in audit committees influencing the purchase decision of NAS as a means 
of managing audit quality and auditor independence. These findings are consistent with 
Abbott and Parker (2000, 2001) who find that independent audit committee members 
view NAS as having the potential to impair audit quality. This concern of audit quality 
impairment then influences their purchase decision of NAS. 
In an experimental study Gaynor et al. (2006), provide evidence that audit 
committees consider audit quality and the likelihood of impairing auditor independence 
when weighing their decision to purchase NAS. The authors find that audit committee 





but are reluctant to purchase NAS if they are publicly disclosed, as they feel accountable 
for justifying the purchase of NAS. A third study performed by Zaman, Hudaib and 
Haniffa (2011) examine the influence of audit committee effectiveness on the purchase of 
audit fees and NAS. Using a sample of 540 company year observations from the U.K. for 
the period 2001-2004, the authors examine four measures of audit committee 
effectiveness (independence, financial expertise, frequency of meetings and size of the 
audit committee). They find that effective audit committees are engaged in more 
monitoring and that larger clients are more likely to purchase higher levels of NAS due to 
the complexity of their operations and as a means of ensuring a high quality audit. In 
contrast, small clients are negatively associated with the purchase of NAS, suggesting 
that smaller firms are less concerned with protecting auditor independence and therefore 
do not limit the amount of NAS purchased from the auditor. 
Recently, Naiker et al. (2013) examined the effect of former audit partners (FAPs) 
on the audit committee, using a sample of 2,748 observations for fiscal years ending 2004 
and 2005, and found that the level of NAS purchases declines with the appointment of the 
former audit partner to the audit committee. The authors specifically examine whether the 
potential to impair auditor independence is greater when the FAP is affiliated with the 
firm’s current auditor versus when the FAP is unaffiliated. Interestingly, they find no 
difference in NAS purchases between the two types of former audit partners. However, 
they do find that firms with affiliated or unaffiliated FAPs are more conservative in their 
NAS purchases than firms without an FAP on the audit committee. These findings appear 
to support the view that the presence of an audit partner on the audit committee does not 





effective oversight of the financial reporting process and purchasing only the necessary 
amount of NAS.  
Upon examining the level of NAS purchases based on whether a FAP joined the 
audit committee in the pre-SOX or post-SOX period, Naiker et al. (2013) find that post-
SOX affiliated FAPs purchase less NAS. Furthermore the authors find no difference in 
purchase levels of NAS for firms with former audit partners appointed to the audit 
committee within the three year cooling off period and those not satisfying the cooling 
off period. Lastly, Naiker et al. (2013) find that audit committee members with partner 
level experience purchase lower levels of NAS than audit committee members with other 
types of expertise (financial and accounting expertise). They suggest that FAPs exercise 
objective and independent oversight that serves to reduce the likelihood of purchasing 
higher levels of NAS and thus impairing auditor independence. More importantly, they 
imply that auditor independence can be managed based on the characteristics of the audit 
committee. 
In summary, research on NAS has been limited to examining whether NAS 
impairs auditor independence using audit quality as a context to study auditor 
independence, with minimal research on the factors that influence the purchase of NAS. 
Scant research on governance variables and audit committee characteristics associated 
with the purchase of NAS indicates these factors influence the level of NAS approved by 
the audit committee member. Low levels of stock ownership are associated with low 
levels of monitoring and higher purchases of NAS (Mitra & Hossain, 2007) while 
effective oversight is associated with lower purchases of NAS as audit committee 





(Naiker et al., 2013). These findings suggest that good governance may play a role in 
mitigating the auditor independence issues associated with the purchase of NAS (Sharma, 
2013). 
Surprisingly, of the four studies examining investor perceptions of impairment of 
auditor independence, and the seven studies discussed in this study on governance 
factors, only two have utilized post-SOX data (Naiker et al., 2013; Zaman et al. 2011). 
The limited post-SOX studies provide an opportunity for future research in this area. 
Furthermore, given that the limited research on NAS has not provided a definitive answer 
as to whether NAS impairs auditor independence and that regulators have recently turned 
the spotlight on NAS potentially impairing auditor independence, it is important to 
examine other factors that may influence the NAS purchase decision. One trait that has 
not been examined as an antecedent to the purchase of NAS is how the amount and 
structure of audit committee compensation may influence the purchase decision.  
 
Hypotheses Development – Audit Committee Compensation and the Purchase of NAS 
Compensation of members on the audit committee has received modest attention 
over the last decade despite its ability to influence the level of oversight provided and the 
level of financial reporting quality. Therefore, to provide new evidence, the first step in 
addressing auditor independence concerns stemming from NAS purchases may be to 
evaluate the potential risks associated with the various compensation structures offered to 
audit committee members. Audit committee members have the responsibility to approve 
the nature, scope and amount of NAS procured from the external auditor as well as 





amount and structure of compensation as prior research suggests audit committee 
members’ decisions and judgments can be affected by the compensation they receive 
(Archambeault et al., 2008; Magilke et al., 2009). Moreover, since firms have the 
discretion to determine the structure and amount of compensation as there are no 
authoritative statements on audit committee compensation, I posit that the NAS purchase 
decision may be influenced by the compensation structure of the audit committee.  
Total Compensation. According to agency theory, conflict of interest exists 
between agents (members on the audit committee) and principals (shareholders) due to 
agents being self-serving and interested in maximizing their own personal wealth at the 
expense of the shareholders’ interest (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
One way to align the interests of shareholders with those of members on the audit 
committee is to provide them with compensation that incentivizes them to act on behalf 
of the shareholders, provide effective oversight of the financial reporting process and 
make objective decisions. In line with this theory, it is critical that members be 
independent and compensated using a structure that ensures proper and effective 
oversight by the audit committee. Prior research on audit committee compensation has 
shown that the compensation structure could influence the quality of financial reporting 
and audit committee objectivity (Archambeault et al., 2008; Campbell et al., 2012; 
Magilke et al., 2009). Extending these findings to the NAS literature, compensation of 
the audit committee members may also influence the level of NAS purchased from the 
auditor. Since audit committee members are concerned with impairment of auditor 





audit committee with higher total compensation could bias their purchase decision of 
NAS. 
There are various competing perspectives as to why members on the audit 
committee receiving higher compensation packages would influence the purchase of 
NAS. One viewpoint indicates that the greater demand for monitoring of the financial 
reporting process, the higher the compensation that is paid to audit committee members 
since it requires an increased commitment of time and expertise by the audit committee 
member (Engel et al., 2010). This perspective suggests that the amount of compensation 
paid to members reflects the quality of the members on the audit committee. High quality 
members are expected to possess appropriate knowledge and expertise that should enable 
them to make more informed and objective NAS purchase decisions in the best interests 
of the shareholders. Since members on the audit committee may perceive that higher 
levels of NAS purchases could undermine auditor independence (Abbott et al., 2003; 
Naiker et al., 2013), high quality directors would be expected to make more conservative 
NAS purchase decisions in order to minimize the threat to auditor independence.  
A corresponding view is that audit committee members are highly paid in order to 
compensate for assuming greater risk-taking and accountability (Archambeault et al., 
2008; Linn & Park, 2005). For example, large and complex firms need more monitoring 
and more experienced members on their audit committee; therefore, in order to attract the 
necessary talent the firm would be more likely to pay higher levels of compensation. As a 
result of the greater risk assumed however, audit committee members may be concerned 
with reputation and litigation exposure. Audit committee members are generally 





which they are compensated for, therefore, it is in their primary interests to maintain their 
reputational capital (Abbott & Parker, 2000, 2001; Srinivasan, 2005) and limit any 
reputational damage and litigation exposure caused by the consequences of their 
decisions, such as financial misstatements (Abbott et al., 2003; Naiker & Sharma, 2009). 
Thus, in order to exercise strong due diligence and minimize their reputational and 
litigation exposure, as well as minimize the appearance of a lack of auditor independence, 
audit committee members would choose to purchase less NAS (Naiker et al., 2013). 
In contrast to agency theory, managerial hegemony theory suggests that boards 
and management have personal and social ties, which result in the board aiding 
management in recruiting friends and cronies onto the board, resulting in weak 
governance (Cohen, Krishnamoorthy, & Wright, 2008; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). As a 
result, board members become passive, are unlikely to question management and receive 
very generous or excessive compensation packages. Brick et al. (2006) find that director 
compensation is positively associated with CEO compensation and with the CEO being 
on the board of directors. Specifically, the authors find that if the CEO is the chair of the 
board, directors receive larger total compensation packages, which is indicative of weak 
governance (Brick et al., 2006; Ryan & Wiggins, 2004). Extending the use of managerial 
hegemony theory to the NAS literature, excessive compensation could undermine audit 
committee independence and bias the pre-approval of NAS purchases. If the audit 
committee member receives a large amount of compensation he or she may feel indebted 
to the CEO and succumb to the CEO’s wishes as to the levels of NAS purchases. Based 
on competing perspectives that greater total compensation may motivate the audit 





H1: Total audit committee members’ compensation is related to the purchase of 
NAS. 
Cash Compensation. According to agency theory, audit committee members need 
to be properly compensated in order to incentivize them to provide objective monitoring 
and effective governance on behalf of the shareholders. Empirical research on cash 
compensation of members on the audit committee suggests that this form of 
compensation can be beneficial for effective governance (Campbell et al., 2012; Magilke 
et al., 2009; Rickling & Sharma, 2013). Compensating audit committee members with 
cash can be advantageous for effective governance as it makes audit committee members 
more objective and less motivated to influence the financial reporting process as their 
compensation is fixed and not tied to firm performance. Since their remuneration is not 
subject to changes in share price due to firm performance, audit committee members can 
concentrate their efforts on providing good governance and reducing the impairment of 
auditor independence (Campbell et al., 2012; Rickling & Sharma, 2013). Furthermore, 
Rickling & Sharma (2013) suggest this form of compensation may be a better tool for 
aligning the interests of audit committee members with those of shareholders. 
Extending this to the NAS literature, there are two viewpoints as to whether cash- 
compensated audit committee members would choose to purchase greater or lower levels 
of NAS. One viewpoint indicates that the presence of stronger audit committees is 
associated with the purchase of lower levels of NAS since stronger audit committees are 
more concerned with mitigating potential threats to auditor independence and protecting 
the quality of financial reporting (Naiker et al., 2013). In this context, I posit that 





monitoring by the audit committee, as they will be more objective and not have the 
incentive to allow the manipulation of earnings. This will lead audit committee members 
to adopt a more conservative approach and purchase less NAS in order to minimize 
impairment of auditor independence. Furthermore, since the value of a firm’s stock may 
decline as a result of poor financial reporting quality, stronger audit committees may 
choose to purchase less NAS in order to maintain audit and financial reporting quality.  
An alternative perspective is that cash-compensated audit committee members 
may choose to purchase more NAS as a means of providing effective governance. 
Gaynor et al. (2006) performed an experiment using experienced directors as audit 
committee members and evaluated the use of external auditors for both audit and NAS. 
Their findings indicate that audit committee members favor hiring the external auditor for 
both audit and non-audit services if they perceive this action would increase audit quality. 
This viewpoint suggests that audit committee members purchase more NAS when it 
enhances audit quality. 
Taking into consideration that cash compensation could influence the audit 
committee member to purchase more or less NAS, and that there is mixed evidence on 
how cash compensation influences the quality of financial reporting, I hypothesize: 
 H2: Audit committee members’ cash compensation is related to the purchase of 
NAS. 
Equity Compensation. The limited research on audit committee compensation has 
not provided conclusive results as to what is the appropriate compensation structure that 
best aligns the interests of audit committee members with those of shareholders. 





aligns the interests of directors and shareholders, and motivates audit committee members 
to more effectively monitor management and the financial reporting process. In line with 
this framework, and due to the lack of a compensation guideline for audit committee 
members, the NACD has recommended that at least 50% of the compensation paid to 
independent directors be in the form of equity as this form of compensation aligns the 
interests of directors with those of shareholders (NACD, 2001).   
In light of the NACD recommendations on more equity compensation for 
directors, recently Rickling and Sharma (2013) examined the NACD’s recommended 
threshold of 50% equity-based compensation for audit committee members. Surprisingly, 
their findings reveal that high levels of equity compensation are detrimental to effective 
oversight by the audit committee. Consistent with these findings, the majority of 
empirical research on audit committee compensation also reflects that equity holdings 
motivate audit committee members to focus on stock appreciation rather than effective 
oversight of management. This form of compensation is associated with weak financial 
reporting quality and impairs audit committee members’ objectivity (Archambeault et al., 
2008; Campbell et al., 2012; Rickling & Sharma, 2013).   
Furthermore, post-SOX firms are offering greater equity compensation as a means 
of attracting more directors to the board and more audit committee members, which is 
associated with weak monitoring by directors (Linck et al., 2009) due to them serving on 
multiple boards. According to the “busyness hypothesis” (Ferris, Jagannathan & 
Pritchard, 2003; Sharma, 2011; Sharma & Iselin, 2012) independent directors who serve 
on multiple boards are too busy to provide effective monitoring because they are 





a result, this combination of equity compensation and multiple board directorships leads 
to a weak governance structure. In this context, I posit that equity compensation will 
influence audit committee members’ purchase decision of NAS as their interests will be 
aligned with those of management rather than shareholders. Specifically, audit committee 
members will have the incentive to focus on firm performance goals and short-term 
economic gains in order to maximize their return on their equity holdings. This focus will 
motivate audit committee members to purchase NAS as a means of enhancing firm 
performance at the detriment of auditor independence. The level of NAS purchased 
however, will be dependent on the type of equity compensation offered (stock option 
compensation, stock award compensation, and stock holdings) because different types of 
equity compensation have been shown to have different effects on risk taking behavior 
and financial reporting quality. I now discuss how each of these types of equity 
compensation is related to NAS purchases. 
Stock Option Compensation. Of the three types of equity compensation (stock 
options, stock awards and stock holdings), stock option compensation has the greatest 
ability to influence audit committee members’ objectivity and motivate aggressive 
financial reporting (Archambeault et al. 2008; Keune & Johnstone, 2010; Magilke et al., 
2009). This form of equity compensation provides the greatest gain for audit committee 
members as they stand to gain significantly from an increase in higher stock prices while 
minimizing their losses by not exercising their options when stock prices decrease. 
Additionally, stock options motivate audit committee members to engage in excessive 
risk-taking behavior in order to receive high returns (Cullinan et al., 2008; Persellin, 





ability to monitor effectively (Rickling & Sharma, 2013; Sharma, 2011), and incentivizes 
audit committee members to focus on firm performance in order to influence the value of 
their holdings (Archambeault et al., 2008).  
A related study on stock options by Persellin (2009) also provides further 
evidence that audit committee members may be influenced by stock option 
compensation. The authors found that members who are paid with stock options are more 
likely to side with management in an auditor-management disagreement, suggesting that 
their interests are more aligned with those of management. Extending these findings to 
the NAS literature, audit committee members paid with stock options will prefer to side 
with management in relation to the purchase of NAS, as they will favor purchasing 
higher levels of NAS in order to maximize the value of their stock options in the short-
term. 
Given that stock options provide a motivating factor for stock appreciation and 
have the ability to influence audit committee members’ decision-making, this form of 
compensation will influence audit committee members’ purchase decision of NAS. I 
posit that the greater the amount of audit committee compensation paid with stock 
options, the greater the level of NAS that will be purchased from the auditor. Therefore, I 
hypothesize:  
H3: Audit committee members’ stock option compensation is positively related to 
the purchase of NAS. 
Stock Award Compensation. Similar to stock option compensation, stock awards 
have the potential to influence audit committee members’ objectivity because the value of 





misalign the interests of the audit committee member with those of shareholders. The 
greater the compensation in the form of stock awards, the greater the likelihood that the 
audit committee member will focus on increasing firm performance in order to increase 
the value of the stock, at the detriment of effective oversight.  
Research on stock awards has been minimal. Recently, Rickling and Sharma 
(2013) examined whether stock awards were associated with the likelihood of a firm’s 
actual earnings beating analysts’ forecasts of earnings and found a positive association. 
These results provide support that this form of compensation is not conducive for 
effective governance and that the focus on stock appreciation and short-term economic 
gains, as a result of holding stock awards, could bias audit committee members to 
purchase more NAS in order to increase firm earnings, regardless of whether it 
undermines auditor independence. This increase in firm earnings in turn would more 
likely increase the value of audit committee members’ stock awards, reaping economic 
benefits for the audit committee members.   
A second study, however, that examined the association between stock awards 
and the likelihood of meeting or beating the analyst earnings forecast (Campbell et al., 
2012), has provided results in contrast to Rickling & Sharma (2013). This study found 
stock awards had no significant effect on earnings management, suggesting that perhaps 
stock awards may not be detrimental to the quality of financial reporting. Given limited 
research on this type of compensation and the mixed evidence, it is not clear whether 






H4:  Audit committee members’ stock award compensation is related to the 
purchase of NAS. 
Stock Holdings Compensation. Similar to stock options, stock holdings have the 
ability to create economic wealth for audit committee members when the price of the 
stock increases. However, in contrast to stock options, they are subject to declines in 
stock price, which negatively affects the value of audit committee members’ share 
holdings. Due to the increased risk assumed by the audit committee member, this type of 
compensation is viewed more favorably but has been less widely offered as a form of 
compensation.  
 Two studies examine the effect of stock holdings on financial reporting quality. 
Campbell et al. (2012) examine the effect of stock holdings on financial reporting quality 
(meet or beat financial analysts’ forecasts and discretionary accruals) and find no 
significant results. In contrast, Flynn (2008) examines investors’ perception of earnings 
quality when audit committee members are paid with shares of company stock. 
Compensating audit committee members with shares raises concerns about the audit 
committee’s independence because the stock holdings have the potential to affect audit 
committee members’ net worth since they are tied to firm performance. The authors 
noted that over 45% of the participants in the stock compensation group chose a smaller 
audit adjustment which resulted in greater reporting bias and lower earnings quality. 8 
                                                          
8 A third study on stock holdings by Cullinan et al. (2012) examines the effect of stock shares 
(common and restricted shares) on internal control weaknesses. The variable stock holding is coded 1 if the 
company awarded shares to any of its directors on the audit committee, and 0 if the company did not.  No 





Based on the mixed empirical evidence and the limited research on stock holding 
compensation paid to the audit committee, it is not clear whether stock holdings may 
influence audit committees to purchase more or less NAS. Therefore, I hypothesize:  
H5: Audit committee members’ stock holding compensation is related to the 











In order to analyze the relationship between audit committee compensation and 
NAS, I obtain data for the period 2010 to 2012 for U.S. publicly listed companies. The 
sample period begins in 2010 to avoid the effect of the 2007-2009 financial crises on the 
results. Additionally, the SEC adopted compensation disclosure enhancements requiring 
public companies to enhance reporting of stock options and stock awards for executive 
and director compensation.9 Disclosure of this information is effective for companies 
filing financial statements for fiscal year ending on or after December 31, 2009 (SEC, 
2009). This provides further support for the sample period to begin in 2010.  
Various databases have been used to collect the information for the variables 
studied. Data on audit and non-audit fees was obtained from Audit Analytics while 
information on director compensation was gathered from the Execucomp database. 
Information on the members that serve on the audit committee was obtained from 
Corporate Library and matched with compensation data from Execucomp. Finally, data 
for financial variables were gathered from Compustat.10 
                                                          
9 Amendments to the disclosure of stock option and stock award compensation require firms to 
report the aggregate grant date fair value of stock options and stock awards granted in accordance with 
FASB ASC Topic 718 rather than the dollar amount recognized for financial statement purposes (FASB 
123R). This provides for a more transparent view of the value of the equity compensation. 
10 Information on compensation and financial variables that was not available in the databases was 







Sample Selection and Industry 
  
Panel A: Sample Selection 
 Observations 
Firms with AC director data in Corporate Library 2010-2012   8,911 
Less insurance and financial institutions    (828) 
Less firms with missing compensation data in Execucomp (4,028) 
Less firms with missing audit fee data in Audit Analytics    (323) 
Less firms with missing audit fee data in Compustat     (57) 
Final Sample   3,675 
  
Panel B: Sample by year 
 #  Firms 
Firms in sample from 2010    1,217 
Firms in sample from 2011    1,197 
Firms in sample from 2012    1,261 
Final Sample    3,675 
 
Panel C: Industry Composition 






Number of Firms 
 
% of Sample 
1 Consumer Nondurables    241   6.50 
2 Consumer Durables    106   2.90 
3 Manufacturing    661  18.00 
4 Energy    192   5.22 
5 Hi-Tech    763  20.80 
6 Telecommunications      98    2.66 
7 Shops    554  15.07 
8 Health    315    8.60 
9 Utilities    196    5.32 
10 Other    549   14.93 
 Total Sample 3,675 100.00 
    
Industry classification is based on the Fama and French 10 group SIC code classification 








Panel A of Table 1 details the sample selection process. I initiated the sample 
selection process by obtaining governance data on U.S. publicly traded companies 
provided by Corporate Library for the period 2010-2012. This resulted in an initial 
sample of 8,911 companies. Consistent with prior research (Engel et al., 2010; Naiker et 
al., 2013; Yermack, 2004), I excluded insurance and financial institutions (SIC codes 
6000 – 6999) from the sample (n=828) as they are highly regulated and tend to have 
distinct corporate governance structures than firms that are in non-regulated industries. 
This yielded a sample of 8,083 firm-year observations. I then proceeded to identify the 
members that serve on the audit committee of these companies as I am interested in 
analyzing their compensation. The next step involved obtaining information on director 
compensation from Execucomp for the three-year period. The Execucomp database 
provides information on the amount and types of compensation paid to directors. 
Subsequently, information from Corporate Library was merged with director 
compensation data from the Execucomp database to obtain audit committee 
compensation information by firm. Upon merging the compensation data from 
Execucomp with Corporate Library, the initial sample was reduced to 4,055 company 
year observations for the three year period as a result of missing compensation data in 
Execucomp (n=4,028). This sample was further reduced due to missing data from Audit 
Analytics (n=323) and missing financial data from Compustat (n=57) resulting in a final 
sample of 3,675 firm-year observations across the three year period of 2010-2012. The 
final sample includes 1,217 companies from 2010, 1,197 companies from 2011, and 





Panel C of Table 1 shows the industry composition of the sample. Similar to prior 
audit committee and NAS research (e.g., Krishnan & Yu, 2010; Rickling & Sharma, 
2013) that employ the Fama and French (1997) industry classification, I classified the 
sample into 10 Fama and French (1997) industry groups. The following three industry 
groups, Hi-Tech (20.80%), Manufacturing (18.00%) and Shops (15.07%), represent 
approximately 54 percent of the sample. 
 
Research Method and Measurement of Variables 
Consistent with prior research on audit committee characteristics and NAS 
(Abbott et al., 2003; Naiker et al., 2013), a multivariate regression model is used to 
examine the relationship between audit committee compensation and NAS. This method 
is appropriate for continuous variables such as the ones being examined in this study, 
where a linear relationship is assumed, and for multiple control variables that influence 
these two constructs, based on prior literature. The general form of the design is depicted 
by the following equation: 
 
FEERATIO = ƒ{AUDIT COMMITTEE_COMPENSATION + AUDIT 
COMMITTEE CONTROL VARIABLES + BOARD CONTROL VARIABLES + 























Dependent Variable: NAS. The dependent variable is FEERATIO (ratio of total 
non-audit fees to total fees) consistent with prior studies (DeFond et al., 2002; Naiker et 
al., 2013). This ratio was selected because it represents the proportion of non-audit fees 
that audit committee members are required by SOX to approve in relation to total fees 
paid to the auditor. Supplementary tests of NAS are also performed as Ashbaugh et al. 
(2003) point out that the FEERATIO measure may not be of much significance if it 
represents an inconsequential part of the total fees generated from a client. I use the 
natural logarithm of NAS fees (LOG_NAF), the ratio of total NAS to audit fees 
(NAF_TO_AF), and the unexpected portion of the natural logarithm of total non-audit 
fees (UNEXP_NAF) as additional measures to represent the purchase of NAS which are 
consistent with prior research (Abbott et al., 2003; Antle et al., 2006; DeFond et al., 
2002; Naiker et al., 2013). Information on audit fees and non-audit fees is sourced from 
Audit Analytics.  
NAS are also composed of audit related (AUDITREL_RATIO), tax (TAX 
RATIO), and other unspecified services (OTHER_RATIO), which are required 
disclosures under the SEC rules (SEC, 2003d, 2003e). These measures have been used by 
other scholars (Kinney et al., 2004; Naiker et al., 2013) and provide an opportunity to 
identify the impact of audit committee compensation on the type of NAS. AUDITREL_ 
RATIO is calculated as the ratio of audit-related NAS fees to total fees while 
TAX_RATIO is calculated as the ratio of tax NAS fees to total fees. Finally, 
OTHER_RATIO is calculated as the ratio of other NAS fees to total fees. Information on 
all these variables was obtained from Audit Analytics. Panel A of Table 2 describes the 









   
Panel A: Main Dependent and Alternative Dependent Variables 
Variable Name  Variable Measurement (Source) 
   
FEERATIO  Ratio of total non-audit fees to total fees (audit and non-audit) 
paid to the auditor (Audit Analytics). 
LOG_NAF  Natural logarithm of total non-audit fees (Audit Analytics). 
NAF_TO_AF  Ratio of total non-audit fees to total audit fees (Audit 
Analytics). 
UNEXP_NAF  Unexpected portion of FEERATIO. To derive UNEXP_NAF, 
FEERATIO is regressed on the independent variables described 
in the main model equation after eliminating audit committee 
compensation variables. The residuals from the estimation of 
the regression are used to derive UNEXP_NAF. 
AUDITREL_RATIO  Ratio of audit-related non-audit fees to total fees (Audit 
Analytics). 
TAX_RATIO  Ratio of tax non-audit fees to total fees (Audit Analytics). 
OTHER_RATIO  Ratio of other non-audit fees to total fees (Audit Analytics). 
   
Panel B: Test Variables 
Variable Name Expected 
Sign 
Variable Measurement (Source) 
   
LN_TOTCOMP +/- Natural logarithm of average total audit committee (AC) 
member compensation (sum of Avg. total cash, Avg. total 
stock award, and Avg. total stock options). Average total cash 
is the sum of cash compensation of all AC members divided by 
number of AC members. Average calculations for stock award, 
stock compensation, and stock ownership are calculated in a 
similar manner. (Execucomp). 
LN_CASHCOMP +/- Natural logarithm of the average cash compensation of the 
members on the audit committee (Execucomp). 
LN_STOPT + Natural logarithm of average stock option compensation for 
members on the audit committee (Execucomp). 
LN_STAWD +/- Natural logarithm of the average dollar value of stock award 
audit committee member compensation (Execucomp). 
LN_EQUITY ? Natural logarithm of audit committee member equity 
compensation. Equity compensation is the sum of Avg. total 
stock award and Avg. total stock option compensation 
(Execucomp). 
ACCASH +/- Ratio of audit committee member average cash compensation 










Variable Definitions (continued) 
 
Panel B: Test Variables 
Variable Name Expected 
Sign 
Variable Measurement (Source) 
   
 
ACSTOPT + Ratio of average audit committee member stock option 
compensation to average total compensation (Execucomp). 
ACSTAWD +/- Ratio of average audit committee member stock award 
compensation to average total compensation (Execucomp). 
ACEQUITY ? Ratio of equity compensation to average total compensation 
for members on the audit committee (Execucomp). 
STOWNACDIR +/- Ratio of the value of average audit committee member stock 
ownership owned to market capitalization (Compustat 
#MKTVALT). Value of stock ownership is derived by 
multiplying the average number of shares owned (Corporate 
Library) by the stock price (Compustat). 
 
 
Panel C: Control Variables: Audit Committee Characteristics 
Variable Name Expected 
Sign 
Variable Measurement (Source) 
   
ACCTPRCT - Percentage of audit committee members (AC) with qualifications 
as a CPA and/or experience as a public accountant, auditor, CFO, 
Controller or Chief Accounting Officer (accounting background). 
(Number of AC members with accounting background/ Total AC 
members) (Morningstar).  
FINPRCT - Percentage of audit committee members with experience as an 
investment banker, financial analyst, venture capitalist or any 
other financial management role (Number of AC members with 
finance experience/Total AC members) (Morningstar). 
SUPERPRCT + Percentage of audit committee members with experience as a 
chief executive officer or company president (Number of AC 
members with experience as CEO or company president/Total 
AC members) (Morningstar). 
ACPCT3BDS + Percentage of AC members that serve on three or more boards 
(Number of AC members that serve on three or more boards/Total 
number of AC members (Corporate Library). 
ACMBRTEN - Average number of years on the board for members on the audit 
committee (Sum of years of board tenure of AC members/Total 
number of AC members) (Morningstar). 
LN_MEET 
 











Variable Definitions (continued) 
 
Panel D: Control Variables: Board Characteristics 
Variable Name Expected 
Sign 
Variable Measurement (Source) 
   
NONACBDIND - Percentage of directors serving on the board but not on the audit 
committee who are independent (Corporate Library). 
 
Panel E: Control Variables: CEO Characteristics 
Variable Name Expected 
Sign 
Variable Measurement (Source) 
   
CEOPOWER + Sum of CEODUAL (1 if CEO also serves as the board chairman 
and 0 otherwise-Corporate Library), CEOTEN (1 if the CEO 
tenure is greater than the median of the sample – Corporate 
Library) and CEOCOMP (1 if CEO total compensation is greater 
than the sample median) (Corporate Library). 
 
 
Panel F: Control Variables: Other Firm-Specific 
Variable Name Expected 
Sign 
Variable Measurement (Source) 
   
BIG4 + 1 if the firm’s external auditor is a Big 4 and 0 otherwise (Audit 
Analytics). 
BLOCK - Cumulative percentage shares held by Blockholders owning at 
least five percent of outstanding shares (Corporate Library). 
LEV - Total Liabilities (Compustat #LT) divided by Total Assets 
(Compustat #AT). 
BM - Book-to-market equity ratio. Book equity is total common equity 
(Compustat #CEQ) and market equity is obtained by multiplying 
the closing share price (Compustat #PRCC_F) by total shares 
outstanding (Compustat #CSHO). 
ANNRET - Change in stock price at the end of the fiscal year (Compustat 
#PRCC_F) over the previous year. 
 
OPINC - Operating income (Compustat #OIADPP) divided by total assets 
(Compustat #AT). 





   
  Table 2 
 
Variable Definitions (continued) 
Panel F: Control Variables: Other Firm-Specific 
Variable Name Expected 
Sign 
Variable Measurement (Source) 
   
LN_ASSETS + Natural logarithm of total assets (Compustat #AT). 
INSTMAJ - 1 if Institution shareholders hold majority ownership and 0 
otherwise (Corporate Library). 
FOROPS + 1 of the firm reports foreign currency adjustments and 0 otherwise 
(Compustat #FCA) 
SPITEMS + Special items (Compustat #SPI) scaled by Total Assets. 
MERGER + 1 if the firm is involved in a merger or acquisition and 0 otherwise 
(Compustat #AQP, AQA). 
RESTRUCT + 1 if the firm incurred restructuring costs and 0 otherwise 
(Compustat #RCP, RCA).  
 
DEISSUE + 1 if the firm had a change of at least 10 percent in debt 
(Compustat #DLL plus #DLC) and 0 otherwise. 
SALESGR + Percentage growth in sales (Compustat #SALES) over previous 
year. 
EMPLAN + 1 if the firm has a pension or post-retirement plan and 0 otherwise 










Independent Variables: Audit committee member compensation. Audit committee 
member compensation is measured using seven variables of interest encompassing 
various measures of total compensation, cash compensation, stock award compensation, 
stock option compensation, and stock ownership. Total audit committee member 
compensation (LN_TOTCOMP) is measured by taking the natural logarithm of the 
average total compensation of the audit committee members. Total compensation 
comprises total cash compensation, total stock award compensation, and total stock 
option compensation. These three compensation data are obtained from the Execucomp 
database. To derive average total compensation, the sum of the compensation is divided 
by the number of audit committee members. Examining this variable provides 
information on how the level of total compensation is associated with the purchase of 
NAS as proposed in Hypothesis 1.  
The second hypothesis examines the relationship between cash compensation and 
the purchase of NAS. Cash Compensation (LN_CASHCOMP) is calculated by taking the 
natural logarithm of the average total cash compensation of the members on the audit 
committee similar to Campbell et al. (2012). Cash compensation information was 
obtained from the Execucomp database. Consistent with prior research (Rickling & 
Sharma, 2013) cash compensation is also measured using the ratio of average total audit 
committee member cash compensation to average total compensation (ACCASH). The 
use of this ratio is useful for examining whether the cash component of compensation is 
changing as a percentage of the total compensation paid to the audit committee 
member.11 It is important to examine cash compensation as most of the studies on audit 
                                                          
11 Using the LN_CASHCOMP measures reveals whether the audit committee member is being 





committee compensation have only examined various types of equity compensation 
(Archambeault et al., 2008; Cullinan et al., 2010), with minimal attention to cash 
compensation. Furthermore, the studies that have examined cash compensation have been 
primarily experimental studies, (Bierstaker et al., 2012; Flynn, 2008; Magilke et al., 
2009), not archival studies such as this one probably because such data was not readily 
available until the SEC required detailed director compensation disclosures effective 
December 15, 2006 (U.S. SEC, 2007)12.  
In order to test hypothesis 3, stock option compensation is measured by taking the 
natural logarithm of average total stock option compensation for members on the audit 
committee (LN_STOPTCOMP). The dollar value of stock option compensation was 
obtained from the Execucomp database. In addition, a second measure of stock option 
has been calculated using the ratio of average total audit committee member stock option 
compensation to average total compensation (ACSTOPT). Since the Execucomp database 
does not provide information on exercisable versus un-exercisable options and short-term 
versus long-term stock options for directors, only the dollar value of total stock options is 
used in the study.  
Stock award compensation represents the amount of compensation awarded to 
audit committee members in the form of stock awards valued in accordance with FASB 
ASC Topic 718. It is important to examine stock awards because this form of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
compensation (ACCASH) illustrates not only the size of the form of compensation but how it is structured. 
For example, cash compensation could increase in value but represent a smaller portion of the audit 
committee member’s total compensation package. I examine both of these forms of compensation in order 
to obtain an understanding of their effect on the NAS purchase decision. 
12 The lack of additional studies on cash compensation may also be due to the limited information 
provided by the Execucomp database on director compensation data. Of the approximately 2,000 firms 
listed in the Execucomp database each year since 2006, only 50 percent of these can be matched with 
corporate governance and financial data from other databases, thereby requiring intense hand collection of 





compensation can result in individuals reaping large economic benefits as the stock price 
increases and members exercise their awards. Thus, the use of stock awards may 
motivate audit committee members to make decisions based on the potential gains 
associated with their holdings rather than incentivizing them to be objective.  
Research on stock awards is also quite limited. Only two studies have examined 
the relationship between stock award compensation and financial performance and both 
have provided conflicting results and used different measures of stock award 
compensation. Cullinan et al. (2010) examined stock awards by indicating whether the 
firm offered stock awards using dummy variables (coded as 1or 0) while Engel et al. 
(2010) include stock awards as a component of total compensation but do not test it 
separately. Stock award compensation is measured in this study using the natural 
logarithm of the average total dollar value of stock award compensation for audit 
committee members (LN_STAWD) as well as by calculating the ratio of total average 
stock award compensation to average total compensation (ACSTAWD) consistent with 
prior research on audit committee compensation (Campbell et al., 2012; Keune & 
Johnstone, 2012; Rickling & Sharma, 2013). The value of stock award compensation is 
sourced from the Execucomp database.  
Only two studies have examined stock holdings with one study finding no 
significant results (Campbell et al., 2010) and the other (Keune & Johnstone, 2012) 
finding a negative association between long-term stock holdings and the likelihood of 
waiving misstatements. Due to the limited research on this form of compensation and the 
scant findings, this study proposed examining stock holdings. However, information on 





databases. Therefore, a ratio of the value of average stock ownership held by audit 
committee members is used (STOWNACDIR) as an alternative. First, the average 
number of shares owned by the audit committee members is calculated by taking the sum 
of the shares owned by the audit committee members and dividing by the number of audit 
committee members. The average total number of shares owned by the audit committee 
members is then multiplied by the year-end stock price to arrive at a value of stock 
ownership. The derived stock value is then divided by the market capitalization of the 
firm to obtain a ratio of the value of stock ownership of the audit committee members. 
Although STOWNACDIR is not a form of audit committee member compensation, the 
use of this variable provides an opportunity to examine if the ratio of the value of shares 
owned impacts the NAS purchase decision. Data on the number of shares held by audit 
committee members was obtained from Corporate Library while market capitalization 
and stock price data was obtained from Compustat.  
Finally, as part of additional testing, the effect of equity compensation on the 
purchase of NAS is examined. Equity compensation is calculated as the sum of average 
total stock options compensation and average total stock awards compensation similar to 
prior research (Archambeault et al., 2008; Rickling & Sharma, 2013), and is measured 
using the natural logarithm of equity compensation (LN_EQUITY) and the ratio of equity 
compensation to average total compensation (ACEQUITY). This ratio provides 
information on the percentage of equity compensation that audit committee members 
receive as part of their total compensation package. Refer to Panel B of Table 2 for a 





Control Variables: Governance Characteristics. Consistent with prior research, I 
include control variables that have been shown to influence the purchase of NAS, audit 
committee member compensation and audit committee independence. First, I control for 
audit committee member characteristics. I control for audit committee accounting, 
finance and supervisory expertise following measures employed in Naiker & Sharma 
(2009), Dhaliwal, Naiker, and Navissi (2010), and Naiker et al. (2013). I use a measure of 
the percentage of audit committee members’ accounting expertise (ACCTPRCT) 
calculated as the number of audit committee members with accounting expertise over 
total number of audit committee members. Accounting expertise includes having 
experience as a public accountant, auditor, CFO, controller, Chief Accounting Officer or 
a CPA. A measure of the percentage of finance expertise (FINPRCT) is also derived 
using the ratio of audit committee members with experience as an investment banker, 
financial analyst, venture capitalist or any other financial management role to the total 
number of audit committee members. Finally, as the SEC’s definition of financial 
expertise includes individuals with any experience supervising employees with financial 
responsibilities or in the capacity of CEO or president (SEC, 2003c), a third measure of 
expertise was calculated (SUPERPRCT). This measure is a ratio of the number of audit 
committee members with experience as a CEO or company president divided by the total 
number of audit committee members. The Morningstar database provides information on 
the type of expertise of each director by company. 
Based on prior research (Dhaliwal et al., 2010; Naiker & Sharma, 2009; Naiker et 
al., 2013), I predict that audit committee members with accounting and finance expertise 





contrast, supervisory expertise on the audit committee has been shown to be positively 
associated with the purchase of NAS (Naiker et al., 2013). Therefore, I predict 
supervisory expertise will have a positive association with the purchase of NAS.  
In addition, I control for the percentage of audit committee members serving on 
three or more outside boards (ACPCT3BDS) as audit committee members serving on too 
many boards may be too busy to exercise proper oversight of management or may be 
influenced by the other committees they serve on (Sharma & Iselin, 2012; Sharma, 
Naiker, & Lee, 2009). Furthermore, the number of boards they serve on may impact the 
audit committee member’s compensation, as the more boards they serve on the more 
compensation they may receive. I, therefore, expect audit committee members that serve 
on more boards to purchase more NAS. Information on the number of boards that audit 
committee members serve on is available from Corporate Library. ACPCT3BDS is 
calculated by taking the total number of audit committee members who serve on three or 
more boards and dividing by the total number of audit committee members to obtain a 
ratio. 
I control for other characteristics of the audit committee members such as the 
average member tenure (ACMBRTEN) as prior research indicates that the longer the 
tenure of the member on the board, the greater the member’s total compensation (Brick et 
al., 2006). Member tenure has also been associated with less attendance problems at 
board meetings (Adams & Ferreira, 2008) suggesting tenure is associated with good 
governance. In addition, the greater the tenure of the audit committee member the less 
likely he/she is concerned with being “liked” or being easily influenced by other board 





Bebchuk, Fried, & Walker (2002) emphasize that directors with longer tenure have more 
organization specific expertise and more commitment towards shareholder interests and 
are, therefore, more willing to disagree with management. Since greater audit committee 
tenure seems to be associated with greater oversight, I predict that audit committee tenure 
will be negatively associated with the purchase of NAS. Audit committee member tenure 
data was obtained from the Morningstar database. The average audit committee director 
tenure was derived by adding the years of service on the board of those members on the 
audit committee and dividing by the total number of members on the audit committee, 
similar to MacGregor (2012).  
The natural logarithm of the number of audit committee meetings held 
(LN_MEET) is also included as a control variable as prior studies indicate that the 
number of audit committee meetings may suggest greater or weaker oversight 
(Raghunandan & Rama, 2007; Sharma et al., 2009; Sharma & Iselin, 2012; Zhang, Zhou, 
& Zhou, 2007). If there is weak oversight by the audit committee, then the audit 
committee that meets more often may signal that there are internal problems within the 
organization that need to be resolved, and therefore, more monitoring may be needed. 
However, if there is strong oversight then more frequent meetings may suggest better 
monitoring on behalf of the audit committee since they meet often (Engel et al., 2010; 
Raghunandan & Rama, 2007; Rickling & Sharma, 2013; Sharma et al., 2009). The 
number of meetings has also been positively associated with cash compensation and total 
compensation of directors (Brick et al., 2006). Based on prior research, the number of 
audit committee meetings held has the potential to influence the purchase of NAS 





make a prediction on the direction of the effect of audit committee meetings on NAS. 
Information on committee meetings was obtained from Morningstar and also hand 
collected from proxy filings. Panel C of Table 2 provides a description of all the audit 
committee characteristics included as control variables. 
Second, I also control for board independence as prior research indicates that 
more independent board members provide greater oversight (Ryan & Wiggins, 2004). 
Specifically, board independence is critical as it determines whether the board will be 
effective in monitoring management. The greater the number of directors that are 
independent, the less likely the board can be influenced by others and the greater their 
ability to provide strong monitoring (DeFond et al., 2002; Carcello, Hermanson, & Ye, 
2011). Panel D of Table 2 provides a description of the measure of board independence 
calculated as the percentage of directors serving on the board, but not on the audit 
committee, that are independent (NONACBDIND), consistent with Naiker and Sharma 
(2009). Since the members on the audit committee are required to be independent, this 
measure captures the proportion of board members that are not part of the audit 
committee and that are independent. The number of members not on the audit committee 
is calculated by taking the total number of directors on the board and subtracting the 
number of members that sit on the audit committee less those directors that are inside or 
gray directors. Information on the size of the board and the number of inside and outside 
directors was obtained from Corporate Library. I expect NONACBDIND to be negatively 
associated with the purchase of NAS. 
Third, I control for the CEO’s power over the directors by developing a measure 





others (Galinsky, Magee, Gruenfeld, Whitson, & Liljenquist, 2008) by either limiting the 
information provided for decision making purposes or using one’s influence to coerce 
others to act in accordance with one’s own objectives (Elias, 2008). There are four 
dimensions of power: structural power, ownership power, expert power and prestige 
power (Finkelstein, 1992; French & Raven, 1959). Structural power refers to the power 
exerted due to the position the individual holds such as the CEO’s role as chairman of the 
board or his/her compensation package. Ownership power refers to the ownership 
holdings the CEO has or whether he/she is the founder of the company. Expert power 
refers to the ability to exert influence based on the level of expertise and skills such as the 
length of CEO tenure and number of executive positions held. Prestige power refers to 
the ability to network with others based on reputation (French & Raven, 1959; Lisic, 
Neal, & Zhang, 2014).  
Research on corporate governance indicates that when the CEO is powerful, 
he/she can use their various sources of power to dominate the financial reporting process 
and weaken the audit committee’s oversight process even when the audit committee is 
fully independent and has financial experts as members (Carcello et al., 2011; Cheng, 
Lawrence, & Smith, 2014). In the NAS context, the CEO may also have the power to 
influence the audit committee to purchase specific levels of NAS. For example, the CEO 
may have the ability to influence the audit committee by promising some form of 
compensation (reward power) or by exerting his/her expertise (expert power) such that 
the audit committee may follow the advice of the CEO. Therefore, I consider the power 





Various measures of CEO power have been used by scholars in order to capture 
the CEO’s influence. Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, & LaFond (2006) measure CEO power 
as the aggregate of 1) CEO duality (CEO as chairman of the board), 2) CEO 
compensation, and 3) whether the CEO sits on the nominating committee and/or the audit 
committee. The authors use these variables because prior research shows that when the 
CEO acts as chairman of the board or is highly compensated, he/she has the ability to 
influence the board and audit committee. For example, CEO duality and CEO 
compensation are associated with greater cash and total compensation paid to the board 
and audit committee (Brick et al., 2006; Ryan & Wiggins, 2004).  
Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) measure CEO power as whether the CEO serves 
on the nominating committee as membership on this committee provides the CEO with 
the opportunity to select individuals who will not disagree with him/her. The authors find 
that when the CEO is on the nominating committee and is involved in the board selection 
process, director firms appoint fewer independent directors on the board. Thus, 
independence is compromised and the effectiveness of the board and audit committee 
diminishes as suggested by Carcello et al. (2011). Although post-SOX the CEO is 
prohibited from being formally involved in the nominating process (U.S. SEC, 2003), the 
CEO can still indirectly use his/her power to influence the director selection process. 
Finally, Lisic et al. (2014) create a CEO power variable which includes 11 CEO 
characteristics encompassing many of the variables used in the prior CEO power studies 
(CEO cash compensation/highest executive compensation, CEO duality, share 
ownership, founder, CEO tenure, number of executive positions held and number of 





CEO sits on, if education is from an elite institution and percentage of directors with 
board tenure shorter than CEO tenure). They examine whether CEO power moderates the 
relationship between audit committee financial expertise and financial restatements. They 
find that when CEO power is low, audit committee financial expertise is negatively 
associated with financial restatements. In contrast, when CEO power is high audit 
committee financial expertise is positively associated with financial restatements. 
Due to the multitude of variables used by other scholars to capture CEO power, I 
develop a measure of power consisting of the aggregate of CEO duality, CEO total 
compensation, and CEO tenure. CEO duality and CEO total compensation are selected 
because they are representative of CEO power in the majority of studies on CEO power 
and are positively associated with lower quality financial reporting. CEO tenure is chosen 
as the third component of CEO power as this variable represents the CEO’s accumulated 
ability to influence the board over time (Cheng et al., 2014). CEO tenure has also been 
used to capture the power of the CEO since the CEO’s influence has been shown to 
increase with CEO tenure13. These three variables combined, therefore, have the potential 
to be associated with greater CEO power.  
In order to capture the power of the CEO, CEOPOWER is measured as follows: It 
is the sum of 1) CEO duality (CEODUAL) coded as a dummy variable with 1 indicating 
the CEO is the chairman of the board and zero otherwise; 2) CEO tenure (CEOTEN) in 
which CEO tenure is equal to 1 if CEO tenure is greater than the median tenure of the 
                                                          
13 The greater the length of CEO tenure, the greater the CEO is entrenched and the greater power 
the CEO has to influence the compensation structure offered to audit committee members (Ryan & 
Wiggins, 2005). Additionally, Naiker and Sharma (2009) develop a measure of CEO influence over the 
former audit partner (FAP) comparing CEO tenure to FAP tenure. They suggest the greater the tenure of 
the CEO the greater the ability of the CEO to influence the appointment of the FAP to the board thereby 





sample, and; 3) CEO total compensation which is coded 1 if CEO compensation is 
greater than the sample CEO compensation median. Total CEO Compensation includes 
all forms of compensation paid to the CEO (cash, bonuses, stock awards, stock options, 
and other types) and is available in the Corporate Library database. CEO duality and the 
number of years of CEO tenure are also available from Corporate Library. Panel E of 
Table 2 provides a description of the CEO POWER variable. The variable ranges from 0 
to 3, with three indicating a high level of power by the CEO and zero indicating low 
power. Based on prior findings in which high CEO power is associated with a lack of 
financial reporting, I expect CEO power to be positively associated with the purchase of 
NAS. 
Control Variables: Other Firm-Specific Variables. Big 4 auditors (BIG4) is 
included as a control variable as large audit firms tend to provide more NAS to clients 
than smaller audit firms due to the increased resources at their disposal (DeFond et al., 
2002; Frankel et al., 2002). Firm financial variables that have been associated with audit 
committee compensation and the purchase of NAS are also controlled for. Blockholders 
(BLOCK), leverage (LEV), book to market ratio (BM), annual returns (ANNRET), 
operating income (OPINC) are all negatively associated with the purchase of NAS 
(Abbott et al., 2003; DeFond et al., 2002; Frankel et al., 2002; Naiker et al., 2013; 
Raghunandan et al., 2003), and therefore, are included as control variables in the current 
study. Majority of institutional ownership (INSTMAJ) is also controlled for and expected 
to be negatively associated with the purchase of NAS as market perception studies 
indicate that investors perceive NAS to threaten auditor independence (Francis & Ke, 





addition, variables or characteristics that increase the demand for purchase of NAS 
(positive expected association) such as the size of the firm (LN_ASSETS), firms with 
foreign and complex operations (FOROPS), firms with special accounting transactions 
(SPITEMS), firms engaged in a merger (MERGER), restructuring (RESTRUCT) or new 
debt issue (DEISSUE), firms with a growth strategy (SALESGR), and firms with pension 
or post-retirement plans (EMPLAN), have also been included as control variables 
(DeFond et al., 2002; Frankel et al., 2002; Naiker et al., 2013). Panel F of Table 2 







CHAPTER 4  
RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Panel A of Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for fees paid to the auditors. Firms 
across the sample purchase an average (mean) of $3,455,388 of audit fees, an average of 
$883,915 of non-audit fees, and an average of $4,339,304 in total fees (audit and non-
audit fees). The average FEERATIO for firms in the sample is 16.1 percent while the 
average NAF_TO_AF comprises 23.1 percent. Upon examining the types of NAS 
purchased (audit-related, tax and other), firms purchase an average of $493,076 (9.6 
percent) of tax NAS, $344,812 (5.5 percent) of audit related NAS, and $44,300 (0.08 
percent) of other NAS. These results suggest that on average firms purchase more tax 
NAS. 
 Panel B of Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for the test variables. On average, 
an audit committee member receives $74,572 in cash compensation, $26,063 in stock 
options and $77,467 in stock awards. The average equity compensation per audit 
committee member is $103,531 while the average total compensation approximates 
$178,103. Approximately 47 percent of total audit committee compensation is in cash 
(ACCASH), with 13 percent comprising stock options (ACSTOPT), and the remaining 
40 percent in stock awards (ACSTAWD). These results indicate that audit committee 











Panel A: Audit and Non-audit fees 
     
Variables Mean Median SD Quartile 1 Quartile 3 
Audit Fees ($) 3,455,388 1,766,950 5,443,319  972,925  3,753,495 
Non-audit Fees ($) 883,915 277,881 2,197,388  83,479  825,763 
Total Fees ($) 4,339,304 2,100,000 7,156,414  1,155,157  4,687,900 
Audit-related NAS ($) 344,812 57,000 1,211,460  0  252,494 
Tax NAS ($) 493,076 125,759 1,155,103  16,996  457,618 
Other-NAS ($) 44,300 0 284,511  0  3,000 
FEERATIO 0.161 0.135 0.131  0.054  0.240 
LOG_NAF 11.85 12.534 3.331  11.33  13.62 
NAF_TO_AF 0.231 0.156 0.277  0.057  0.317 
UNEXP_NAF 0.000 0.199 0.988 -0.138  0.514 
AUDITREL_RATIO 0.055 0.027 0.078  0.000  0.076 
TAX_RATIO 0.096 0.058 0.108  0.009  0.154 
OTHER_RATIO 0.008 0.000 0.031  0.000  0.002 
 
Panel B: Test Variables 
 
Variables Mean Median SD Quartile 1 Quartile 3 
Total Compensation ($) 178,103 169,242 91,438 119,683 217,644 
Cash ($) 74,572 71,298 33,596 53,500 92,500 
Stock Option ($) 26,063 0 59,930 0 30,163 
Stock Award ($) 77,467 68,477 70,398 29,995 109,450 
Equity ($) 103,531 90,653 82,638 53,657 128,838 
LN_TOTCOMP 11.953 12.039 0.661 11.692 12.290 
LN_CASHCOMP 11.012 11.174 1.218 10.887 11.434 
LN_STOPT 3.660 0.000 5.156  0.000 10.314 
LN_STAWD 9.237 11.134 4.344 10.308 11.602 
ACCASH 0.471 0.460 0.203 0.347 0.553 
ACSTOPT 0.128 0.000 0.222 0.000 0.216 
ACSTAWD 0.399 0.450 0.243 0.239 0.556 






                                                               Table 3 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics (continued) 
 
Panel C: Audit committee, Board and CEO Control Variables 
 
Variables Mean Median SD Quartile 1  Quartile 3 
ACCTPRCT 0.287 0.250 0.268 0.000  0.400 
FINPRCT 0.323 0.333 0.273 0.000  0.500 
SUPERPRCT 0.063 0.000 0.147 0.000  0.000 
ACPCT3BDS 0.189 0.000 0.225 0.000  0.333 
ACMBRTEN 7.90 7.25 3.946 5.250  9.851 
LN_MEET 1.948 2.079 0.468 1.609  2.197 
NONACBDIND 0.300 0.333 0.187 0.142  0.444 
CEOPOWER 1.490 2.000 0.977 1.000  2.000 
 
 
Panel D: Firm-Specific Control Variables 
 
Variables Mean Median SD  Quartile 1  Quartile 3 
BIG4 0.930 1.000 0.260  1.000   1.000 
BLOCK 0.249 0.231 0.152  0.134   0.344 
LEV 0.510 0.507 0.235  0.341   0.656 
BM 0.560 0.475 1.148  0.301   0.723 
ANNRET 0.387 0.129 3.762 -0.094   0.406 
OPINC 0.098 0.090 0.100  0.054   0.139 
TOTAL ASSETS ($m) 8,902 1,904 30,519     669   6,186 
LN_ASSETS 7.682 7.553 1.590   6.507   8.730 
INSTMAJ 0.700 1.000 0.460   0.000   1.000 
FOROPS 0.380 0.000 0.487   0.000   1.000 
SPITEMS 0.298 0.000 0.589  -0.006   0.469 
MERGER 0.260 0.000 0.440   0.000   1.000 
RESTRUCT 0.420 0.000 0.494   0.000   1.000 
DEISSUE 0.830 1.000 0.377   1.000   1.000 
SALESGR 0.089 0.051 1.037  -0.053   0.154 





form of equity (stock options plus stock awards). The average ratio of the value of shares 
held (STOWNACDIR) by an audit committee member approximates 0.10 percent. 
Panel C of Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for audit committee, board and 
CEO control variables. In order to capture the expertise of the audit committee member, 
the type of expertise is categorized as accounting expertise, supervisory expertise and 
finance expertise, similar to Naiker et al. (2013). As described in Table 2, ACCTPRCT 
represents the percentage of audit committee members with experience as a public 
accountant, auditor, CFO, controller, or Chief Accounting Officer, while SUPERPRCT is 
the percentage of audit committee members with experience as a CEO or company 
president. Lastly, FINPRCT is calculated as the percentage of audit committee members 
with experience as an investment banker, financial analyst, venture capitalist or any other 
financial management experience. Panel C indicates that on average the percentage of 
audit committee members with accounting expertise is 28.7 percent (ACCTPRCT) while 
the percentage of audit committee members with finance expertise is 32.3 percent 
(FINPRCT). In addition, the percentage of audit committee members with supervisory 
expertise is on average 6.3 percent (SUPERPRCT).  
Approximately 19 percent of the audit committee members serve on three or more 
boards of other publicly held companies (ACPCT3BDS). The average tenure on the 
board for members on the audit committee is 7.9 years (ACMBRTEN), and 
approximately 30 percent of the directors on the board, that are not members of the audit 






 Panel D of Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for firm specific control variables. 
On average, 93 percent of the firms in the sample are audited by a Big 4 audit firm 
(BIG4). The average firm size, represented by total assets, is $8,902 million. Companies 
in the sample also have an average leverage ratio of 51 percent, book-to-market ratio of 
56 percent, average sales growth of 9 percent and operating income of 10 percent.  
Descriptive statistics on other control variables are reported in Panel D. 
 Table 4 reports the Pearson correlations matrix for the variables used in the 
regression models for Hypotheses 1 through 5. 14 While there are a number of significant 
correlations, they are not large enough to pose multi-collinearity threats as the 
correlations are below the 0.80 threshold (Kennedy, 2008). BIG4 is significant and 
positively correlated with the majority of measures of audit committee compensation 
while ACDIRMBR is statistically significantly and negatively correlated with stock 
award compensation but positively correlated with cash and stock option compensation. 
ACPCT3BDS, LEV, LN_ASSETS, DEISSUE, RESTRUCT, and CEOPOWER are 
significant and positively correlated with most compensation measures. Correlations 
significant at p <0.05 are highlighted in bold. In addition, variance inflation factors (VIF) 
were also used to assess the magnitude of multi-collinearity and range from 1.028 to 
2.819. These factors are well below the recommended score of 10 (Kennedy, 2008), 
suggesting the correlations do not pose a problem. Lastly, the Durbin Watson statistic 
was used to assess autocorrelations in the residuals. Values in this study range between 
2.023 and 2.051, which approximate the recommended value of 2 for no auto correlation 
in the sample (Durbin & Watson, 1950).  
 
                                                          




























FEERATIO           
LN_TOTCOMP .091          
LN_CASHCOMP .063          
LN_STAWD .040 .357 .102        
LN_STOPT .037 .107 -.066 -.381       
ACCASH -.038 -.546 .316 -.388 -.266      
ACSTAWD .023 .356 -.106 .826 -.558 -.518     
ACSTOPT .010 .109 -.173 .368 .856 -.346 -.623    
STOWNACDIR -.011 -.010 -.092 -.098 .076 -.045 -.066 .114   
BIG4 .087 .197 .099 .134 .005 -.077 .090 -.028 -.025  
INSTMAJ .015 -.010 .024 -.009 -.032 .052 -.010 -.036 -.028 .003 
BLOCK -.081 -.036 .021 .014 -.001 .015 -.013 .001 .010 -.039 
ACDIRMBR -.022 -.026 .004 -.099 .061 .041 -.096 .068 .062 -.085 
ACPCT3BDS .045 .159 .007 .080 -.010 -.055 .073 -.029 -.069 .136 
NONACBDIND .026 .118 .071 .122 -.028 .033 .075 -.051 -.125 .157 
ACCTPRCT -.032 .013 .000 .018 .022 -.031 .005 .022 -.024 .008 
SUPERPRCT .008 -.088 -.057 -.029 .003 -.010 .002 .001 .035 -.091 
FINPRCT -.015 .007 .001 -.019 -.001 -.003 -.012 .017 .027 .010 
LN_MEET .014 .140 .061 .080 .003 -.046 .060 -.024 -.074 .104 
BM -.005 -.093 -.012 -.029 -.017 .083 -.031 -.043 .005 -.076 
LEV .062 .098 .142 .174 -.171 .107 .101 -.209 -.084 .229 
ANNRET .003 .001 .005 -.027 .013 .027 -.028 .007 .000 .007 
OPINC .079 .037 -.020 .012 -.004 -.083 .029 .044 -.021 -.009 
LN_AT .140 .389 .207 .255 -.133 -.068 .222 -.181 -.171 .305 
SPITEMS .014 -.043 -.005 -.010 -.022 .026 -.004 -.019 -.018 .004 
MERGER .125 .102 .040 .103 .006 -.099 .085 -.002 .012 .032 
DEISSUE .084 .094 .103 .130 -.108 .030 .090 -.125 -.049 .069 
FOROPS .032 .041 .001 .011 .029 -.035 .013 .018 .020 .021 
EMPLAN .008 -.037 .057 .024 -.056 .131 -.029 -.088 -.042 .091 
RESTRUCT .075 .090 .051 .130 -.004 -.014 .071 -.064 -.061 .099 
SALESGR .012 .019 -.008 -.016 .008 -.034 -.003 .035 .013 -.009 
CEOPOWER .074 .150 .059 .068 -.047 -.081 .093 -.029 -.035 .064 
           








Pearson Correlation Matrix (continued) 
 
 
INSTMAJ BLOCK ACMBRTEN ACPCT3BDS NONACBDIND ACCTPRCT SUPPRCT FINPRCT LNMEET BM 
INSTMAJ           
BLOCK -.235          
ACMBRTEN .005 -.045         
ACPCT3BDS .026 -.050 -.105        
NONACBDIND .026 -.053 -.186 .154       
ACCTPRCT -.049 .031 -.135 .013 .109      
SUPERPRCT -.029 .048 .014 -.028 -.012 -.081     
FINPRCT -.023 .063 .015 -.040 .010 .139 -.001    
LNMEET .008 -.024 -.031 .064 .138 .046 -.056 .043   
BM -.023 .027 .018 -.039 -.027 .023 .004 .031 -.040  
LEV .040 .004 -.120 .146 .084 -.067 -.041 .005 .042 -.110 
ANNRET -.006 .036 -.059 .008 .038 .020 .013 -.007 -.013 -.040 
OPINC .021 -.087 -.028 .027 -.019 .042 -.018 .010 -.017 -.174 
LN_AT .180 -.299 -.077 .277 .242 .059 -.074 -.044 .163 -.057 
SPITEMS .057 .001 -.026 .044 .157 -.021 .017 -.022 -.009 -.039 
MERGER .010 -.006 -.002 .032 -.030 .024 .029 .018 .038 -.008 
DEISSUE .084 -.052 .003 .074 -.022 -.005 -.031 -.006 .043 .006 
FOROPS .008 -.010 -.013 .067 .019 .028 .030 -.023 .012 -.021 
EMPLAN .023 .-.101 -.084 .060 .195 -.062 -.037 -.049 .029 .030 
RESTRUCT .012 .036 -.052 .139 .150 .009 .015 -.029 .090 -.017 
SALESGR .008 .017 -.002 -.010 -.020 -.008 -.008 -.017 .005 -.017 
CEOPOWER .083 -.165 .102 .077 .055 -.069 -.018 -.019 .009 -.054 
























LEV            
ANNRET .061           
OPINC -.031 .044          
LN_AT .397 .000 .013         
SPITEMS .018 .032 .088 -.042        
MERGER -.032 -.031 -.020 .063 -.057       
DEISSUE . 229 .002 -.007 .218 .059 .078      
FOROPS -.076 .004 -.024 -.004 -.027 .073 .001     
EMPLAN .188 .034 -.090 .228 .260 -.112 -.158 -.010    
RESTRUCT .148 .036 -.107 .130 -.044 .114 .042 .173 .116   
SALESGR -.034 .001 .031 -.031 .001 .031 .026 .019 -.096 -.038  
CEOPOWER .083 -.021 .061 .324 .045 .047 .118 -.018 -.017 -.005 -.013 
            




Results of Main Model Hypotheses (FEERATIO) 
 Coefficients for industry and year variables are included but not reported in the 
model in order to conserve space. All FEERATIO regression models reported in this 
chapter are statistically significant with explanatory power (adjusted 𝑅2) ranging from 
0.050 to 0.055, consistent with Naiker et al. 2013.15  
The results of the regression model for Hypothesis 1 are presented in Table 5. 
Hypothesis 1 predicts that total audit committee compensation is related to the purchase 
of NAS. The results indicate that LN_TOTCOMP is not statistically significantly related 
to FEERATIO; therefore Hypothesis 1 is not supported. Moreover, this finding seems to 
suggest that paying audit committee members with larger amounts of total compensation 
does not influence the purchase of NAS when expressed as a percentage of total fees. 
 Results for the control variables shows that accounting expertise (ACCTPRCT) is 
negatively and statistically significantly (p=0.026) related to FEERATIO while 
FINPRCT and SUPERPRCT are not statistically significant. The negative association of 
ACCTPRCT with FEERATIO is consistent with Naiker et al. (2013). BIG4, OPINC, 
LN_ASSETS, MERGER and DEISSUE are all positively related to FEERATIO and 
significant at the 0.01 level while BLOCK (p=0.000) is negatively and significantly 
related to FEERATIO. The signs of the coefficient on all these control variables are 
consistent with their expected signs. As expected, INSTMAJ (p=0.068) and 
                                                          
15 The explanatory powers obtained in the FEERATIO regression models in this study are 
consistent with Naiker et al. (2013). Results for the FEERATIO regression model on affiliated and 
unaffiliated former audit firm partners in the Naiker et al. (2013) study indicate an adjusted 𝑅2of 0.057. 
The adjusted 𝑅2for FEERATIO on LN_TOTCOMP is 0.050, on LN_CASHCOMP, ACSTOPT, 
LN_STAWD, and ACSTAWD is 0.053, on ACCASH is 0.052, and on STOWNACDIR is 0.052 (see 








 Regression of FEERATIO on Total Compensation (LN_TOTCOMP) 
 
      
Variable Expected Sign Coefficient T-stat p-value  
Intercept    0.016  0.365 0.715  
LN_TOTCOMP +/-   0.005  1.459 0.145  
ACCTPRCT - -0.016 -1.935 0.026**  
FINPRCT - -0.002 -0.232 0.408  
SUPERPRCT +  0.002  0.153 0.439  
ACPCT3BDS + -0.008 -0.841 0.200  
ACMBRTEN - -0.001 -0.905 0.182  
LN_MEET +/- -0.006 -1.177 0.239  
NONACBDIND - -0.011 -0.854 0.098*  
CEOPOWER +  0.001  1.993 0.334  
BIG4 +  0.024  2.698 0.002***  
BLOCK - -0.053 -3.648 0.000***  
LEV -  0.009  0.641 0.204  
BM -  0.004  1.755 0.029**  
ANNRET -  0.000  0.492 0.310  
OPINC -  0.095  4.128 0.000***  
LN_ASSETS +  0.008  3.771 0.000***  
INSTMAJ - -0.007 -1.467 0.068*  
FOROPS + -0.000 -0.114 0.493  
SPITEMS + -0.002 -0.305 0.378  
MERGER +  0.029  5.813 0.000***  
RESTRUCT +  0.008  1.313 0.051*  
DEISSUE +  0.016  2.441 0.005***  
SALESGR +  0.001  0.653 0.246  
EMPLAN +  0.008  1.056 0.115  
Industries  included    
Years  included    
Observations  3,675    
Adjusted 𝑅2  0.050***    
Durbin-Watson  2.036    
The p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign and two-tailed otherwise. 






 NONACBDIND (p=0.098) are negatively and marginally significantly related to the 
purchase of NAS. All other control variables are not statistically significant. 
 The results for Hypothesis 2 are presented in Table 6 and Table 7. Hypothesis 2 
predicts that cash compensation is related to the purchase of NAS but no direction is 
predicted based on the mixed evidence in the prior literature. FEERATIO was regressed 
on cash compensation of audit committee members using the natural logarithm of cash 
compensation, (LN_CASHCOMP) (Table 6) and the ratio of cash to total compensation 
(ACCASH) (Table 7). When FEERATIO was regressed on LN_CASHCOMP, cash 
compensation is positively related to FEERATIO but marginally significant (p=0.089). 
Consistent with prior research, control variables BIG4, LN_ASSETS, MERGER and 
DEISSUE are positively and highly significantly related to FEERATIO (p<0.01). 
BLOCK is negatively related to the purchase of NAS, as expected, and also highly 
significant (p=0.001). INSTMAJ is also negatively related to the purchase of NAS but 
marginally significant (p=0.056). The percentage of audit committee members with 
accounting expertise (ACCTPRCT) is negatively related to the purchase of NAS and 
significant (p=0.026), indicating this type of expertise is associated with a reduction in 
the purchase of NAS.  
In contrast to the results obtained with LN_CASHCOMP, when FEERATIO is 
regressed on the ratio of cash compensation (ACCASH), it is negatively related but not 
significant. All control variables that are significant using LN_CASHCOMP are also 
significant with FEERATIO (p<0.01). In summary, the findings for ACCASH and 
LN_CASHCOMP seem to provide contrary results. The findings suggest that 





compensation, positively affects audit committee members’ purchase decision; 
motivating them to purchase larger amounts of NAS as their cash compensation rises. 
However, the insignificant result for ACCASH suggests that as the audit committee’s 
cash compensation increases as a percentage of total compensation, more NAS are not 
purchased. These findings are partially consistent with Hypothesis 2.  
Hypothesis 3 predicts that audit committee member stock option compensation is 
positively related to the purchase of NAS. The results for the regression of FEERATIO 
on two measures of stock option compensation (LN_STOPT and ACSTOPT) are 
presented in Tables 8 and 9. LN_STOPT (p=0.001) and ACSTOPT (p=0.034) are 
positively, and significantly related to the purchase of NAS. Both of these findings 
support Hypothesis 3. They indicate that compensating the audit committee member with 
stock options is associated with the purchase of more NAS. As the amount of stock 
option compensation and the ratio of stock option to total compensation increases, so 
does the purchase of NAS. Compensating audit committee members with stock options 
therefore does not seem to be an appropriate form of compensation as it appears to 
encourage audit committee members to purchase more NAS.  
Consistent with prior hypotheses testing, the control variables BIG4, 
LN_ASSETS, MERGER, RESTRUCT and DEISSUE are positively related to 
FEERATIO and statistically significant (p<0.05) in both stock option compensation 
regression models. Contrary to the expected direction, BM and OPINC are positively and 
significantly related to FEERATIO (p<0.05). Finally, as expected, ACCTPRCT is 
negative and statistically significant (p<0.05) while SUPERPRCT and FINPRCT are not 








 Regression of FEERATIO on Cash Compensation (LN_CASHCOMP) 
 
      
Variable Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient T-stat p-value  
Intercept   0.036  1.480 0.139  
LN_CASHCOMP +/-  0.003  1.703 0.089*  
ACCTPRCT - -0.016 -1.948 0.026**  
FINPRCT - -0.002 -0.215 0.416  
SUPERPRCT +  0.002  0.143 0.443  
ACPCT3BDS + -0.008 -0.806 0.210  
ACMBRTEN - -0.001 -0.971 0.166  
LN_MEET +/- -0.005 -1.127 0.260  
NONACBDIND - -0.011 -0.842 0.200  
CEOPOWER +  0.001  0.474 0.317  
BIG4 +  0.025  2.871 0.002***  
BLOCK - -0.054 -3.466 0.001***  
LEV -  0.007  0.685 0.247  
BM -  0.003  1.790 0.037**  
ANNRET -  0.000  0.508 0.306  
OPINC -  0.096  4.310 0.000***  
LN_ASSETS +  0.009  4.618 0.000***  
INSTMAJ - -0.008 -1.588 0.056*  
FOROPS +  0.000  0.029 0.488  
SPITEMS + -0.002 -0.366 0.357  
MERGER +  0.029  5.773 0.000***  
RESTRUCT +  0.008  1.692 0.045**  
DEISSUE +  0.016  2.488 0.006***  
SALESGR +  0.001  0.704 0.240  
EMPLAN +  0.007  1.074 0.141  
Industries  included    
Years  included    
Observations  3,675    
Adjusted 𝑅2  0.053***    
Durbin-Watson  2.043    
The p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign and two-tailed otherwise. 









 Regression of FEERATIO on Ratio of Cash Compensation (ACCASH) 
 
      
Variable Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient T-stat p-value  
Intercept   0.076  3.854 0.000***  
ACCASH +/- -0.007 -0.666 0.506  
ACCTPRCT - -0.016 -1.944 0.026**  
FINPRCT - -0.002 -0.199 0.421  
SUPERPRCT +  0.001  0.076 0.469  
ACPCT3BDS + -0.008 -0.810 0.209  
ACMBRTEN -  0.000 -0.842 0.200  
LN_MEET +/- -0.005 -1.126 0.260  
NONACBDIND - -0.011 -0.795 0.213  
CEOPOWER +  0.001  0.392 0.347  
BIG4 +  0.025  2.860 0.002***  
BLOCK - -0.052 -3.367 0.001***  
LEV -  0.008  0.764 0.223  
BM -  0.003  1.818 0.034**  
ANNRET -  0.000  0.519 0.302  
OPINC -  0.092  4.133 0.000***  
LN_ASSETS +  0.009  4.822 0.000***  
INSTMAJ - -0.007 -1.502 0.066*  
FOROPS +  0.000  0.077 0.469  
SPITEMS + -0.002 -0.307 0.380  
MERGER +  0.029  5.775 0.000***  
RESTRUCT +  0.008  1.680 0.046**  
DEISSUE +  0.016  2.536 0.005***  
SALESGR +  0.001  0.701 0.241  
EMPLAN +  0.007  1.113 0.133  
Industries  included    
Years  Included    
Observations  3,671    
Adjusted 𝑅2  0.052***    
Durbin-Watson  2.043    
The p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign and two-tailed otherwise. 









 Regression of FEERATIO on Stock Option Compensation (LN_STOPT) 
 
      
Variable Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient T-stat p-value  
Intercept   0.065  3.434 0.001***  
LN_STOPT +  0.001  3.128 0.001***  
ACCTPRCT - -0.016 -2.001 0.022**  
FINPRCT - -0.002 -0.199 0.421  
SUPERPRCT +  0.001  0.048 0.481  
ACPCT3BDS + -0.008 -0.838 0.201  
ACMBRTEN - -0.001 -1.057 0.145  
LN_MEET +/- -0.005 -1.129 0.129  
NONACBDIND - -0.009 -0.692 0.244  
CEOPOWER +  0.001  0.462 0.322  
BIG4 +  0.024  2.718 0.003***  
BLOCK - -0.050 -3.278 0.001***  
LEV -  0.011  1.009 0.156  
BM -  0.004  1.874 0.030**  
ANNRET -  0.000  0.452 0.326  
OPINC -  0.097  4.367 0.000***  
LN_ASSETS +  0.009  4.927 0.000***  
INSTMAJ - -0.008 -1.613 0.053*  
FOROPS +  0.000  0.057 0.477  
SPITEMS + -0.002 -0.286 0.387  
MERGER +  0.030  5.877 0.000***  
RESTRUCT +  0.008  1.715 0.043**  
DEISSUE +  0.016  2.607 0.004***  
SALESGR +  0.001  0.691 0.245  
EMPLAN +  0.008  1.261 0.103  
Industries  included    
Years  included    
Observations  3,675    
Adjusted 𝑅2  0.055***    
Durbin-Watson  2.046    
The p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign and two-tailed otherwise. 







                                        Table 9 
 
  
 Regression of FEERATIO on the Ratio of Stock Option Compensation (ACSTOPT) 
 
      
Variable Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient T-stat p-value  
Intercept   0.067  3.519 0.000***  
ACSTOPT +  0.019  1.828 0.034**  
ACCTPRCT - -0.016 -1.977 0.024**  
FINPRCT - -0.002 -0.223 0.412  
SUPERPRCT +  0.001  0.086 0.465  
ACPCT3BDS + -0.008 -0.831 0.203  
ACMBRTEN - -0.001 -0.959 0.169  
LN_MEET +/- -0.005 -1.108 0.134  
NONACBDIND - -0.009 -0.712 0.238  
CEOPOWER +  0.001  0.385 0.350  
BIG4 +  0.024  2.828 0.003***  
BLOCK - -0.051 -3.320 0.001***  
LEV -  0.010  0.874 0.191  
BM -  0.004  1.864 0.031**  
ANNRET -  0.000  0.479 0.316  
OPINC -  0.093  4.148 0.000***  
LN_ASSETS +  0.009  4.987 0.000***  
INSTMAJ - -0.007 -1.547 0.061*  
FOROPS +  0.000  0.090 0.464  
SPITEMS + -0.002 -0.278 0.390  
MERGER +  0.030  5.855 0.000***  
RESTRUCT +  0.009  1.780 0.037**  
DEISSUE +  0.016  2.573 0.005***  
SALESGR +  0.001  0.664 0.253  
EMPLAN +  0.007  1.161 0.123  
Industries  included    
Years  included    
Observations  3,671    
Adjusted 𝑅2  0.053***    
Durbin-Watson  2.045    
The p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign and two-tailed otherwise. 







audit committee with accounting expertise seems to motivate the audit committee to be 
more conservative in its decision to purchase NAS. 
The results for Hypothesis 4 are presented in Tables 10 and 11. Stock award 
compensation is measured using the natural logarithm of stock award compensation 
(LN_STAWD) and the ratio of stock option to total compensation (ACSTAWD). None 
of the two compensation measures are significantly related to the purchase of NAS. 
Results from both regression models therefore do not support the hypothesis that stock 
award compensation is related to the purchase of NAS. When examining the control 
variables in the above regression models, BIG4, OPINC, LN_ASSETS, MERGER and 
DEISSUE are positively and statistically, significantly (p<0.01) related to FEERATIO, 
while BLOCK is negative and significant (p=0.001). The variables BM and RESTRUCT 
are positive and statistically significant (p<0.05). Lastly, ACCTPRCT is negative and 
statistically significant (p<0.05), similar to the results for Hypotheses 1 to 3. In summary, 
given that stock award compensation is not related to the purchase of NAS, it appears that 
compensating audit committee members with stock award compensation may be 
beneficial as it does not affect the NAS purchase decision.  
Hypothesis 5 predicts that audit committee member stock holding compensation 
is associated with the purchase of NAS. In order to test this hypothesis a measure of the 
natural logarithm of stock holdings (LN_STHOLD) and a ratio of stock holdings to total 
compensation (ACSTHLD) had been proposed. However, information on the number of 
shares held by each director was not available in the databases used for this study. 
Furthermore, a review of a sample of proxy statements for the data collected for 2010 to 





their stock options and stock awards is not provided so a calculation was also not 
possible. Due to this limitation, a ratio of the value of the average stock ownership held 
by the audit committee member (STOWNACDIR) is used. This variable provides a ratio 
of the value of the stock owned by the audit committee member in relation to market 
capitalization of the firm. Table 12 presents the results of the regression of FEERATIO 
on STOWNACDIR. The variable STOWNACDIR is not statistically significant 
suggesting this measure does not play a role in the purchase of NAS. It is important to 
highlight that the average ratio of the value of shares owned by the audit committee is 
0.10 percent (refer to Panel B of Table 3); therefore, this small ratio may not be large 
enough to capture an effect. The control variables significant in prior regression models 
are also significant in this model (see Table 12 for details).  
Additional Measures and Types of NAS 
 In order to validate the results obtained from the regression models using 
FEERATIO, additional measures of NAS are used as dependent variables: natural 
logarithm of non-audit fees (LOG_NAF), ratio of non-audit fees to audit fees 
(NAF_TO_AF), and the unexpected portion of non-audit fees (UNEXP_NAF). The use 
of these alternate NAS variables also provides an opportunity to extend Naiker et al.’s 
(2013) research using compensation measures. In addition, further testing is performed 
using a measure of the ratio of audit related (AUDITREL_RATIO), tax (TAX_RATIO) 
and other types of NAS (OTHER_RATIO) in order to understand what impact the 
various measures of compensation have on the various types of NAS. All LOG_NAF and 
NAF_TO_AF regression models are statistically significant with explanatory power 








 Regression of FEERATIO on Stock Award Compensation (LN_STAWD) 
 
      
Variable Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient T-stat p-value  
Intercept   0.073  3.856 0.000***  
LN_STAWD +/-  0.000  -0.497 0.619  
ACCTPRCT - -0.016 -1.928 0.027**  
FINPRCT - -0.002 -0.234 0.407  
SUPERPRCT +  0.001  0.058 0.477  
ACPCT3BDS + -0.008 -0.789 0.215  
ACMBRTEN - -0.001 -0.945 0.172  
LN_MEET +/- -0.005 -1.089 0.276  
NONACBDIND - -0.010 -0.750 0.227  
CEOPOWER +  0.001  0.463 0.321  
BIG4 +  0.025  2.929 0.001***  
BLOCK - -0.051 -3.306 0.001***  
LEV -  0.008  0.784 0.216  
BM -  0.003  1.795 0.036**  
ANNRET -  0.000  0.483 0.314  
OPINC -  0.096  4.309 0.000***  
LN_ASSETS +  0.009  4.887 0.000***  
INSTMAJ - -0.008 -1.615 0.053*  
FOROPS +  0.000  0.032 0.487  
SPITEMS + -0.002 -0.308 0.379  
MERGER +  0.030  5.822 0.000***  
RESTRUCT +  0.008  1.718 0.043**  
DEISSUE +  0.016  2.570 0.005***  
SALESGR +  0.001  0.691 0.244  
EMPLAN +  0.007  1.114 0.132  
Industries  included    
Years  included    
Observations  3,675    
Adjusted 𝑅2  0.053***    
Durbin-Watson  2.043    
The p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign and two-tailed otherwise. 











 Regression of FEERATIO on the Ratio of Stock Award Compensation 
                                        (ACSTAWD) 
 
      
Variable Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient T-stat p-value  
Intercept   0.066  3.613 0.000***  
ACSTAWD +/- -0.010 -1.097 0.273  
ACCTPRCT - -0.016 -1.959 0.025**  
FINPRCT - -0.002 -0.217 0.414  
SUPERPRCT +  0.002  0.116 0.454  
ACPCT3BDS + -0.008 -0.795 0.213  
ACMBRTEN - -0.001 -0.976 0.164  
LN_MEET +/- -0.005 -1.092 0.137  
NONACBDIND - -0.010 -0.719 0.236  
CEOPOWER +  0.001  0.461 0.322  
BIG4 +  0.025  2.928 0.001***  
BLOCK - -0.052 -3.340 0.001***  
LEV -  0.008  0.716 0.237  
BM -  0.003  1.765 0.039**  
ANNRET -  0.000  0.480 0.315  
OPINC -  0.094  4.209 0.000***  
LN_ASSETS +  0.009  4.996 0.000***  
INSTMAJ - -0.008 -1.590 0.056*  
FOROPS +  0.000  0.076 0.469  
SPITEMS - -0.002 -0.325 0.372  
MERGER +  0.030  5.856 0.000***  
RESTRUCT +  0.008  1.752 0.040**  
DEISSUE +  0.016  2.518 0.006***  
SALESGR +  0.001  0.692 0.244  
EMPLAN +  0.007  1.057 0.145  
Industries  included    
Years  included    
Observations  3,671    
Adjusted 𝑅2  0.053***    
Durbin-Watson  2.045    
The p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign and two-tailed otherwise. 










 Regression of FEERATIO on the Ratio of Stock Ownership (STOWNACDIR) 
 
      
Variable Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient T-stat p-value  
Intercept   0.063  3.371 0.001***  
STOWNACDIR +/-  0.450  0.942 0.346  
ACCTPRCT - -0.014 -1.665 0.048**  
FINPRCT - -0.004 -0.494 0.311  
SUPERPRCT +  0.002  0.152 0.439  
ACPCT3BDS + -0.009 -0.882 0.189  
ACMBRTEN - -0.001 -1.014 0.155  
LN_MEET +/- -0.005 -1.127 0.130  
NONACBDIND - -0.010 -0.729 0.233  
CEOPOWER +  0.001  0.504 0.307  
BIG4 +  0.025  2.811 0.002***  
BLOCK - -0.050 -3.246 0.001***  
LEV -  0.010  0.883 0.189  
BM -  0.003  1.769 0.039**  
ANNRET -  0.000  0.437 0.331  
OPINC -  0.097  4.258 0.000***  
LN_ASSETS +  0.009  4.886 0.000***  
INSTMAJ - -0.008 -1.600 0.055*  
FOROPS +  0.001 -0.282 0.389  
SPITEMS - -0.002 -0.298 0.382  
MERGER +  0.029  5.741 0.000***  
RESTRUCT +  0.008  1.585 0.056*  
DEISSUE +  0.015  2.423 0.007***  
SALESGR +  0.001  0.710 0.238  
EMPLAN +  0.008  1.225 0.110  
Industries  included    
Years  included    
Observations  3,634    
Adjusted 𝑅2  0.052***    
Durbin-Watson  2.051    
The p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign and two-tailed otherwise. 







Total Compensation. Table 13 presents the results of LOG_NAF, NAF_TO_AF 
and UNEXP_NAF regressed on total audit committee compensation (LN_TOTCOMP). 
LN_TOTCOMP is positive, and significantly related to LOG_NAF (p=0.000) while not 
statistically significant with NAF_TO_AF and UNEXP_NAF. The results for LOG_NAF 
suggest that the level of total compensation does impact the audit committee members’ 
purchase decision of NAS. As total compensation increases so does the proportion of 
NAS that are purchased by the audit committee. These findings, which are contrary to the 
findings obtained in Hypothesis 1 with FEERATIO, indicate there is mixed evidence 
with regards to Hypothesis 1.  
Cash Compensation. A regression of the three alternate dependent variables on 
the natural logarithm of cash (LN_CASHCOMP) is offered in Table 14. The coefficient 
on LN_CASHCOMP is significant and positively related in the LOG_NAF model 
(p=0.016) and positive but marginally significantly related in the UNEXP_NAF model 
(p=0.099). In contrast, LN_CASHCOMP is not significant using NAF_TO_AF as a 
measure of the purchase of NAS.  
Table 15 presents the results for the regression models of LOG_NAF, 
NAF_TO_AF, and UNEXP_NAF using ACCASH as a measure of cash compensation. 
ACCASH is negative, and statistically significantly related to LOG_NAF (p=0.016) but 
not significantly related to UNEXP_NAF and NAF_TO_AF. The results of the 
LOG_NAF regression models for LN_CASHCOMP and ACCASH suggest that audit 
committee members choose to purchase greater amounts of NAS when compensated with 
cash, but that as the proportion of cash compensation to total compensation increases, 





consideration of other compensation seem to indicate that the size of cash compensation 
could be providing incentives to purchase more NAS. However, when the cash 
compensation is considered relative to other compensation then it seems that greater cash 
compensation in the total cash compensation structure seems to provide fewer incentives 
to purchase more NAS.  These findings therefore provide some evidence consistent with 
Hypothesis 2.  
Stock option compensation. For stock option compensation, the three dependent 
variables LOG_NAF, NAF_TO_AF and UNEXP_NAF were regressed on the two 
measures of stock option compensation (LN_STOPT and ACSTOPT) with the results 
being presented in Tables 16 and 17, respectively. LN_STOPT (p=0.000) and ACSTOPT 
(p=0.009) are both positively, statistically significantly related to NAF_TO_AF. In 
addition, LN_STOPT (p=.001) and ACSTOPT (p=0.043) are both positively, and 
significantly related to UNEXP_NAF.  None of the two forms of stock option 
compensation are significant in the LOG_NAF regression models. These findings suggest 
that as the amount and proportion of audit committee compensation increases, the audit 
committee purchases larger proportions of NAS, thereby providing support for 
Hypothesis 3. 
Stock award compensation. Tables 18 and 19 provide results on the regression 
models of LOG_NAF, NAF_TO_AF and UNEXP_NAF on two measures of stock award 
compensation: the natural logarithm of stock awards (LN_STAWD) and the ratio of stock 
awards to total compensation (ACSTAWD). Results reveal that LN_STAWD (p=0.002), 
and ACSTAWD (p=0.007), are positively, and significantly related to LOG_NAF. These 








    




        
  LOG_NAF NAF_TO_AF UNEXP_NAF 
Variable Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Intercept  -0.436 0.657  0.013  0.887 -0.383  0.202 
LN_TOTCOMP ?  0.346 0.000***  0.012  0.137  0.032  0.202 
ACCTPRCT - -0.192 0.151 -0.037  0.017**   
FINPRCT - -0.023 0.449  0.002  0.459   
SUPERPRCT +  0.213 0.257 -0.009  0.390   
ACPCT3BDS +  0.404 0.037** -0.016  0.227   
ACMBRTEN -  0.004 0.385 -0.002  0.095*   
LN_MEET +/-  0.163 0.137 -0.011  0.278   
NONACBDIND -  0.130 0.333 -0.047  0.049**   
CEOPOWER + -0.022 0.339  0.002  0.324   
BIG4 +  1.255 0.000***  0.037  0.022**   
BLOCK - -0.511 0.072* -0.114  0.001***   
LEV -  0.410 0.047**  0.035  0.063*   
BM -  0.103 0.008***  0.005  0.116   
ANNRET -  0.011 0.187  0.004  0.485   
OPINC -  1.895 0.000***  0.142  0.001***   
LN_ASSETS +  0.751 0.000***  0.011  0.006***   
INSTMAJ - -0.231 0.017** -0.014  0.088*   
FOROPS +  0.371 0.000*** -0.007  0.230   
SPITEMS +  0.190 0.008*** -0.006  0.311   
MERGER +  0.502 0.000***  0.047  0.000***   
RESTRUCT +  0.297 0.003***  0.015  0.071*   
DEISSUE +  0.165 0.125  0.028  0.020**   
SALESGR +  0.025 0.293  0.001  0.448   
EMPLAN +  0.223 0.059*  0.014  0.152   
Industries  included  included    
Years  included  included    
Observations  3,675  3,675  3,675  
Adjusted 𝑅2  0.239***  0.033***  0.000  
Durbin-Watson  2.023  2.035  2.041  
The p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign and two-tailed otherwise. 











    




        
  LOG_NAF NAF_TO_AF UNEXP_NAF 
Variable Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Intercept   2.206 0.000***  0.064  0.225 -0.247  0.101 
LN_CASHCOMP ?  0.099 0.016**  0.006  0.134  0.022  0.099* 
ACCTPRCT - -0.195 0.148 -0.037  0.016**   
FINPRCT - -0.015 0.466  0.002  0.452   
SUPERPRCT +  0.167 0.305 -0.009  0.381   
ACPCT3BDS +  0.435 0.028** -0.015  0.238   
ACMBRTEN -  0.002 0.428 -0.002  0.086*   
LN_MEET +/-  0.183 0.095* -0.011  0.303   
NONACBDIND -  0.161 0.296 -0.046  0.051*   
CEOPOWER + -0.016 0.385  0.003  0.307   
BIG4 +  1.307 0.000***  0.039  0.018**   
BLOCK - -0.470 0.091* -0.114  0.001***   
LEV -  0.339 0.084*  0.032  0.081*   
BM -  0.092 0.016**  0.004  0.136   
ANNRET -  0.012 0.180  0.000  0.480   
OPINC -  1.957 0.000***  0.144  0.001***   
LN_ASSETS +  0.796 0.000***  0.012  0.001***   
INSTMAJ - -0.263 0.008*** -0.015  0.072*   
FOROPS +  0.375 0.000*** -0.007  0.234   
SPITEMS +  0.178 0.095* -0.007  0.293   
MERGER +  0.509 0.000***  0.047  0.000***   
RESTRUCT +  0.313 0.002***  0.016  0.064*   
DEISSUE +  0.149 0.149  0.027  0.023**   
SALESGR +  0.027 0.279  0.001  0.441   
EMPLAN +  0.179 0.105  0.012  0.183   
Industries  included  included    
Years  included  included    
Observations  3,675  3,675  3,675  
Adjusted 𝑅2  0.237***  0.033***  0.000*  
Durbin-Watson  2.027  2.036  2.041  
The p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign and two-tailed otherwise. 










    




        
  LOG_NAF NAF_TO_AF UNEXP_NAF 
Variable Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Intercept   3.475 0.000***  0.145  0.001*  0.024  0.567 
ACCASH ? -0.518 0.016** -0.016  0.511 -0.051  0.530 
ACCTPRCT - -0.191 0.153 -0.037  0.015**   
FINPRCT - -0.014 0.469  0.002  0.446   
SUPERPRCT +  0.109 0.369 -0.011  0.360   
ACPCT3BDS +  0.432 0.028** -0.015  0.237   
ACMBRTEN -  0.005 0.345 -0.002  0.106   
LN_MEET +/-  0.182 0.097* -0.011  0.302   
NONACBDIND -  0.170 0.287 -0.045  0.055*   
CEOPOWER + -0.023 0.335  0.002  0.335   
BIG4 +  1.290 0.000***  0.039  0.018**   
BLOCK - -0.407 0.123 -0.111  0.001***   
LEV -  0.411 0.048**  0.034  0.071*   
BM -  0.097 0.011**  0.005  0.129   
ANNRET -  0.012 0.175  0.000  0.476   
OPINC -  1.883 0.000***  0.137  0.002***   
LN_ASSETS +  0.802 0.000***  0.013  0.001***   
INSTMAJ - -0.251 0.011** -0.014  0.084*   
FOROPS +  0.378 0.000*** -0.007  0.247   
SPITEMS +  0.195 0.076* -0.006  0.313   
MERGER +  0.506 0.000***  0.047  0.000***   
RESTRUCT +  0.306 0.002***  0.016  0.064*   
DEISSUE +  0.169 0.120  0.028  0.020**   
SALESGR +  0.026 0.286  0.001  0.443   
EMPLAN +  0.207 0.074*  0.013  0.174   
Industries  included  included    
Years  included  included    
Observations  3,671  3,671  3,671  
Adjusted 𝑅2  0.236***  0.032***  0.000  
Durbin-Watson  2.024  2.036  2.043  
The p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign and two-tailed otherwise. 










    




        
  LOG_NAF NAF_TO_AF UNEXP_NAF 
Variable Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Intercept   3.187 0.000***  0.119  0.003*** -0.034  0.087* 
LN_STOPT +  0.005 0.625  0.003  0.000***  0.009  0.001*** 
ACCTPRCT - -0.192 0.152 -0.039  0.014**   
FINPRCT - -0.016 0.464  0.002  0.444   
SUPERPRCT +  0.130 0.346 -0.012  0.348   
ACPCT3BDS +  0.441 0.026** -0.016  0.225   
ACMBRTEN -  0.003 0.405 -0.002  0.069*   
LN_MEET +/-  0.187 0.090* -0.011  0.298   
NONACBDIND -  0.187 0.268 -0.042  0.070*   
CEOPOWER + -0.016 0.380  0.002  0.311   
BIG4 +  1.312 0.000***  0.035  0.027**   
BLOCK - -0.401 0.126 -0.108  0.001***   
LEV -  0.375 0.064*  0.041  0.040**   
BM -  0.093 0.015**  0.005  0.116   
ANNRET -  0.012 0.185  0.000  0.494   
OPINC -  1.954 0.000***  0.147  0.001***   
LN_ASSETS +  0.810 0.000***  0.013  0.001***   
INSTMAJ - -0.264 0.008*** -0.015  0.069*   
FOROPS +  0.376 0.000*** -0.007  0.243   
SPITEMS +  0.188 0.083* -0.006  0.321   
MERGER +  0.515 0.000***  0.048  0.000***   
RESTRUCT +  0.311 0.002***  0.016  0.060*   
DEISSUE +  0.163 0.125  0.029  0.017**   
SALESGR +  0.027 0.281  0.001  0.447   
EMPLAN +  0.191 0.092*  0.015  0.133   
Industries  included  included    
Years  included  included    
Observations  3,675  3,675  3,675  
Adjusted 𝑅2  0.236***  0.036***  0.002***  
Durbin-Watson  2.026  2.040  2.047  
The p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign and two-tailed otherwise. 










    
 Regression of Alternative Measures of NAS on the Ratio of Stock 
Option Compensation (ACSTOPT) 
 
  
        
  LOG_NAF NAF_TO_AF UNEXP_NAF 
Variable Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Intercept   3.280 0.000***  0.123  0.003*** -0.017  0.384 
ACSTOPT + -0.256 0.132  0.051  0.009***  0.127  0.043** 
ACCTPRCT - -0.187 0.159 -0.038  0.015**   
FINPRCT - -0.013 0.470  0.002  0.458   
SUPERPRCT +  0.130 0.346 -0.011  0.363   
ACPCT3BDS +  0.447 0.024** -0.016  0.228   
ACMBRTEN -  0.004 0.374 -0.002  0.082*   
LN_MEET +/-  0.186 0.090* -0.010  0.311   
NONACBDIND -  0.173 0.283 -0.042  0.068*   
CEOPOWER + -0.015 0.391  0.002  0.343   
BIG4 +  1.326 0.000***  0.038  0.021**   
BLOCK - -0.416 0.117 -0.109  0.001***   
LEV -  0.339 0.085*  0.038  0.072*   
BM -  0.089 0.018**  0.005  0.115   
ANNRET -  0.012 0.178  0.000  0.495   
OPINC -  1.949 0.000***  0.137  0.002***   
LN_ASSETS +  0.808 0.000***  0.013  0.001***   
INSTMAJ - -0.263 0.008** -0.015  0.077*   
FOROPS +  0.375 0.000*** -0.007  0.253   
SPITEMS +  0.183 0.089* -0.006  0.328   
MERGER +  0.511 0.000***  0.048  0.000***   
RESTRUCT +  0.304 0.003***  0.017  0.050**   
DEISSUE +  0.155 0.141  0.028  0.018**   
SALESGR +  0.028 0.271  0.000  0.462   
EMPLAN +  0.179 0.106  0.014  0.155   
Industries  included  included    
Years  included  included    
Observations  3,671  3,671  3,671  
Adjusted 𝑅2  0.236***  0.033***  0.001*  
Durbin-Watson  2.027  2.038  2.046  
The p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign and two-tailed otherwise. 









    




        
  LOG_NAF NAF_TO_AF UNEXP_NAF 
Variable Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Intercept   3.079 0.000***  0.141  0.001***  0.016  0.675 
LN_STAWD ?  0.037 0.002*** -0.001  0.309 -0.002  0.643 
ACCTPRCT - -0.192 0.152 -0.037  0.017**   
FINPRCT - -0.001 0.496  0.001  0.465   
SUPERPRCT +  0.144 0.329 -0.012  0.350   
ACPCT3BDS +  0.453 0.023** -0.015  0.240   
ACMBRTEN -  0.006 0.318 -0.002  0.083*   
LN_MEET +/-  0.178 0.106 -0.010  0.326   
NONACBDIND -  0.104 0.365 -0.043  0.067*   
CEOPOWER + -0.016 0.384  0.002  0.311   
BIG4 +  1.295 0.000***  0.040  0.014**   
BLOCK - -0.473 0.089* -0.108  0.000***   
LEV -  0.330 0.089*  0.035  0.065**   
BM -  0.093 0.015**  0.004  0.135   
ANNRET -  0.013 0.154  0.000  0.496   
OPINC -  1.905 0.000***  0.145  0.001***   
LN_ASSETS +  0.793 0.000***  0.013  0.000***   
INSTMAJ - -0.248 0.012*** -0.016  0.065*   
FOROPS +  0.375 0.000*** -0.007  0.235   
SPITEMS +  0.182 0.009* -0.006  0.313   
MERGER +  0.487 0.000***  0.048  0.000***   
RESTRUCT +  0.280 0.002***  0.016  0.055*   
DEISSUE +  0.144 0.157  0.028  0.018**   
SALESGR +  0.029 0.263  0.001  0.449   
EMPLAN +  0.187 0.095*  0.013  0.173   
Industries  included  included    
Years  included  included    
Observations  3,675  3,675  3,675  
Adjusted 𝑅2  0.238***  0.032***  0.000  
Durbin-Watson  2.026  2.037  2.043  
The p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign and two-tailed otherwise. 










    
 Regression of Alternative Measures of NAS on the Ratio of Stock 
Award Compensation (ACSTAWD) 
 
  
        
  LOG_NAF NAF_TO_AF UNEXP_NAF 
Variable Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Intercept   3.034 0.000***  0.122  0.002***  0.028  0.377 
ACSTAWD ?  0.561 0.007*** -0.031  0.116 -0.070  0.298 
ACCTPRCT - -0.183 0.164 -0.038  0.015**   
FINPRCT - -0.009 0.480  0.002  0.456   
SUPERPRCT +  0.112 0.366 -0.010  0.378   
ACPCT3BDS +  0.442 0.026** -0.015  0.242   
ACMBRTEN -  0.004 0.305 -0.002  0.077*   
LN_MEET +/-  0.181 0.099* -0.010  0.322   
NONACBDIND -  0.007 0.319 -0.042  0.068*   
CEOPOWER + -0.020 0.353  0.003  0.306   
BIG4 +  1.309 0.000***  0.040  0.015**   
BLOCK - -0.429 0.110 -0.110  0.000***   
LEV -  0.359 0.072*  0.033  0.077*   
BM -  0.093 0.014**  0.004  0.142   
ANNRET -  0.013 0.164  0.000  0.496   
OPINC -  1.898 0.000***  0.141  0.001***   
LN_ASSETS +  0.796 0.000***  0.014  0.000***   
INSTMAJ - -0.249 0.011** -0.015  0.068*   
FOROPS +  0.375 0.000*** -0.007  0.247   
SPITEMS +  0.187 0.084* -0.006  0.306   
MERGER +  0.497 0.000***  0.048  0.000***   
RESTRUCT +  0.293 0.004***  0.017  0.053**   
DEISSUE +  0.159 0.134  0.027  0.021**   
SALESGR +  0.029 0.267  0.001  0.448   
EMPLAN +  0.191 0.090*  0.012  0.189   
Industries  included  included    
Years  included  included    
Observations  3,671  3,671  3,671  
Adjusted 𝑅2  0.236***  0.033***  0.000  
Durbin-Watson  2.027  2.038  2.046  
The p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign and two-tailed otherwise. 







positively influences the purchase of NAS. As the proportion of stock award 
compensation increases, audit committees choose to purchase larger amounts of NAS. No 
significant associations were found using NAF_TO_AF and UNEXP_NAF, similar to the 
main findings with FEERATIO; therefore the majority of the evidence on stock award 
compensation is inconsistent with Hypothesis 4. 
Types of NAS. The three types of NAS (AUDITREL_RATIO, TAX_RATIO, and 
OTHER_RATIO) were regressed on the various measures of audit committee 
compensation in order to gain further understanding as to whether compensation affects 
the types of NAS. Tables 20 through 26 present the results of these regression models on 
total compensation, cash compensation, stock option and stock award compensation. The 
results reveal that none of the compensation measures are significant with audit-related 
NAS (AUDITREL_RATIO) and other types of NAS (OTHER_RATIO). For tax NAS, 
LN_TOTCOMP (p=0.028), LN_STOPT (p=0.000), and ACSTOPT (p=0.012) are 
positively and statistically, significantly related to TAX_RATIO (see Tables 20, 22 and 
25). These results indicate that NAS are driving the main results.  
 
Supplemental Analyses 
Having examined the various relationships hypothesized between compensation 
and the purchase of NAS, I perform supplemental tests using two measures of equity 
compensation as the independent variable. Since prior literature has provided mixed 









    




        
  AUDITREL_RATIO TAX_RATIO OTHER_RATIO 
Variable Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Intercept   0.019 0.445 -0.002  0.955 -0.002  0.861 
LN_TOTCOMP ? -0.002 0.265  0.007  0.028**  0.001  0.285 
ACCTPRCT - -0.018 0.000*** -0.001  0.468  0.002  0.135 
FINPRCT -  0.008 0.046** -0.009  0.073*  0.001  0.355 
SUPERPRCT + -0.006 0.247  0.008  0.249  0.000  0.492 
ACPCT3BDS + -0.007 0.124  0.001  0.443 -0.002  0.163 
ACMBRTEN - -0.001 0.001***  0.001  0.137  0.000  0.401 
LN_MEET +/-  0.005 0.091* -0.010  0.011**  0.000  0.845 
NONACBDIND -  0.001 0.456 -0.009  0.217 -0.003  0.170 
CEOPOWER +  0.000 0.390  0.001  0.352  0.000  0.485 
BIG4 + -0.015 0.001***  0.042  0.000*** -0.002  0.182 
BLOCK - -0.006 0.248 -0.048  0.000***  0.001  0.365 
LEV -  0.025 0.000*** -0.018  0.023**  0.001  0.361 
BM -  0.003 0.001***  0.000  0.469  0.000  0.405 
ANNRET -  0.000 0.443  0.000  0.162  0.000  0.172 
OPINC -  0.012 0.179  0.082  0.000***  0.000  0.479 
LN_ASSETS +  0.008 0.000***  0.000  0.437  0.000  0.221 
INSTMAJ - -0.002 0.202 -0.005  0.223  0.000  0.413 
FOROPS + -0.007 0.007***  0.008  0.023**  0.000  0.329 
SPITEMS +  0.004 0.140 -0.003  0.240 -0.002  0.056* 
MERGER +  0.017 0.000***  0.006  0.086*  0.006  0.000*** 
RESTRUCT +  0.000 0.473  0.008  0.017**  0.000  0.451 
DEISSUE +  0.005 0.087*  0.008  0.066*  0.003  0.014** 
SALESGR +  0.001 0.120  0.000  0.430  0.000  0.278 
EMPLAN +  0.010 0.004*** -0.004  0.222  0.001  0.191 
Industries  included  included  included  
Years  included  included  included  
Observations  3,675  3,675  3,675  
Adjusted 𝑅2  0.069***  0.046***  0.012***  
Durbin-Watson  2.023  2.000  2.032  
The p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign and two-tailed otherwise. 










    




        
  AUDITREL_RATIO TAX_RATIO OTHER_RATIO 
Variable Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Intercept  -0.014 0.319  0.049  0.017**  0.001  0.842 
LN_CASHCOMP ?  0.000 0.826  0.002  0.130  0.001  0.209 
ACCTPRCT - -0.018 0.000*** -0.001  0.464  0.002  0.137 
FINPRCT -  0.008 0.046** -0.009  0.076*  0.001  0.350 
SUPERPRCT + -0.005 0.272  0.007  0.269  0.000  0.495 
ACPCT3BDS + -0.007 0.114  0.002  0.416 -0.002  0.169 
ACMBRTEN - -0.001 0.001***  0.000  0.151 -0.000  0.381 
LN_MEET +/-  0.005 0.103 -0.010  0.015**  0.000  0.874 
NONACBDIND -  0.000 0.476 -0.008  0.232 -0.003  0.172 
CEOPOWER +  0.000 0.401  0.001  0.327  0.000  0.471 
BIG4 + -0.016 0.001***  0.043  0.000*** -0.002  0.195 
BLOCK - -0.007 0.217 -0.048  0.000***  0.001  0.372 
LEV -  0.026 0.000*** -0.019  0.015**  0.001  0.400 
BM -  0.003 0.001***  0.000  0.473  0.000  0.433 
ANNRET -  0.000 0.441  0.000  0.158  0.000  0.174 
OPINC -  0.012 0.186  0.083  0.000***  0.000  0.493 
LN_ASSETS +  0.008 0.000***  0.001  0.243  0.000  0.270 
INSTMAJ - -0.002 0.225 -0.005  0.084*  0.000  0.442 
FOROPS + -0.007 0.006***  0.008  0.022**  0.000  0.332 
SPITEMS +  0.004 0.141 -0.004  0.223 -0.002  0.051* 
MERGER +  0.017 0.000***  0.006  0.081*  0.006  0.000*** 
RESTRUCT +  0.000 0.459  0.009  0.014**  0.000  0.467 
DEISSUE +  0.005 0.087*  0.008  0.075*  0.003  0.016** 
SALESGR +  0.001 0.122  0.000  0.420  0.000  0.282 
EMPLAN +  0.010 0.003*** -0.005  0.174  0.001  0.217 
Industries  included  included  included  
Years  included  included  included  
Observations  3,675  3,675  3,675  
Adjusted 𝑅2  0.069***  0.045***  0.012***  
Durbin-Watson  2.024  2.002  2.033  
The p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign and two-tailed otherwise. 









    




        
  AUDITREL_RATIO TAX_RATIO OTHER_RATIO 
Variable Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Intercept  -0.005 0.654  0.061  0.000***  0.008  0.084 
LN_STOPT ?  0.000 0.217  0.001  0.000***  0.000  0.331 
ACCTPRCT - -0.018 0.000*** -0.001  0.434  0.002  0.136 
FINPRCT -  0.008 0.047** -0.009  0.079*  0.001  0.350 
SUPERPRCT + -0.005 0.270  0.006  0.299  0.000  0.480 
ACPCT3BDS + -0.007 0.117  0.001  0.434 -0.002  0.171 
ACMBRTEN - -0.001 0.001***  0.000  0.185  0.000  0.390 
LN_MEET +/-  0.005 0.101 -0.010  0.014**  0.000  0.885 
NONACBDIND -  0.000 0.484 -0.006  0.289 -0.003  0.185 
CEOPOWER +  0.000 0.401  0.001  0.331  0.000  0.474 
BIG4 + -0.016 0.001***  0.041  0.000*** -0.002  0.197 
BLOCK - -0.007 0.217 -0.045  0.000***  0.001  0.332 
LEV -  0.025 0.000*** -0.016  0.038**  0.001  0.365 
BM -  0.003 0.001***  0.000  0.484  0.000  0.427 
ANNRET -  0.000 0.445  0.000  0.176  0.000  0.171 
OPINC -  0.011 0.190  0.085  0.000***  0.000  0.493 
LN_ASSETS +  0.008 0.000***  0.002  0.167  0.000  0.326 
INSTMAJ - -0.002 0.226 -0.006  0.079*  0.000  0.445 
FOROPS + -0.007 0.006***  0.008  0.020**  0.000  0.334 
SPITEMS +  0.004 0.141 -0.003  0.248 -0.002  0.055* 
MERGER +  0.017 0.000***  0.006  0.064*  0.006  0.000*** 
RESTRUCT +  0.000 0.455  0.009  0.013**  0.000  0.466 
DEISSUE +  0.005 0.088*  0.008  0.058*  0.003  0.014** 
SALESGR +  0.001 0.122  0.000  0.427  0.000  0.280 
EMPLAN +  0.010 0.003*** -0.004  0.239  0.001  0.203 
Industries  included  included  included  
Years  included  included  included  
Observations  3,675  3,675  3,675  
Adjusted 𝑅2  0.069***  0.049***  0.012***  
Durbin-Watson  2.023  2.006  2.033  
The p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign and two-tailed otherwise. 









    




        
  AUDITREL_RATIO TAX_RATIO OTHER_RATIO 
Variable Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Intercept  -0.005 0.627  0.069  0.000**  0.008  0.074* 
LN_STAWD ?  0.000 0.580  0.000  0.920 -0.000  0.982 
ACCTPRCT - -0.018 0.000*** -0.000  0.471  0.002  0.134 
FINPRCT -  0.008 0.048** -0.009  0.077*  0.001  0.352 
SUPERPRCT + -0.005 0.266  0.006  0.293  0.000  0.481 
ACPCT3BDS + -0.007 0.113  0.002  0.408 -0.002  0.173 
ACMBRTEN - -0.001 0.001***  0.000  0.142  0.000  0.397 
LN_MEET +/-  0.005 0.100 -0.010  0.016**  0.000  0.889 
NONACBDIND -  0.001 0.456 -0.007  0.248 -0.003  0.182 
CEOPOWER +  0.000 0.402  0.001  0.330  0.000  0.474 
BIG4 + -0.016 0.001***  0.043  0.000*** -0.002  0.204 
BLOCK - -0.007 0.232 -0.046  0.000***  0.002  0.335 
LEV -  0.026 0.000*** -0.019  0.018**  0.001  0.378 
BM -  0.003 0.001***  0.000  0.475  0.000  0.431 
ANNRET -  0.000 0.433  0.000  0.161  0.000  0.173 
OPINC -  0.012 0.182  0.083  0.000***  0.000  0.490 
LN_ASSETS +  0.008 0.000***  0.001  0.186  0.000  0.325 
INSTMAJ - -0.002 0.218 -0.006  0.082*  0.000  0.444 
FOROPS + -0.007 0.006***  0.008  0.022**  0.000  0.333 
SPITEMS +  0.004 0.137 -0.004  0.237 -0.002  0.055* 
MERGER +  0.017 0.000***  0.006  0.077*  0.006  0.000*** 
RESTRUCT +  0.000 0.473  0.009  0.014**  0.000  0.465 
DEISSUE +  0.005 0.082*  0.008  0.067*  0.003  0.014** 
SALESGR +  0.001 0.124  0.000  0.423  0.000  0.281 
EMPLAN +  0.010 0.003*** -0.005  0.184  0.001  0.209 
Industries  included  included  included  
Years  included  included  included  
Observations  3,675  3,675  3,675  
Adjusted 𝑅2  0.069***  0.045***  0.011***  
Durbin-Watson  2.024  2.003  2.033  
The p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign and two-tailed otherwise. 









    




        
  AUDITREL_RATIO TAX_RATIO OTHER_RATIO 
Variable Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Intercept  -0.008 0.479  0.075  0.000***  0.008  0.101 
ACCASH ?  0.005 0.439 -0.013  0.158  0.001  0.814 
ACCTPRCT - -0.018 0.000*** -0.001  0.470  0.002  0.133 
FINPRCT -  0.008 0.045** -0.009  0.078*  0.001  0.352 
SUPERPRCT + -0.005 0.275  0.007  0.290  0.000  0.475 
ACPCT3BDS + -0.007 0.115  0.002  0.424 -0.002  0.177 
ACMBRTEN - -0.001 0.001***  0.001  0.116  0.000  0.393 
LN_MEET +/-  0.005 0.103 -0.010  0.014**  0.000  0.894 
NONACBDIND -  0.001 0.471 -0.008  0.242 -0.003  0.185 
CEOPOWER +  0.000 0.399  0.001  0.367  0.000  0.464 
BIG4 + -0.015 0.001***  0.042  0.000*** -0.002  0.207 
BLOCK - -0.007 0.220 -0.047  0.000***  0.001  0.333 
LEV -  0.025 0.000*** -0.018  0.023**  0.001  0.380 
BM -  0.003 0.001***  0.000  0.494  0.000  0.438 
ANNRET -  0.000 0.439  0.000  0.154  0.000  0.172 
OPINC -  0.011 0.202  0.080  0.000***  0.000  0.492 
LN_ASSETS +  0.008 0.000***  0.001  0.210  0.000  0.332 
INSTMAJ - -0.002 0.226 -0.005  0.102  0.000  0.455 
FOROPS + -0.007 0.006***  0.008  0.019**  0.000  0.329 
SPITEMS +  0.004 0.146 -0.003  0.246 -0.002  0.054* 
MERGER +  0.017 0.000***  0.006  0.086*  0.006  0.000*** 
RESTRUCT +  0.000 0.487  0.008  0.016**  0.000  0.457 
DEISSUE +  0.005 0.091*  0.008  0.066*  0.003  0.014** 
SALESGR +  0.001 0.122  0.000  0.423  0.000  0.282 
EMPLAN +  0.010 0.004*** -0.004  0.201  0.001  0.210 
Industries  included  included  included  
Years  included  included  included  
Observations  3,671  3,671  3,671  
Adjusted 𝑅2  0.069***  0.045***  0.011***  
Durbin-Watson  2.025  2.003  2.033  
The p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign and two-tailed otherwise. 









    




        
  AUDITREL_RATIO TAX_RATIO OTHER_RATIO 
Variable Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Intercept  -0.005 0.658  0.063  0.000***  0.008  0.087 
ACSTOPT ? -0.002 0.343  0.019  0.012**  0.001  0.356 
ACCTPRCT - -0.018 0.000*** -0.001  0.455  0.002  0.135 
FINPRCT -  0.008 0.044** -0.009  0.074*  0.001  0.354 
SUPERPRCT + -0.005 0.268  0.007  0.280  0.000  0.472 
ACPCT3BDS + -0.007 0.114  0.001  0.429 -0.002  0.174 
ACMBRTEN - -0.001 0.001***  0.001  0.155  0.000  0.393 
LN_MEET +/-  0.005 0.106 -0.010  0.016**  0.000  0.891 
NONACBDIND -  0.000 0.485 -0.006  0.280 -0.003  0.187 
CEOPOWER +  0.000 0.413  0.001  0.357  0.000  0.473 
BIG4 + -0.016 0.001***  0.042  0.000*** -0.002  0.197 
BLOCK - -0.007 0.217 -0.046  0.000***  0.002  0.330 
LEV -  0.025 0.000*** -0.017  0.028**  0.001  0.359 
BM -  0.003 0.001***  0.000  0.488  0.000  0.424 
ANNRET -  0.000 0.446  0.000  0.168  0.000  0.171 
OPINC -  0.010 0.213  0.081  0.000***  0.000  0.499 
LN_ASSETS +  0.008 0.000***  0.002  0.147  0.000  0.331 
INSTMAJ - -0.002 0.239 -0.005  0.088*  0.000  0.451 
FOROPS + -0.007 0.006***  0.008  0.018**  0.000  0.331 
SPITEMS +  0.004 0.143 -0.003  0.252 -0.002  0.056* 
MERGER +  0.017 0.000***  0.006  0.069*  0.006  0.000*** 
RESTRUCT +  0.000 0.474  0.009  0.011**  0.000  0.463 
DEISSUE +  0.005 0.089*  0.008  0.063*  0.003  0.014** 
SALESGR +  0.001 0.121  0.000  0.438  0.000  0.278 
EMPLAN +  0.010 0.003*** -0.004  0.205  0.001  0.200 
Industries  included  included  included  
Years  included  included  included  
Observations  3,671  3,671  3,671  
Adjusted 𝑅2  0.069***  0.046***  0.011***  
Durbin-Watson  2.024  2.004  2.032  
The p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign and two-tailed otherwise. 









    




        
  AUDITREL_RATIO TAX_RATIO OTHER_RATIO 
Variable Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Intercept  -0.012 0.280  0.070  0.000***  0.006  0.153 
ACSTAWD ? -0.002 0.781 -0.007  0.384 -0.001  0.599 
ACCTPRCT - -0.018 0.000*** -0.001  0.466  0.002  0.135 
FINPRCT -  0.008 0.045** -0.009  0.076*  0.001  0.355 
SUPERPRCT + -0.005 0.269  0.008  0.271  0.000  0.477 
ACPCT3BDS + -0.007 0.112  0.002  0.412 -0.002  0.176 
ACMBRTEN - -0.001 0.001***  0.000  0.152  0.000  0.382 
LN_MEET +/-  0.005 0.105 -0.010  0.016**  0.000  0.898 
NONACBDIND -  0.001 0.473 -0.007  0.268 -0.003  0.191 
CEOPOWER +  0.000 0.414  0.001  0.327  0.000  0.206 
BIG4 + -0.016 0.000***  0.043  0.000*** -0.002  0.204 
BLOCK - -0.007 0.222 -0.047  0.000***  0.002  0.329 
LEV -  0.025 0.000*** -0.019  0.017**  0.001  0.370 
BM -  0.003 0.001***  0.000  0.463  0.000  0.434 
ANNRET -  0.000 0.441  0.000  0.164  0.000  0.169 
OPINC -  0.010 0.212  0.082  0.000***  0.000  0.491 
LN_ASSETS +  0.008 0.000***  0.002  0.151  0.000  0.347 
INSTMAJ - -0.002 0.235 -0.006  0.083*  0.000  0.460 
FOROPS + -0.007 0.007***  0.008  0.019**  0.000  0.330 
SPITEMS +  0.004 0.141 -0.004  0.234 -0.002  0.055* 
MERGER +  0.017 0.000***  0.006  0.071*  0.006  0.000*** 
RESTRUCT +  0.000 0.489  0.009  0.013**  0.000  0.468 
DEISSUE +  0.005 0.087*  0.008  0.072*  0.003  0.014** 
SALESGR +  0.001 0.124  0.000  0.422  0.000  0.279 
EMPLAN +  0.010 0.003*** -0.005  0.172  0.001  0.206 
Industries  included  included  included  
Years  included  included  included  
Observations  3,671  3,671  3,671  
Adjusted 𝑅2  0.069***  0.045***  0.011***  
Durbin-Watson  2.025  2.004  2.032  
The p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign and two-tailed otherwise. 






NACD recommends greater compensation of directors in the form of equity, I explore the 
effect equity compensation has on the purchase of NAS. Additionally, I explore whether 
the CEO can impact the audit committee’s decision to purchase NAS.  
Equity compensation. The NACD recommends compensating directors on the 
board and audit committee with at least 50 percent of equity compensation as this form 
aligns the interests of the directors with those of shareholders (NACD, 2001). Having 
examined the effect of stock award compensation and stock option compensation 
separately on the various measures of NAS, I now examine the effect equity 
compensation has on the purchase of NAS. I use the natural logarithm of equity 
(LN_EQUITY), which is composed of the sum of average stock award and average stock 
option compensation, and the ratio of equity to total audit committee member 
compensation (ACEQUITY), similar to Rickling and Sharma (2013). 
Tables 27 and 28 present the results of the regression model of FEERATIO, 
LOG_NAF and NAF_TO_AF on the equity measures LN_EQUITY and ACEQUITY, 
respectively. Both of the equity measures are not significant with FEERATIO and 
NAF_TO_AF. However, LN_EQUITY and ACEQUITY are both positively and 
significantly (p< 0.05) related to LOG_NAF. The mixed findings therefore provide some 
indication that the greater the amount and proportion of equity compensation paid to the 
audit committee members, the greater the amount of NAS purchased from the auditor. 
Results suggest that, contrary to the NACD recommendations, compensating audit 
committee members with equity may be detrimental for effective oversight as it may 
compromise the audit committee members’ objectivity and influence them to purchase 





 Table 27 
 
  
    




        
  FEERATIO LOG_NAF NAF_TO_AF 
Variable Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Intercept   0.074 0.000***  2.831  0.000***  0.141  0.001*** 
LN_EQUITY ?  0.000 0.841  0.047  0.011** -0.001  0.754 
ACCTPRCT - -0.016 0.026** -0.188  0.156 -0.037  0.017** 
FINPRCT - -0.002 0.412 -0.015  0.465  0.002  0.454 
SUPERPRCT +  0.001 0.473  0.125  0.351 -0.011  0.356 
ACPCT3BDS + -0.008 0.218  0.432  0.028** -0.015  0.247 
ACMBRTEN - -0.001 0.178  0.004  0.367 -0.002  0.092* 
LN_MEET +/- -0.005 0.275  0.173  0.115 -0.010  0.321 
NONACBDIND - -0.010 0.217  0.142  0.318 -0.045  0.058* 
CEOPOWER +  0.001 0.320 -0.017  0.377  0.003  0.309 
BIG4 +  0.025 0.001***  1.277  0.000***  0.040  0.015** 
BLOCK - -0.051 0.000*** -0.448  0.100 -0.110  0.000*** 
LEV -  0.008 0.224  0.383  0.059*  0.034  0.072* 
BM -  0.003 0.036**  0.094  0.014**  0.004  0.135 
ANNRET -  0.000 0.311  0.013  0.156  0.000  0.487 
OPINC -  0.096 0.000***  1.925  0.000***  0.144  0.001*** 
LN_ASSETS +  0.009 0.000***  0.799  0.000***  0.013  0.000*** 
INSTMAJ - -0.008 0.054* -0.256  0.009*** -0.015  0.070* 
FOROPS + -0.000 0.488  0.378  0.000*** -0.007  0.233 
SPITEMS + -0.002 0.375  0.193  0.077* -0.006  0.307 
MERGER +  0.029 0.000***  0.498  0.000***  0.047  0.000*** 
RESTRUCT +  0.008 0.045**  0.300  0.003***  0.016  0.064* 
DEISSUE +  0.016 0.005***  0.163  0.128  0.028  0.020** 
SALESGR +  0.001 0.241  0.026  0.290  0.001  0.441 
EMPLAN +  0.007 0.134  0.203  0.078  0.012  0.177 
Industries  included  included  included  
Years  included  included  included  
Observations  3,675  3,675  3,675  
Adjusted 𝑅2  0.053***  0.237***  0.032***  
Durbin-Watson  2.043  2.026  2.036  
The p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign and two-tailed otherwise. 
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  FEERATIO LOG_NAF NAF_TO_AF 
Variable Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Intercept   0.069 0.000***  2.956  0.000***  0.129  0.002*** 
ACEQUITY ?  0.007 0.506  0.518  0.041**  0.016  0.511 
ACCTPRCT - -0.016 0.025** -0.191  0.153 -0.037  0.016** 
FINPRCT - -0.002 0.421 -0.014  0.468  0.002  0.446 
SUPERPRCT +  0.001 0.469  0.109  0.369 -0.011  0.360 
ACPCT3BDS + -0.008 0.208  0.432  0.028** -0.015  0.237 
ACMBRTEN -  0.000 0.199  0.005  0.344 -0.002  0.105 
LN_MEET +/- -0.005 0.260  0.182  0.097* -0.011  0.302 
NONACBDIND - -0.011 0.213  0.170  0.286 -0.045  0.055* 
CEOPOWER +  0.001 0.347 -0.023  0.334  0.002  0.335 
BIG4 +  0.025 0.002***  1.290  0.000***  0.039  0.018** 
BLOCK - -0.052 0.000*** -0.407  0.122 -0.111  0.000*** 
LEV -  0.008 0.222  0.411  0.048**  0.034  0.071* 
BM -  0.003 0.034**  0.097  0.011**  0.005  0.129 
ANNRET -  0.000 0.302  0.012  0.175  0.000  0.476 
OPINC -  0.092 0.000***  1.883  0.000***  0.137  0.002*** 
LN_ASSETS +  0.009 0.000***  0.802  0.000***  0.013  0.000*** 
INSTMAJ - -0.007 0.066* -0.251  0.011** -0.014  0.084* 
FOROPS + -0.000 0.469  0.378  0.000*** -0.007  0.247 
SPITEMS + -0.002 0.379  0.195  0.076* -0.006  0.313 
MERGER +  0.029 0.000***  0.506  0.000***  0.047  0.000*** 
RESTRUCT +  0.008 0.046**  0.306  0.002***  0.016  0.064* 
DEISSUE +  0.016 0.005***  0.169  0.119  0.028  0.020** 
SALESGR +  0.001 0.241  0.026  0.286  0.001  0.442 
EMPLAN +  0.007 0.132  0.207  0.074  0.013  0.173 
Industries  included  included  included  
Years  included  included  included  
Observations  3,671  3,671  3,671  
Adjusted 𝑅2  0.052***  0.236***  0.032***  
Durbin-Watson  2.043  2.024  2.036  
The p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign and two-tailed otherwise. 






FEERATIO Greater than 5 Percent. Section 202 of the SOX Act requires 
preapproval of NAS when these services are greater than five percent of the total fees 
(audit and non-audit) paid to the audit firm. The perception of the SEC is that the higher 
the ratio of non-audit fees to total fees, the greater the likelihood the auditor may 
compromise independence. Further analysis was performed in order to gain an 
understanding if the percentage of FEERATIO threshold affects the results. To test this 
effect, I split the sample into firms with FEERATIO greater than five percent and firms 
with FEERATIO less than or equal to five percent. Approximately 2,820 firm-years 
(76.8%) have a FEERATIO of greater than five percent while the remaining 854 firm-
years (23.3%) have a FEERATIO of less than or equal to five percent.  
Using the sample of firms with FEERATIO greater than five percent, I ran 
regressions with FEERATIO on all the forms of compensation. The results from the 
regression models of FEERATIO on the various compensation measures are presented in 
Tables 29 to 35. Results indicate that stock option and stock award compensation are 
associated with the purchase of NAS. The coefficients for LN_STOPT (p=0.001) and 
ACSTOPT (p=0.007) are both positive and highly significant. Total compensation 
(LN_TOTCOMP) and cash compensation (LN_CASH and ACCASH) are not significant. 
One implication of these findings is that firms compensating their audit committee 
members with greater levels and proportion of stock options  purchase larger proportions 
of NAS that are greater than the five percent threshold established by SOX.  
Results in Tables 32 and 35 show the coefficients on LN_STAWD and 
ACSTAWD are negative, with LN_STAWD being marginally significant (p=0.097) and 





committee is compensated with greater levels and proportion of stock awards and the 
firm is purchasing NAS beyond the five percent threshold, this form of compensation 
may be motivating the audit committee members to reduce the purchase of NAS.  
Using the sample of firms with FEERATIO less than or equal to five percent, I also ran 
regression models with the various forms of compensation (refer to Tables 29 to 35). The 
results show that LN_TOTCOMP (p=0.006) and LN_STAWD (p=0.029) are positively 
and significantly related to FEERATIO, while ACCASH is negative and significant 
(p=.043) (Table 33). LN_CASHCOMP, LN_STOPT, ACSTOPT and ACSTAWD are not 
significant. These results differ from those obtained with the sample of FEERATIO 
greater than five percent. They reveal when firms purchase smaller proportions of NAS 
(less than or equal to five percent of total fees) and the percentage of cash compensation 
in the compensation structure increases, the audit committee reduces the amount of NAS 
purchased. Conversely, when firms purchase low proportions of NAS and compensate 
the audit committee with greater levels and proportions of stock awards, this form of 
compensation seems to be associated with purchasing more NAS.  
In summary, based on results obtained with the two samples of FEERATIO, the 
form of compensation does seem to affect the proportion of NAS being purchased. When 
firms purchase small proportions of NAS, audit committee cash compensation is 
associated with small purchases of NAS. When companies purchase larger proportions of 
NAS, stock option compensation seems to motivate the audit committee to purchase 
more NAS. Stock award compensation, on the other hand, appears to reduce the purchase 






 Table 29 
 
  
    
 Regression of FEERATIO on LN_TOTCOMP 
Sample of FEERATIO Greater than 5 Percent and  
FEERATIO Less than or equal to 5 Percent 
 
  
        
  FEERATIO > 5% FEERATIO < 5%  
Variable Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value   
Intercept   0.184 0.000*** -0.044  0.000***   
LN_TOTCOMP ?  0.003 0.456  0.003  0.006**   
ACCTPRCT - -0.017 0.022** -0.191  0.206   
FINPRCT - -0.005 0.275 -0.014  0.052   
SUPERPRCT + -0.015 0.152  0.109  0.196   
ACPCT3BDS + -0.010 0.162  0.432  0.482   
ACMBRTEN -  0.000 0.316  0.005  0.265   
LN_MEET +/- -0.009 0.092*  0.182  0.623   
NONACBDIND - -0.018 0.101  0.170  0.188   
CEOPOWER +  0.004 0.069* -0.023  0.114   
BIG4 +  0.013 0.095*  1.290  0.001***   
BLOCK - -0.059 0.000*** -0.407  0.431   
LEV -  0.018 0.061*  0.411  0.013**   
BM -  0.002 0.177  0.097  0.301   
ANNRET -  0.000 0.499  0.012  0.400   
OPINC -  0.048 0.023**  1.883  0.137   
LN_ASSETS +  0.001 0.397  0.802  0.000***   
INSTMAJ - -0.009 0.044* -0.251  0.162   
FOROPS + -0.003 0.301  0.378  0.133   
SPITEMS + -0.003 0.331  0.195  0.015**   
MERGER +  0.021 0.000***  0.506  0.378   
RESTRUCT +  0.002 0.348  0.306  0.298   
DEISSUE +  0.015 0.013**  0.169  0.053*   
SALESGR +  0.000 0.397  0.026  0.093*   
EMPLAN + -0.001 0.463  0.207  0.114   
Industries  included  included    
Years  included  included    
Observations  2,820  854    
Adjusted 𝑅2  0.033***  0.111***    
Durbin-Watson  2.070  1.883    
The p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign and two-tailed otherwise. 







 Table 30 
 
  
    
 Regression of FEERATIO on LN_CASHCOMP 
Sample of FEERATIO Greater than 5 Percent and  
FEERATIO Less than or equal to 5 percent 
 
  
        
  FEERATIO > 5% FEERATIO < 5%  
Variable Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value   
Intercept   0.191 0.000*** -0.013  0.027**   
LN_CASHCOMP ?  0.003 0.108  0.000  0.784   
ACCTPRCT - -0.017 0.022** -0.002  0.189   
FINPRCT - -0.005 0.276  0.003  0.055   
SUPERPRCT + -0.015 0.154 -0.004  0.184   
ACPCT3BDS + -0.011 0.155  0.000  0.492   
ACMBRTEN -  0.000 0.297  0.000  0.250   
LN_MEET +/- -0.009 0.097*  0.001  0.378   
NONACBDIND - -0.018 0.100  0.003  0.227   
CEOPOWER +  0.004 0.066* -0.023  0.155   
BIG4 +  0.014 0.089*  0.006  0.000***   
BLOCK - -0.060 0.000***  0.002  0.299   
LEV -  0.017 0.071*  0.006  0.020**   
BM -  0.002 0.190  0.000  0.404   
ANNRET -  0.000 0.495  0.000  0.379   
OPINC -  0.048 0.022**  0.016  0.145   
LN_ASSETS +  0.001 0.379  0.003  0.000***   
INSTMAJ - -0.009 0.040* -0.002  0.097*   
FOROPS + -0.002 0.311  0.002  0.120   
SPITEMS + -0.003 0.312  0.004  0.014**   
MERGER +  0.021 0.000***  0.000  0.406   
RESTRUCT +  0.002 0.355  0.001  0.266   
DEISSUE +  0.015 0.016** -0.003  0.050**   
SALESGR +  0.000 0.397 -0.002  0.138   
EMPLAN + -0.001 0.423  0.002  0.155   
Industries  included  included    
Years  included  included    
Observations  2,820  854    
Adjusted 𝑅2  0.033***  0.103***    
Durbin-Watson  2.071  1.893    
The p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign and two-tailed otherwise. 







 Table 31 
 
  
    
 Regression of FEERATIO on LN_STOPT 
Sample of FEERATIO Greater than 5 Percent and  
FEERATIO Less than or equal to 5 Percent 
 
  
        
  FEERATIO > 5% FEERATIO < 5%  
Variable Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value   
Intercept   0.211 0.000*** -0.013  0.009*   
LN_STOPT ?  0.001 0.001***  0.000  0.154   
ACCTPRCT - -0.018 0.018** -0.002  0.188   
FINPRCT - -0.004 0.313  0.003  0.064*   
SUPERPRCT + -0.015 0.157 -0.004  0.150   
ACPCT3BDS + -0.010 0.161  0.000  0.485   
ACMBRTEN -  0.000 0.262  0.000  0.252   
LN_MEET +/- -0.009 0.096*  0.001  0.374   
NONACBDIND - -0.017 0.123 -0.002  0.246   
CEOPOWER +  0.004 0.065*  0.004  0.154   
BIG4 +  0.012 0.111  0.006  0.000***   
BLOCK - -0.057 0.000***  0.002  0.301   
LEV -  0.020 0.041**  0.006  0.013***   
BM -  0.002 0.175  0.000  0.358   
ANNRET -  0.000 0.477  0.000  0.384   
OPINC -  0.049 0.019**  0.006  0.132   
LN_ASSETS +  0.001 0.277  0.003  0.000***   
INSTMAJ - -0.009 0.039** -0.002  0.092*   
FOROPS + -0.002 0.314  0.002  0.116   
SPITEMS + -0.003 0.336  0.004  0.013**   
MERGER +  0.022 0.000***  0.000  0.403   
RESTRUCT +  0.002 0.335  0.001  0.269   
DEISSUE +  0.016 0.010** -0.003  0.046***   
SALESGR +  0.001 0.395 -0.003  0.125   
EMPLAN +  0.000 0.474  0.002  0.154   
Industries  included  included    
Years  included  included    
Observations  2,820  854    
Adjusted 𝑅2  0.036***  0.104**    
Durbin-Watson  2.072  1.896    
The p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign and two-tailed otherwise. 









    
 Regression of FEERATIO on LN_STAWD 
Sample of FEERATIO Greater than 5 Percent and  
FEERATIO Less than or equal to 5 Percent 
 
  
        
  FEERATIO > 5% FEERATIO < 5%  
Variable Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value   
Intercept   0.218 0.000*** -0.013  0.010*   
LN_STAWD ? -0.001 0.097*  0.000  0.029**   
ACCTPRCT - -0.017 0.023** -0.002  0.193   
FINPRCT - -0.005 0.271  0.004  0.039**   
SUPERPRCT + -0.016 0.139 -0.003  0.199   
ACPCT3BDS + -0.010 0.161  0.000  0.495   
ACMBRTEN -  0.000 0.275  0.000  0.192   
LN_MEET +/- -0.008 0.104  0.001  0.418   
NONACBDIND - -0.016 0.131 -0.003  0.170   
CEOPOWER +  0.004 0.065*  0.002  0.164   
BIG4 +  0.015 0.076*  0.006  0.000***   
BLOCK - -0.057 0.000***  0.001  0.361   
LEV -  0.019 0.057*  0.005  0.027**   
BM -  0.002 0.199  0.000  0.485   
ANNRET -  0.000 0.477  0.000  0.376   
OPINC -  0.049 0.021**  0.005  0.176   
LN_ASSETS +  0.001 0.245  0.003  0.000***   
INSTMAJ - -0.009 0.034** -0.001  0.119   
FOROPS + -0.003 0.294  0.001  0.136   
SPITEMS + -0.003 0.334  0.004  0.015**   
MERGER +  0.022 0.000***  0.000  0.462   
RESTRUCT +  0.003 0.290  0.000  0.358   
DEISSUE +  0.016 0.011** -0.003  0.046***   
SALESGR +  0.000 0.405 -0.002  0.164   
EMPLAN + -0.001 0.447  0.002  0.154   
Industries  included  included    
Years  included  included    
Observations  2,820  854    
Adjusted 𝑅2  0.033***  0.103**    
Durbin-Watson  2.069  1.894    
The p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign and two-tailed otherwise. 









    
 Regression of FEERATIO on ACCASH 
Sample of FEERATIO Greater than 5 Percent and  
FEERATIO Less than or equal to 5 percent 
 
  
        
  FEERATIO > 5% FEERATIO < 5%  
Variable Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value   
Intercept   0.210 0.000*** -0.008  0.105   
ACCASH ?  0.008 0.515 -0.006  0.043**   
ACCTPRCT - -0.017 0.022** -0.002  0.202   
FINPRCT - -0.005 0.279  0.003  0.060*   
SUPERPRCT + -0.015 0.161 -0.004  0.131   
ACPCT3BDS + -0.010 0.164  0.000  0.446   
ACMBRTEN -  0.000 0.303  0.000  0.226   
LN_MEET +/- -0.008 0.099*  0.001  0.381   
NONACBDIND - -0.017 0.111 -0.003  0.216   
CEOPOWER +  0.004 0.066*  0.004  0.154   
BIG4 +  0.014 0.083*  0.006  0.000***   
BLOCK - -0.059 0.000***  0.002  0.343   
LEV -  0.017 0.079*  0.007  0.008***   
BM -  0.001 0.209  0.000  0.356   
ANNRET -  0.000 0.497  0.000  0.385   
OPINC -  0.046 0.028**  0.006  0.140   
LN_ASSETS +  0.001 0.279  0.003  0.000***   
INSTMAJ - -0.009 0.043* -0.001  0.116   
FOROPS + -0.002 0.328  0.002  0.110   
SPITEMS + -0.003 0.318  0.004  0.012**   
MERGER +  0.021 0.000***  0.000  0.392   
RESTRUCT +  0.002 0.331  0.001  0.315   
DEISSUE +  0.015 0.016** -0.003  0.048***   
SALESGR +  0.000 0.390 -0.003  0.097*   
EMPLAN + -0.002 0.404  0.002  0.148   
Industries  included  included    
Years  included  included    
Observations  2,816  854    
Adjusted 𝑅2  0.032***  0.107**    
Durbin-Watson  2.073  1.901    
The p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign and two-tailed otherwise. 










    
 Regression of FEERATIO on ACSTOPT 
Sample of FEERATIO Greater than 5 Percent and  
FEERATIO Less than or equal to 5 percent 
 
  
        
  FEERATIO > 5% FEERATIO < 5%  
Variable Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value   
Intercept   0.205 0.000*** -0.013  0.009*   
ACSTOPT ?  0.027 0.007***  0.001  0.154   
ACCTPRCT - -0.018 0.019** -0.002  0.192   
FINPRCT - -0.005 0.288  0.003  0.059*   
SUPERPRCT + -0.014 0.178 -0.004  0.168   
ACPCT3BDS + -0.011 0.152  0.000  0.497   
ACMBRTEN -  0.000 0.296  0.000  0.251   
LN_MEET +/- -0.008 0.104  0.001  0.374   
NONACBDIND - -0.016 0.124 -0.002  0.237   
CEOPOWER +  0.004 0.081*  0.004  0.154   
BIG4 +  0.013 0.092*  0.006  0.000***   
BLOCK - -0.058 0.000***  0.002  0.288   
LEV -  0.019 0.051*  0.006  0.017**   
BM -  0.002 0.168  0.000  0.384   
ANNRET -  0.000 0.489  0.000  0.378   
OPINC -  0.043 0.037**  0.006  0.140   
LN_ASSETS +  0.001 0.249  0.003  0.000***   
INSTMAJ - -0.009 0.046** -0.002  0.095*   
FOROPS + -0.002 0.328  0.002  0.115   
SPITEMS + -0.002 0.343  0.004  0.013**   
MERGER +  0.021 0.000***  0.000  0.401   
RESTRUCT +  0.003 0.296  0.001  0.271   
DEISSUE +  0.016 0.011** -0.003  0.048***   
SALESGR +  0.000 0.412 -0.003  0.127   
EMPLAN +  0.000 0.486  0.002  0.154   
Industries  included  included    
Years  included  included    
Observations  2,816  854    
Adjusted 𝑅2  0.034***  0.104**    
Durbin-Watson  2.072  1.896    
The p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign and two-tailed otherwise. 








    
 Regression of FEERATIO on ACSTAWD 
Sample of FEERATIO Greater than 5 Percent and  
FEERATIO Less than or equal to 5 percent 
 
  
        
  FEERATIO > 5% FEERATIO < 5%  
Variable Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value   
Intercept   0.226 0.000*** -0.013  0.009***   
ACSTAWD ? -0.027 0.007***  0.003  0.190   
ACCTPRCT - -0.018 0.020** -0.002  0.196   
FINPRCT - -0.005 0.276  0.004  0.049**   
SUPERPRCT + -0.014 0.181 -0.004  0.188   
ACPCT3BDS + -0.011 0.156  0.000  0.479   
ACMBRTEN -  0.000 0.241  0.000  0.217   
LN_MEET +/- -0.008 0.113  0.001  0.361   
NONACBDIND - -0.016 0.134 -0.003  0.206   
CEOPOWER +  0.004 0.061*  0.002  0.164   
BIG4 +  0.014 0.078*  0.006  0.000***   
BLOCK - -0.059 0.000***  0.001  0.317   
LEV -  0.017 0.069*  0.006  0.020**   
BM -  0.001 0.212  0.000  0.439   
ANNRET -  0.000 0.474  0.000  0.387   
OPINC -  0.047 0.026**  0.006  0.159   
LN_ASSETS +  0.002 0.199  0.003  0.000***   
INSTMAJ - -0.009 0.036** -0.002  0.112   
FOROPS + -0.002 0.329  0.001  0.123   
SPITEMS + -0.003 0.320  0.004  0.014**   
MERGER +  0.022 0.000***  0.000  0.425   
RESTRUCT +  0.003 0.290  0.001  0.311   
DEISSUE +  0.015 0.014** -0.003  0.055*   
SALESGR +  0.000 0.406 -0.002  0.127   
EMPLAN + -0.001 0.412  0.002  0.155   
Industries  included  included    
Years  included  included    
Observations  2,816  854    
Adjusted 𝑅2  0.034***  0.105**    
Durbin-Watson  2.073  1.897    
The p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign and two-tailed otherwise. 






Analyses of Quartiles of FEERATIO. To further understand whether the audit 
committee becomes more sensitive to the purchase of NAS when small or larger amounts 
are purchased, the sample was partitioned into quartiles of FEERATIO. There are 914 
firms in Quartile 1 and 918 firms in Quartile 4. Un-tabulated results show firms in 
Quartile 1 purchase an average of $67,161 of NAS, with a maximum of $1,180,890, 
while firms in Quartile 4 purchase on average $2,155,167 of NAS, with a maximum of 
$38,400,000. Tables 36 through 44 present the results of Quartile 1 and Quartile 4 for 
total compensation, cash compensation, stock option compensation, stock awards 
compensation, and equity compensation measures.  
When examining total compensation paid to the audit committee 
(LN_TOTCOMP) the variable is positive and significant (p=0.004) in Quartile 1 (Q1) but 
becomes not significant in Quartile 4 (Q4) suggesting that total audit committee 
members’ compensation impacts the proportion of NAS purchased but as the proportion 
of NAS purchases increases, the amount of total compensation paid to the audit 
committee member does not impact the NAS purchase decision (see Table 36). This may 
be because different types of compensation have varying effects on the NAS purchase 
decision at higher proportions of NAS. I now turn to the types of compensation to 
provide some insights. 
When cash compensation is regressed on FEERATIO for the sample in Q1, 
LN_CASHCOMP is positive but not significant while ACCASH (p=0.025) is negative 
and significant. In Q4, both LN_CASHCOMP and ACCASH are not significant (see 









 Regression of FEERATIO on LN_TOTCOMP using Quartiles 
 
      
  QUARTILE 1 
 
QUARTILE 4  
Variable Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Intercept  -0.050 0.000***  0.320  0.000*** 
LN_TOTCOMP +/-  0.004 0.004***  0.007  0.206 
ACCTPRCT - -0.002 0.160 -0.028  0.007*** 
FINPRCT - -0.005 0.009***  0.025  0.013** 
SUPERPRCT + -0.002 0.315  0.010  0.315 
ACPCT3BDS + -0.000 0.486  0.003  0.416 
ACMBRTEN -  0.000 0.264 -0.002  0.016** 
LN_MEET +/-  0.000 0.867 -0.007  0.293 
NONACBDIND - -0.002 0.265 -0.048  0.005*** 
CEOPOWER + -0.001 0.044** -0.003  0.161 
BIG4 +  0.006 0.000***  0.002  0.432 
BLOCK - -0.001 0.373 -0.043  0.027** 
LEV -  0.005 0.029**  0.066  0.001*** 
BM -  0.001 0.165 -0.001  0.350 
ANNRET -  0.000 0.428 -0.001  0.076* 
OPINC -  0.006 0.177  0.030  0.164 
LN_ASSETS +  0.002 0.000*** -0.002  0.259 
INSTMAJ - -0.001 0.191 -0.011  0.054* 
FOROPS + -0.002 0.079* -0.006  0.179 
SPITEMS +  0.004 0.018** -0.007  0.175 
MERGER +  0.001 0.198  0.006  0.180 
RESTRUCT +  0.001 0.148  0.003  0.337 
DEISSUE + -0.002 0.071* -0.003  0.367 
SALESGR + -0.004 0.033** -0.008  0.266 
EMPLAN + -0.004 0.019** -0.003  0.163 
Industries  included  included  
Years  included  included  
Observations  914  918  
Adjusted 𝑅2  0.134***  0.054***  
Durbin-Watson  1.888  2.093  
The p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign and two-tailed otherwise. 
(***), (**), (*) denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.                                 









 Regression of FEERATIO on LN_CASHCOMP using Quartiles 
 
      
  QUARTILE 1 
 
QUARTILE 4  
Variable Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Intercept  -0.009 0.174  0.358  0.000*** 
LN_CASHCOMP +/-  0.000 0.761  0.004  0.191 
ACCTPRCT - -0.002 0.146 -0.028  0.007*** 
FINPRCT - -0.005 0.011**  0.025  0.013** 
SUPERPRCT + -0.002 0.306  0.011  0.307 
ACPCT3BDS + -0.000 0.499  0.003  0.433 
ACMBRTEN -  0.000 0.259 -0.002  0.012** 
LN_MEET +/-  0.001 0.566 -0.007  0.312 
NONACBDIND - -0.002 0.303 -0.048  0.005*** 
CEOPOWER + -0.001 0.053* -0.003  0.179 
BIG4 +  0.007 0.000***  0.003  0.426 
BLOCK - -0.000 0.484 -0.041  0.033** 
LEV -  0.005 0.041** -0.063  0.000*** 
BM -  0.001 0.260 -0.001  0.304 
ANNRET -  0.000 0.405 -0.001  0.067* 
OPINC -  0.005 0.186  0.030  0.164 
LN_ASSETS +  0.003 0.000*** -0.002  0.336 
INSTMAJ - -0.001 0.122 -0.012  0.043** 
FOROPS + -0.002 0.068* -0.006  0.182 
SPITEMS +  0.004 0.017** -0.007  0.178 
MERGER +  0.001 0.209  0.006  0.195 
RESTRUCT +  0.002 0.123  0.003  0.310 
DEISSUE + -0.002 0.068* -0.002  0.403 
SALESGR + -0.004 0.056* -0.010  0.290 
EMPLAN + -0.004 0.032** -0.003  0.125 
Industries  included  included  
Years  included  included  
Observations  914  918  
Adjusted 𝑅2  0.126***  0.054***  
Durbin-Watson  1.896  2.098  
The p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign and two-tailed otherwise. 









 Regression of FEERATIO on LN_STOPT using Quartiles 
 
      
  QUARTILE 1 
 
QUARTILE 4  
Variable Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Intercept  -0.016 0.001***  0.388  0.000*** 
LN_STOPT +/-  0.000 0.231  0.002  0.005*** 
ACCTPRCT - -0.003 0.144 -0.030  0.004** 
FINPRCT - -0.005 0.013**  0.027  0.009 
SUPERPRCT + -0.002 0.273  0.008  0.344 
ACPCT3BDS + -0.000 0.481  0.004  0.399 
ACMBRTEN -  0.000 0.262 -0.002  0.011** 
LN_MEET +/-  0.001 0.567 -0.006  0.326 
NONACBDIND - -0.002 0.327 -0.048  0.005*** 
CEOPOWER + -0.001 0.051* -0.003  0.162 
BIG4 +  0.007 0.000***  0.002  0.451 
BLOCK -  0.000 0.484 -0.038  0.041** 
LEV -  0.005 0.031** -0.067  0.000*** 
BM -  0.001 0.233 -0.001  0.297 
ANNRET -  0.000 0.408 -0.001  0.085* 
OPINC -  0.006 0.177  0.030  0.158 
LN_ASSETS +  0.003 0.000*** -0.001  0.422 
INSTMAJ - -0.002 0.116 -0.012  0.044** 
FOROPS + -0.002 0.065* -0.007  0.158 
SPITEMS +  0.004 0.017** -0.007  0.188 
MERGER +  0.001 0.206  0.007  0.162 
RESTRUCT +  0.002 0.127  0.004  0.289 
DEISSUE + -0.003 0.064* -0.003  0.367 
SALESGR + -0.004 0.049** -0.008  0.224 
EMPLAN + -0.004 0.031** -0.003  0.173 
Industries  included  included  
Years  included  included  
Observations  914  918  
Adjusted 𝑅2  0.127***  0.059***  
Durbin-Watson  1.898  2.089  
The p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign and two-tailed otherwise. 









 Regression of FEERATIO on LN_STAWD using Quartiles 
 
      
  QUARTILE 1 
 
QUARTILE 4  
Variable Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Intercept  -0.016 0.001***  0.403  0.000*** 
LN_STAWD +/-  0.000 0.021** -0.001  0.106 
ACCTPRCT - -0.003 0.144 -0.027  0.008*** 
FINPRCT - -0.005 0.006***  0.025  0.015** 
SUPERPRCT + -0.002 0.319  0.010  0.321 
ACPCT3BDS + -0.000 0.496  0.002  0.439 
ACMBRTEN -  0.000 0.193 -0.002  0.010** 
LN_MEET +/-  0.001 0.610 -0.007  0.301 
NONACBDIND - -0.003 0.230 -0.045  0.008*** 
CEOPOWER + -0.001 0.055* -0.003  0.205 
BIG4 +  0.007 0.000***  0.003  0.412 
BLOCK - -0.001 0.451 -0.038  0.046** 
LEV -  0.005 0.053** -0.066  0.000*** 
BM -  0.001 0.325 -0.001  0.271 
ANNRET -  0.000 0.391 -0.001  0.058* 
OPINC -  0.005 0.216  0.030  0.164 
LN_ASSETS +  0.003 0.000*** -0.002  0.464 
INSTMAJ - -0.001 0.149 -0.012  0.047** 
FOROPS +  0.002 0.077* -0.006  0.181 
SPITEMS +  0.004 0.017** -0.007  0.192 
MERGER +  0.001 0.262  0.007  0.159 
RESTRUCT +  0.001 0.180  0.004  0.252 
DEISSUE + -0.003 0.061* -0.003  0.353 
SALESGR + -0.004 0.058* -0.011  0.221 
EMPLAN + -0.003 0.037** -0.003  0.107 
Industries  included  included  
Years  included  included  
Observations  914  918  
Adjusted 𝑅2  0.131***  0.055***  
Durbin-Watson  1.902  2.094  
The p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign and two-tailed otherwise. 









 Regression of FEERATIO on LN_EQUITY using Quartiles 
 
      
  QUARTILE 1 
 
QUARTILE 4  
Variable Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Intercept  -0.011 0.034**  0.387  0.000*** 
LN_EQUITY +/-  0.001 0.006*** -0.001  0.572 
ACCTPRCT - -0.002 0.161 -0.028  0.008*** 
FINPRCT -  0.005 0.008***  0.025  0.013** 
SUPERPRCT + -0.003 0.235  0.011  0.303 
ACPCT3BDS +  0.000 0.452  0.003  0.426 
ACMBRTEN -  0.000 0.251 -0.002  0.014** 
LN_MEET +/-  0.001 0.678 -0.007  0.301 
NONACBDIND - -0.002 0.240 -0.047  0.006*** 
CEOPOWER + -0.001 0.059* -0.003  0.187 
BIG4 +  0.006 0.000***  0.003  0.421 
BLOCK - -0.001 0.377 -0.039  0.039** 
LEV -  0.006 0.262 -0.064  0.000** 
BM -  0.001 0.282 -0.001  0.287 
ANNRET -  0.000 0.432 -0.001  0.064* 
OPINC -  0.006 0.173  0.028  0.181 
LN_ASSETS +  0.003 0.000***  0.000  0.427 
INSTMAJ - -0.001 0.124 -0.012  0.050 
FOROPS +  0.002 0.056* -0.006  0.182 
SPITEMS +  0.004 0.016** -0.007  0.183 
MERGER +  0.001 0.234  0.006  0.186 
RESTRUCT +  0.001 0.147  0.004  0.286 
DEISSUE + -0.003 0.062* -0.002  0.393 
SALESGR + -0.004 0.034** -0.003  0.280 
EMPLAN +  0.003 0.037** -0.011  0.109 
Industries  included  included  
Years  included  included  
Observations  914  918  
Adjusted 𝑅2  0.134***  0.053***  
Durbin-Watson  1.909  2.092  
The p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign and two-tailed otherwise. 









 Regression of FEERATIO on ACCASH using Quartiles 
 
      
  QUARTILE 1 
 
QUARTILE 4  
Variable Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Intercept  -0.003 0.565  0.398  0.000*** 
ACCASH +/- -0.007 0.025** -0.002  0.922 
ACCTPRCT - -0.002 0.158 -0.028  0.007*** 
FINPRCT - -0.005 0.011**  0.025  0.013** 
SUPERPRCT + -0.003 0.228  0.011  0.303 
ACPCT3BDS + -0.000 0.441  0.003  0.419 
ACMBRTEN -  0.000 0.231 -0.002  0.018** 
LN_MEET +/-  0.001 0.584 -0.007  0.924 
NONACBDIND - -0.002 0.292 -0.047  0.006*** 
CEOPOWER + -0.007 0.031** -0.003  0.177 
BIG4 +  0.000 0.000***  0.003  0.422 
BLOCK - -0.000 0.464 -0.040  0.035** 
LEV -  0.006 0.017** -0.064  0.000* 
BM -  0.001 0.211 -0.001  0.294 
ANNRET -  0.000 0.407 -0.001  0.073* 
OPINC -  0.005 0.185  0.027  0.193 
LN_ASSETS +  0.003 0.000*** -0.001  0.405 
INSTMAJ - -0.001 0.141 -0.012  0.051* 
FOROPS + -0.002 0.060* -0.006  0.184 
SPITEMS +  0.004 0.015** -0.007  0.181 
MERGER +  0.001 0.198  0.006  0.190 
RESTRUCT +  0.001 0.153  0.003  0.304 
DEISSUE + -0.003 0.061* -0.003  0.386 
SALESGR + -0.004 0.034* -0.010  0.278 
EMPLAN + -0.004 0.031** -0.003  0.127 
Industries  included  included  
Years  included  included  
Observations  914  918  
Adjusted 𝑅2  0.131***  0.051***  
Durbin-Watson  1.905  2.089  
The p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign and two-tailed otherwise. 










 Regression of FEERATIO on ACSTOPT using Quartiles 
 
      
  QUARTILE 1 
 
QUARTILE 4  
Variable Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Intercept  -0.007 0.138  0.385  0.000*** 
ACSTOPT +/-  0.000 0.491  0.033  0.011** 
ACCTPRCT - -0.003 0.148 -0.029  0.005*** 
FINPRCT - -0.005 0.011**  0.026  0.012** 
SUPERPRCT + -0.002 0.300  0.008  0.354 
ACPCT3BDS + -0.000 0.491  0.004  0.396 
ACMBRTEN -  0.000 0.254 -0.002  0.014** 
LN_MEET +/-  0.001 0.555 -0.007  0.317 
NONACBDIND - -0.002 0.309 -0.046  0.006*** 
CEOPOWER + -0.001 0.052* -0.003  0.156 
BIG4 +  0.007 0.000***  0.002  0.424 
BLOCK -  0.000 0.472 -0.046  0.037** 
LEV -  0.005 0.040** -0.068  0.000*** 
BM -  0.001 0.260 -0.001  0.332 
ANNRET -  0.000 0.405 -0.001  0.076* 
OPINC -  0.006 0.186  0.028  0.179 
LN_ASSETS +  0.003 0.000***  0.000  0.457 
INSTMAJ - -0.002 0.120 -0.012  0.050** 
FOROPS + -0.002 0.066* -0.006  0.163 
SPITEMS +  0.004 0.0177** -0.006  0.196 
MERGER +  0.001 0.210  0.007  0.161 
RESTRUCT +  0.002 0.129  0.004  0.264 
DEISSUE + -0.003 0.068* -0.004  0.341 
SALESGR + -0.004 0.052* -0.008  0.185 
EMPLAN + -0.004 0.032** -0.003  0.163 
Industries  included  included  
Years  included  included  
Observations  914  918  
Adjusted 𝑅2  0.126***  0.057***  
Durbin-Watson  1.898  2.086  
The p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign and two-tailed otherwise. 










 Regression of FEERATIO on ACSTAWD using Quartiles 
 
      
  QUARTILE 1 
 
QUARTILE 4  
Variable Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Intercept  -0.008 0.094*  0.403  0.000*** 
ACSTAWD +/-  0.004 0.069* -0.027  0.043** 
ACCTPRCT - -0.002 0.152 -0.028  0.006*** 
FINPRCT - -0.005 0.009***  0.025  0.014** 
SUPERPRCT + -0.002 0.308  0.007  0.361 
ACPCT3BDS +  0.000 0.473  0.003  0.424 
ACMBRTEN -  0.000 0.209 -0.002  0.008*** 
LN_MEET +/-  0.001 0.538 -0.006  0.365 
NONACBDIND - -0.002 0.265 -0.045  0.008*** 
CEOPOWER + -0.001 0.046** -0.003  0.220 
BIG4 +  0.007 0.000***  0.003  0.419 
BLOCK - -0.000 0.489 -0.038  0.046** 
LEV -  0.005 0.041** -0.065  0.000*** 
BM -  0.001 0.297 -0.001  0.280 
ANNRET -  0.000 0.406 -0.001  0.057* 
OPINC -  0.005 0.206  0.030  0.161 
LN_ASSETS +  0.003 0.000*** -0.000  0.496 
INSTMAJ - -0.001 0.143 -0.012  0.044** 
FOROPS +  0.002 0.070* -0.006  0.166 
SPITEMS +  0.004 0.017** -0.007  0.192 
MERGER +  0.001 0.230  0.007  0.161 
RESTRUCT +  0.001 0.155  0.005  0.241 
DEISSUE + -0.002 0.072* -0.003  0.386 
SALESGR + -0.004 0.050** -0.003  0.226 
EMPLAN +  0.003 0.034** -0.011  0.104 
Industries  included  included  
Years  included  included  
Observations  914  918  
Adjusted 𝑅2  0.129***  0.056***  
Durbin-Watson  1.902  2.096  
The p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign and two-tailed otherwise. 









 Regression of FEERATIO on ACEQUITY using Quartiles 
 
      
  QUARTILE 1 
 
QUARTILE 4  
Variable Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Intercept  -0.010 0.056*  0.396  0.000*** 
ACEQUITY ?  0.007 0.025**  0.002  0.922 
ACCTPRCT - -0.002 0.158 -0.028  0.007*** 
FINPRCT - -0.005 0.011**  0.025  0.013 
SUPERPRCT + -0.003 0.228  0.011  0.303 
ACPCT3BDS +  0.000 0.441  0.003  0.419 
ACMBRTEN -  0.000 0.231 -0.002  0.018** 
LN_MEET +/-  0.001 0.584 -0.007  0.292 
NONACBDIND - -0.002 0.292 -0.047  0.006*** 
CEOPOWER + -0.001 0.042** -0.003  0.177 
BIG4 +  0.007 0.000***  0.003  0.422 
BLOCK - -0.000 0.464 -0.039  0.035** 
LEV -  0.006 0.017** -0.064  0.000*** 
BM -  0.001 0.211 -0.001  0.294 
ANNRET -  0.000 0.407 -0.001  0.073* 
OPINC -  0.005 0.185  0.028  0.193 
LN_ASSETS +  0.003 0.000*** -0.002  0.405 
INSTMAJ - -0.001 0.141 -0.012  0.051* 
FOROPS +  0.002 0.060* -0.006  0.184 
SPITEMS +  0.004 0.015** -0.007  0.181 
MERGER +  0.001 0.198  0.006  0.190 
RESTRUCT +  0.001 0.153  0.004  0.304 
DEISSUE + -0.003 0.061* -0.003  0.386 
SALESGR + -0.004 0.034** -0.011  0.278 
EMPLAN +  0.004 0.031** -0.003  0.127 
Industries  included  included  
Years  included  included  
Observations  914  918  
Adjusted 𝑅2  0.129***  0.051***  
Durbin-Watson  1.902  2.089  
The p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign and two-tailed otherwise. 






relatively small, cash compensation motivates the audit committee to purchase greater 
amounts of NAS. However, as the proportion of NAS purchases increases, cash 
compensation results in a decrease in NAS. Stock option compensation has the opposite 
trend than cash compensation. In Q1 both LN_STOPT and ACSTOPT are not related to 
FEERATIO, however in Q4 both of these variables become significant and positively 
related to FEERATIO (LN_STOPT (p=0.005) and ACSTOPT (p=0.011). (See Tables 38 
and 42 for regression results). These results reveal that as the dollar amount and ratio of 
stock option compensation increases, the audit committee purchases larger proportions of 
NAS. 
Tables 39 and 43 present the regression results of LN_STAWD and ACSTAWD 
on FEERATIO in Q1 and Q4. In Q1, the coefficient for LN_STAWD is positive and 
significant (p=0.021) while ACSTAWD is positive and marginally significant (p=0.069). 
In Q4, LN_STAWD becomes negative but is no longer significant while ACSTAWD 
become more significant (p=0.043) but is now negatively related to FEERATIO. Based 
on these results, the use of stock awards as a form of compensation is positively 
associated with the purchase of small proportions of NAS but as NAS get too high, stock 
award compensation paid to audit committee members reduces the proportion of NAS 
purchased from the auditor.  
Lastly, FEERATIO is regressed on the equity measures LN_EQUITY and 
AC_EQUITY in Q1 and Q4. Tables 40 and 44 present the results of the regression 
models and indicate that both LN_EQUITY (p=0.006) and ACEQUITY (p=0.025) are 
positively and significantly related to FEERATIO in Quartile 1 but not significant in 





equity compensation motivates the audit committee to purchase more NAS. 
Alternatively, when the proportion of NAS increases, this form of compensation is not 
associated with a reduction in the purchase of NAS. 
Effect of CEO on Purchase Decision of NAS. Managerial hegemony theory 
presumes that management has control over the board, and consequently, directors cannot 
provide strong governance even if they are fully independent. Supplemental analyses 
performed on quartiles of FEERATIO indicate that the CEO can play a role in the 
purchase decision of NAS. To gain further insights as to whether the CEO has the power 
to affect the NAS purchase decision, I perform additional testing on the CEO Power 
variable. I expect the greater the power of the CEO the greater control the CEO has over 
the purchase of NAS. The variable CEO Power (CEOPOWER) is composed of the sum 
of CEODUAL, CEOTEN and CEOCOMP as presented in Panel E of Table 2. I partition 
the sample into Low CEOPOWER (CEO Power is equal to or less than 1) and High 
CEOPOWER (CEO Power is equal to or greater than 2). There are 1,793 firm-years with 
low CEO Power and 1,881 firm-years with High CEO Power. FEERATIO and 
LOG_NAF are used as measures of NAS in the CEO power sub-sample tests.16 Tables 45 
to 51 present results for the regression models for FEERATIO in the Low CEO Power 
and High CEO Power scenarios. Tables 52 -58 present results for the LOG_NAF 
regression models for the two sub-samples. 
FEERATIO Model. When testing the effect of high and low CEO power using 
FEERATIO as a measure of NAS, total compensation and cash compensation are not 
significant in any of the two sub-samples. Stock option compensation is positive and 
                                                          
16 Due to the insignificant findings obtained with NAF_TO_AF and UNEXP_NAF in the main 






significant in the low CEO power sample (LN_STOPT, p=0.036, ACSTOPT, p=0.048) 
while the ratio of stock award compensation (ACSTAWD, p=0.068) is negative and 
marginally significant. When CEO Power is high, stock option compensation becomes 
highly significant with FEERATIO (LN_STOPT, p=0.005) and all other forms of 
compensation are not significant.  
A comparison of these results with those in the main FEERATIO regression 
models reveals that stock option compensation is positively associated with the purchase 
of NAS, consistent with the results in the main regression models (Tables 8 and 9). They 
suggest that stock option compensation is associated with greater purchases of NAS 
regardless of the level of CEO power. 
LOG_NAF Model. Using the sample of firms with low CEO Power with 
LOG_NAF as the dependent variable, I find that total compensation is significant and 
positively related to the purchase of NAS (p=0.002) and ACCASH (p=0.066) is negative 
and marginally related to the purchase of NAS. All other measures of compensation are 
not significant in the low power sub-sample. In contrast, when CEO Power is high 
LN_TOTCOMP remains positive and significant (p=0.006), ACCASH is no longer 
significant, and LN_CASHCOMP is positive and highly significant (p=0.001). In 
addition, ACSTOPT, which was not significant in the low CEO power sub-sample, is 
now significant and negative (p=0.008). Lastly, stock award compensation is also 
significant in the high CEO power sub-sample. LN_STAWD and ACSTAWD are both 
positive and highly significant (p<0.01). The change in significance of the compensation 








       Regression of FEERATIO on LN_TOTCOMP  
                 HIGH and LOW CEO POWER 
 
      
  HIGH POWER 
(CEO Power > 2) 
LOW POWER  
(CEO Power < 1) 
Variable Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Intercept   0.015 0.789  0.000  0.994 
LN_TOTCOMP +/-  0.006 0.201  0.005  0.428 
ACCTPRCT - -0.003 0.385 -0.026  0.011** 
FINPRCT - -0.018 0.059*  0.011  0.140 
SUPERPRCT + -0.015 0.232  0.019  0.171 
ACPCT3BDS + -0.017 0.126  0.002  0.443 
ACMBRTEN -  0.000 0.284 -0.001  0.046** 
LN_MEET +/- -0.010 0.143 -0.001  0.924 
NONACBDIND -  0.004 0.406 -0.021  0.133 
BIG4 +  0.010 0.223  0.033  0.001*** 
BLOCK - -0.017 0.239 -0.082  0.000*** 
LEV -  0.035 0.022** -0.019  0.098* 
BM - -0.000 0.476  0.004  0.024** 
ANNRET -  0.000 0.417  0.000  0.237 
OPINC -  0.136 0.000***  0.077  0.003*** 
LN_ASSETS +  0.009 0.000***  0.008  0.001*** 
INSTMAJ - -0.018 0.000**  0.002  0.371 
FOROPS + -0.003 0.344  0.003  0.342 
SPITEMS + -0.013 0.062*  0.009  0.140 
MERGER +  0.035 0.000***  0.026  0.000** 
RESTRUCT +  0.010 0.081*  0.003  0.324 
DEISSUE +  0.011 0.132  0.019  0.010** 
SALESGR + -0.019 0.094*  0.002  0.157 
EMPLAN + -0.005 0.270  0.028  0.002*** 
Industries  included  included  
Years  included  included  
Observations  1,881  1,793  
Adjusted 𝑅2  0.053***  0.059***  
Durbin-Watson  1.989  1.968  
The p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign and two-tailed otherwise. 









              Regression of FEERATIO on LN_CASHCOMP 
                           HIGH AND LOW CEO POWER 
 
      
  HIGH POWER 
(CEO Power > 2) 
LOW POWER 
(CEO Power < 1) 
Variable Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Intercept   0.060 0.109  0.022  0.542 
LN_CASHCOMP +/-  0.004 0.156  0.003  0.259 
ACCTPRCT - -0.004 0.370 -0.026  0.012** 
FINPRCT - -0.018 0.063*  0.011  0.141 
SUPERPRCT + -0.015 0.237  0.019  0.173 
ACPCT3BDS + -0.016 0.131  0.002  0.435 
ACMBRTEN -  0.000 0.297 -0.001  0.042** 
LN_MEET +/- -0.010 0.149  0.000  0.960 
NONACBDIND -  0.004 0.416 -0.020  0.139 
BIG4 +  0.011 0.209  0.034  0.001*** 
BLOCK - -0.018 0.226 -0.082  0.002*** 
LEV -  0.033 0.028** -0.021  0.077* 
BM -  0.000 0.479  0.004  0.028** 
ANNRET -  0.000 0.394  0.000  0.226 
OPINC -  0.135 0.000***  0.078  0.002*** 
LN_ASSETS +  0.010 0.000***  0.009  0.000*** 
INSTMAJ - -0.018 0.005***  0.002  0.399 
FOROPS + -0.003 0.332  0.003  0.327 
SPITEMS + -0.014 0.056*  0.009  0.148 
MERGER +  0.035 0.000***  0.027  0.000*** 
RESTRUCT +  0.011 0.063*  0.003  0.335 
DEISSUE +  0.010 0.147  0.019  0.011** 
SALESGR + -0.019 0.102  0.002  0.154 
EMPLAN + -0.006 0.226  0.028  0.002*** 
Industries  included  included  
Years  included  included  
Observations  1,881  1,793  
Adjusted 𝑅2  0.053***  0.059***  
Durbin-Watson  1.989  1.969  
The p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign and two-tailed otherwise. 










                      Regression of FEERATIO on LN_STOPT 
                           HIGH AND LOW CEO POWER 
 
      
  HIGH POWER 
(CEO Power > 2) 
LOW POWER 
(CEO Power < 1) 
Variable Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Intercept   0.087 0.003***  0.042  0.116 
LN_STOPT +  0.002 0.005**  0.001  0.036** 
ACCTPRCT - -0.004 0.364 -0.027  0.010** 
FINPRCT - -0.018 0.059*  0.012  0.131 
SUPERPRCT + -0.016 0.222  0.017  0.200 
ACPCT3BDS + -0.016 0.129  0.002  0.445 
ACMBRTEN -  0.000 0.336 -0.001  0.042** 
LN_MEET +/- -0.010 0.144  0.000  0.951 
NONACBDIND -  0.006 0.370 -0.018  0.165 
BIG4 +  0.011 0.214  0.032  0.002*** 
BLOCK - -0.014 0.285 -0.081  0.000*** 
LEV -  0.036 0.018** -0.016  0.132 
BM -  0.002 0.424  0.004  0.026** 
ANNRET -  0.000 0.408  0.000  0.246 
OPINC -  0.139 0.000***  0.079  0.002*** 
LN_ASSETS +  0.010 0.000***  0.009  0.000*** 
INSTMAJ - -0.019 0.004**  0.002  0.382 
FOROPS + -0.003 0.349  0.003  0.324 
SPITEMS + -0.013 0.063*  0.009  0.135 
MERGER +  0.035 0.000***  0.027  0.000** 
RESTRUCT +  0.011 0.063*  0.003  0.322 
DEISSUE +  0.011 0.125  0.019  0.010 
SALESGR + -0.019 0.098*  0.002  0.156 
EMPLAN + -0.004 0.305  0.028  0.002*** 
Industries  included  included  
Years  included  included  
Observations  1,881  1,793  
Adjusted 𝑅2  0.055***  0.060***  
Durbin-Watson  2.019  1.972  
The p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign and two-tailed otherwise. 
(***), (**), (*) denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.                                 









                          Regression of FEERATIO on LN_STAWD 
                              HIGH AND LOW CEO POWER 
 
      
  HIGH POWER 
(CEO Power > 2) 
LOW POWER  
(CEO Power < 1) 
Variable Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Intercept   0.081 0.010**  0.053 0.044** 
LN_STAWD +/-  0.001 0.387 -0.001 0.133 
ACCTPRCT - -0.004 0.381 -0.026 0.012** 
FINPRCT - -0.018 0.065*  0.011 0.155 
SUPERPRCT + -0.017 0.204  0.016 0.215 
ACPCT3BDS + -0.016 0.137  0.002 0.443 
ACMBRTEN -  0.001 0.270 -0.001 0.040** 
LN_MEET +/- -0.010 0.076*  0.000 0.974 
NONACBDIND -  0.004 0.411 -0.017 0.184 
BIG4 +  0.011 0.199  0.034 0.001*** 
BLOCK - -0.016 0.249 -0.079 0.000*** 
LEV -  0.033 0.030** -0.018 0.103 
BM -  0.000 0.482  0.004 0.031** 
ANNRET -  0.000 0.415  0.000 0.235 
OPINC -  0.133 0.000***  0.078 0.003*** 
LN_ASSETS +  0.010 0.000***  0.010 0.000*** 
INSTMAJ - -0.018 0.006***  0.001 0.423 
FOROPS + -0.003 0.342  0.003 0.329 
SPITEMS + -0.013 0.060*  0.009 0.136 
MERGER +  0.035 0.001***  0.028 0.000*** 
RESTRUCT +  0.010 0.082*  0.004 0.283 
DEISSUE +  0.011 0.131  0.019 0.010** 
SALESGR + -0.019 0.102  0.002 0.162 
EMPLAN + -0.006 0.236  0.028 0.002*** 
Industries  included  included  
Years  included  included  
Observations  1,881  1,793  
Adjusted 𝑅2  0.052***  0.060***  
Durbin-Watson  2.025  1.967  
The p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign and two-tailed otherwise. 









                           Regression of FEERATIO on ACCASH 
                               HIGH AND LOW CEO POWER 
 
      
  HIGH POWER 
(CEO Power > 2) 
LOW POWER  
(CEO Power < 1) 
Variable Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Intercept   0.111 0.001***  0.045  0.099* 
ACCASH +/- -0.022 0.174  0.006  0.680 
ACCTPRCT - -0.004 0.381 -0.026  0.008** 
FINPRCT - -0.018 0.063*  0.011  0.095* 
SUPERPRCT + -0.017 0.202  0.018  0.124 
ACPCT3BDS + -0.017 0.126  0.003  0.283 
ACMBRTEN -  0.001 0.255 -0.001  0.030** 
LN_MEET +/- -0.010 0.072*  0.000  0.961 
NONACBDIND -  0.006 0.383 -0.020  0.099* 
BIG4 +  0.011 0.204  0.034  0.001*** 
BLOCK - -0.016 0.259 -0.081  0.000*** 
LEV -  0.033 0.027** -0.020  0.057* 
BM -  0.000 0.487  0.004  0.020** 
ANNRET -  0.000 0.436  0.000  0.149 
OPINC -  0.128 0.000***  0.079  0.001*** 
LN_ASSETS +  0.010 0.000***  0.009  0.000*** 
INSTMAJ - -0.017 0.007**  0.002  0.271 
FOROPS + -0.002 0.370  0.003  0.220 
SPITEMS + -0.013 0.062*  0.009  0.096* 
MERGER +  0.034 0.000***  0.027  0.001*** 
RESTRUCT +  0.010 0.073*  0.003  0.219 
DEISSUE +  0.011 0.122  0.019  0.007*** 
SALESGR + -0.019 0.093*  0.002  0.102 
EMPLAN + -0.005 0.266  0.028  0.001*** 
Industries  included  included  
Years  included  included  
Observations  1,881  1,793  
Adjusted 𝑅2  0.051***  0.059***  
Durbin-Watson  2.023  1.969  
The p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign and two-tailed otherwise. 









                          Regression of FEERATIO on ACSTOPT 
                               HIGH AND LOW CEO POWER 
 
      
  HIGH POWER 
(CEO Power > 2) 
LOW POWER  
(CEO Power < 1) 
Variable Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Intercept   0.076 0.009***  0.042  0.115 
ACSTOPT +  0.013 0.187  0.024  0.048** 
ACCTPRCT - -0.004 0.372 -0.027  0.010** 
FINPRCT - -0.018 0.061*  0.012  0.138 
SUPERPRCT + -0.015 0.232  0.017  0.203 
ACPCT3BDS + -0.016 0.130  0.002  0.445 
ACMBRTEN -  0.000 0.298 -0.001  0.044** 
LN_MEET +/- -0.010 0.153  0.000  0.928 
NONACBDIND -  0.006 0.381 -0.018  0.168 
BIG4 +  0.012 0.186  0.032  0.002*** 
BLOCK - -0.015 0.273 -0.081  0.000*** 
LEV -  0.033 0.029** -0.016  0.136 
BM -  0.000 0.493  0.004  0.024** 
ANNRET -  0.000 0.393  0.000  0.243 
OPINC -  0.129 0.000***  0.077  0.003*** 
LN_ASSETS +  0.010 0.000***  0.009  0.000*** 
INSTMAJ - -0.018 0.005**  0.002  0.391 
FOROPS + -0.002 0.364  0.003  0.323 
SPITEMS + -0.013 0.062*  0.010  0.127 
MERGER +  0.035 0.000***  0.028  0.000** 
RESTRUCT +  0.011 0.059*  0.004  0.294 
DEISSUE +  0.011 0.129  0.019  0.010 
SALESGR + -0.019 0.102  0.002  0.165 
EMPLAN + -0.006 0.250  0.028  0.002*** 
Industries  included  included  
Years  included  included  
Observations  1,881  1,793  
Adjusted 𝑅2  0.051***  0.078***  
Durbin-Watson  2.025  1.970  
The p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign and two-tailed otherwise. 










                         Regression of FEERATIO on ACSTAWD 
                               HIGH AND LOW CEO POWER 
 
      
  HIGH POWER 
(CEO Power > 2) 
LOW POWER  
(CEO Power < 1) 
Variable Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Intercept   0.078 0.007***  0.052  0.046** 
ACSTAWD +/-  0.004 0.767 -0.024  0.068** 
ACCTPRCT - -0.004 0.376 -0.026  0.011** 
FINPRCT - -0.018 0.065*  0.011  0.142 
SUPERPRCT + -0.016 0.222  0.017  0.199 
ACPCT3BDS + -0.016 0.133  0.002  0.430 
ACMBRTEN -  0.000 0.275 -0.001  0.035** 
LN_MEET +/- -0.010 0.153  0.000  0.928 
NONACBDIND -  0.005 0.391* -0.017  0.187 
BIG4 +  0.012 0.184  0.034  0.001*** 
BLOCK - -0.015 0.261 -0.080  0.000*** 
LEV -  0.032 0.034** -0.019  0.096* 
BM - -0.001 0.470  0.004  0.031** 
ANNRET -  0.000 0.398  0.000  0.234 
OPINC -  0.128 0.000***  0.080  0.002*** 
LN_ASSETS +  0.010 0.000***  0.010  0.000*** 
INSTMAJ - -0.018 0.006**  0.001  0.424 
FOROPS + -0.002 0.362  0.003  0.318 
SPITEMS + -0.013 0.060*  0.009  0.140 
MERGER +  0.035 0.000***  0.028  0.000** 
RESTRUCT +  0.010 0.067*  0.004  0.300 
DEISSUE +  0.011 0.133  0.019  0.011** 
SALESGR + -0.018 0.107  0.002  0.163 
EMPLAN + -0.006 0.402  0.028  0.002*** 
Industries  included  included  
Years  included  included  
Observations  1,881  1,793  
Adjusted 𝑅2  0.070***  0.060***  
Durbin-Watson  1.976  1.970  
The p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign and two-tailed otherwise. 






sub-samples suggest that powerful CEOs can influence the audit committee’s approval of 
NAS purchases from the auditor.  
A further comparison of the findings in the LOG_NAF CEO power sub-samples 
with those in the alternate regression models reveal very similar results. As indicated in 
Tables 13,14, 18, and 19, total compensation, cash compensation and stock award 
compensation are positively and significantly related to LOG_NAF (p<0.01), consistent 
with the findings in the high CEO power sub-sample. In contrast, stock option 
compensation (ACSTOPT) which is not significant in the alternate regression model 
(Table 17), is highly significant (p<0.01) in the high CEO power sub-sample. The 
similarity of these results and the positive findings with stock option compensation in the 
high CEO power sub-sample suggest that audit committee members purchase greater 
proportions of NAS, regardless of the form of compensation provided, due to the power 
exerted by the CEO.  
CEO Power over the Audit Committee. Having found that powerful CEOs can 
affect the relationship between audit committee members’ compensation and NAS 
purchases, I examine whether CEOs can specifically influence the audit committee. Since 
the audit committee is responsible for pre-approving NAS, it is plausible that the CEO 
could influence NAS purchases by exerting pressure on the audit committee. I therefore 
perform additional tests to examine whether the CEO can influence the audit committee 









                        Regression of LOG_NAF on LN_TOTCOMP 
                                HIGH AND LOW CEO POWER 
 
      
  HIGH POWER 
(CEO Power > 2) 
LOW POWER  
(CEO Power < 1) 
Variable Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Intercept   0.104 0.932 -0.863  0.592 
LN_TOTCOMP +/-  0.282 0.006***  0.434  0.002*** 
ACCTPRCT -  0.048 0.424 -0.355  0.100 
FINPRCT - -0.292 0.119  0.235  0.180 
SUPERPRCT +  0.251 0.284  0.114  0.407 
ACPCT3BDS +  0.438 0.077*  0.358  0.144 
ACMBRTEN -  0.013 0.227  0.001  0.486 
LN_MEET +/-  0.140 0.352  0.149  0.361 
NONACBDIND -  0.733 0.034** -0.473  0.150 
BIG4 +  0.949 0.000  1.432  0.000*** 
BLOCK - -0.219 0.334 -0.677  0.084* 
LEV -  0.648 0.039** -0.016  0.482 
BM - -0.169 0.159  0.115  0.006 
ANNRET -  0.004 0.448  0.015  0.162 
OPINC -  2.529 0.000***  1.444  0.017** 
LN_ASSETS +  0.822 0.000***  0.680  0.000*** 
INSTMAJ - -0.293 0.026** -0.184  0.123 
FOROPS +  0.354 0.005**  0.379  0.008*** 
SPITEMS +  0.002 0.494  0.361  0.038** 
MERGER +  0.724 0.000***  0.320  0.033** 
RESTRUCT +  0.183 0.106  0.366  0.012** 
DEISSUE +  0.387 0.029**  0.007  0.486 
SALESGR + -0.487 0.058**  0.041  0.200 
EMPLAN + -0.044 0.402  0.524  0.013 
Industries  included  included  
Years  included  included  
Observations  1,881  1,793  
Adjusted 𝑅2  0.291***  0.181***  
Durbin-Watson  2.042  1.983  
The p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign and two-tailed otherwise. 








                        Regression of LOG_NAF on LN_CASHCOMP 
                                HIGH AND LOW CEO POWER 
 
      
  HIGH POWER 
(CEO Power > 2) 
LOW POWER  
(CEO Power < 1) 
Variable Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Intercept   1.481 0.062*  3.568  0.000*** 
LN_CASHCOMP +/-  0.173 0.001***  0.011  0.862 
ACCTPRCT -  0.027 0.457 -0.344  0.107 
FINPRCT - -0.276 0.132  0.230  0.187 
SUPERPRCT +  0.268 0.271 -0.007  0.494 
ACPCT3BDS +  0.455 0.069*  0.405  0.115 
ACMBRTEN -  0.011 0.253  0.002  0.463 
LN_MEET +/-  0.147 0.327  0.176  0.281 
NONACBDIND -  0.709 0.039** -0.386  0.199 
BIG4 +  0.975 0.000  1.483  0.000*** 
BLOCK - -0.276 0.295 -0.562  0.127 
LEV -  0.572 0.060* -0.069  0.422 
BM - -0.210 0.106  0.103  0.013** 
ANNRET -  0.000 0.498  0.017  0.132 
OPINC -  2.491 0.001***  1.561  0.011** 
LN_ASSETS +  0.849 0.000***  0.757  0.000*** 
INSTMAJ - -0.313 0.019** -0.228  0.076* 
FOROPS +  0.344 0.006**  0.395  0.006*** 
SPITEMS + -0.017 0.462  0.360  0.038** 
MERGER +  0.723 0.000***  0.329  0.030** 
RESTRUCT +  0.226 0.061*  0.359  0.014** 
DEISSUE +  0.355 0.042** -0.017  0.466 
SALESGR + -0.453 0.072** -0.044  0.186 
EMPLAN + -0.097 0.292  0.486  0.020 
Industries  included  included  
Years  included  included  
Observations  1,881  1,793  
Adjusted 𝑅2  0.291***  0.179***  
Durbin-Watson  2.042  1.969  
The p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign and two-tailed otherwise. 









                           Regression of LOG_NAF on LN_STOPT 
                               HIGH AND LOW CEO POWER 
 
      
  HIGH POWER 
(CEO Power > 2) 
LOW POWER  
(CEO Power < 1) 
Variable Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Intercept   3.071 0.000***  3.562  0.000*** 
LN_STOPT + -0.010 0.222  0.016  0.142 
ACCTPRCT -  0.049 0.423 -0.354  0.100* 
FINPRCT - -0.278 0.132  0.237  0.179 
SUPERPRCT +  0.195 0.329  0.024  0.480 
ACPCT3BDS +  0.475 0.061**  0.397  0.120 
ACMBRTEN -  0.012 0.237  0.001  0.473 
LN_MEET +/-  0.158 0.293  0.175  0.283 
NONACBDIND -  0.750 0.031** -0.361  0.214 
BIG4 +  1.034 0.000  1.460  0.000*** 
BLOCK - -0.116 0.410 -0.552  0.131 
LEV -  0.570 0.061* -0.021  0.476 
BM - -0.204 0.114  0.104  0.012** 
ANNRET -  0.002 0.473  0.016  0.140 
OPINC -  2.461 0.001***  1.573  0.010** 
LN_ASSETS +  0.869 0.000***  0.759  0.000*** 
INSTMAJ - -0.313 0.019** -0.224  0.079* 
FOROPS +  0.354 0.005**  0.396  0.006*** 
SPITEMS + -0.002 0.496  0.364  0.037** 
MERGER +  0.737 0.000***  0.340  0.026** 
RESTRUCT +  0.208 0.078*  0.361  0.014** 
DEISSUE +  0.401 0.025** -0.012**  0.475 
SALESGR + -0.468 0.066*  0.044**  0.187 
EMPLAN + -0.086 0.315  0.491  0.019** 
Industries  included  included  
Years  included  included  
Observations  1,881  1,793  
Adjusted 𝑅2  0.289***  0.177***  
Durbin-Watson  2.041  1.984  
The p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign and two-tailed otherwise. 









                          Regression of LOG_NAF on LN_STAWD 
                               HIGH AND LOW CEO POWER 
 
      
  HIGH POWER 
(CEO Power > 2) 
LOW POWER  
(CEO Power < 1) 
Variable Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Intercept   2.880 0.000***  3.608  0.000*** 
LN_STAWD +/-  0.059 0.000***  0.016  0.360 
ACCTPRCT -  0.046 0.427 -0.345  0.107 
FINPRCT - -0.258 0.148  0.235  0.181 
SUPERPRCT +  0.134 0.380  0.017  0.485 
ACPCT3BDS +  0.478 0.060**  0.414  0.110 
ACMBRTEN -  0.016 0.178  0.003  0.436 
LN_MEET +/-  0.138 0.357  0.173  0.287 
NONACBDIND -  0.672 0.047** -0.429  0.175 
BIG4 +  0.960 0.000  1.480  0.000*** 
BLOCK - -0.223 0.331 -0.585  0.117 
LEV -  0.507 0.084*  0.077  0.413 
BM - -0.220 0.096*  0.104  0.012 
ANNRET -  0.008 0.388  0.017  0.129 
OPINC -  2.306 0.002***  1.554  0.011** 
LN_ASSETS +  0.841 0.000***  0.752  0.000*** 
INSTMAJ - -0.288 0.028** -0.222  0.082* 
FOROPS +  0.356 0.005**  0.393  0.006*** 
SPITEMS + -0.006 0.485  0.358  0.039** 
MERGER +  0.711 0.000***  0.311  0.038** 
RESTRUCT +  0.160 0.138  0.346  0.017** 
DEISSUE +  0.368 0.036** -0.023  0.454 
SALESGR + -0.457 0.070*  0.045  0.180 
EMPLAN + -0.080 0.326  0.487  0.020** 
Industries  included  included  
Years  included  included  
Observations  1,881  1,793  
Adjusted 𝑅2  0.294***  0.177***  
Durbin-Watson  2.040  1.989  
The p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign and two-tailed otherwise. 









                            Regression of LOG_NAF on ACCASH 
                                HIGH AND LOW CEO POWER 
 
      
  HIGH POWER 
(CEO Power > 2) 
LOW POWER  
(CEO Power < 1) 
Variable Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Intercept   3.286 0.000***  4.053  0.000*** 
ACCASH ? -0.429 0.210 -0.697  0.066* 
ACCTPRCT -  0.052 0.419 -0.352  0.099* 
FINPRCT - -0.282 0.129  0.232  0.180 
SUPERPRCT +  0.173 0.348 -0.039  0.471 
ACPCT3BDS +  0.461 0.068*  0.404  0.121 
ACMBRTEN -  0.013 0.230  0.002  0.406 
LN_MEET +/-  0.151 0.317  0.175  0.289 
NONACBDIND -  0.760 0.029** -0.363  0.178 
BIG4 +  1.001 0.000  1.469  0.000*** 
BLOCK - -0.111 0.414 -0.553  0.122 
LEV -  0.622 0.046** -0.033  0.478 
BM - -0.180 0.144  0.104  0.009* 
ANNRET - -0.002 0.471  0.016  0.140 
OPINC -  2.461 0.001***  1.549  0.016** 
LN_ASSETS +  0.864 0.000***  0.759  0.000*** 
INSTMAJ - -0.305 0.022** -0.228  0.091* 
FOROPS +  0.361 0.005**  0.394  0.006*** 
SPITEMS + -0.002 0.496  0.365  0.032** 
MERGER +  0.727 0.000***  0.340  0.033** 
RESTRUCT +  0.200 0.086*  0.363  0.014** 
DEISSUE +  0.407 0.024** -0.014  0.484 
SALESGR + -0.492 0.057*  0.043  0.188 
EMPLAN + -0.055 0.379  0.493  0.017** 
Industries  included  included  
Years  included  included  
Observations  1,881  1,793  
Adjusted 𝑅2  0.289***  0.179***  
Durbin-Watson  2.039  1.985  
The p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign and two-tailed otherwise. 








                
                           Regression of LOG_NAF on ACSTOPT 
                              HIGH AND LOW CEO POWER 
 
      
  HIGH POWER 
(CEO Power > 2) 
LOW POWER  
(CEO Power < 1) 
Variable Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Intercept   3.176 0.000***  3.601  0.000*** 
ACSTOPT ? -0.732 0.008***  0.221  0.265 
ACCTPRCT -  0.049 0.423 -0.352  0.102 
FINPRCT - -0.262 0.146  0.232  0.184 
SUPERPRCT +  0.187 0.336 -0.039  0.468 
ACPCT3BDS +  0.482 0.059*  0.404  0.116 
ACMBRTEN -  0.014 0.210  0.002  0.462 
LN_MEET +/-  0.159 0.291  0.175  0.283 
NONACBDIND -  0.738 0.033** -0.363  0.214 
BIG4 +  1.042 0.000  1.469  0.000*** 
BLOCK - -0.150 0.384 -0.553  0.130 
LEV -  0.525 0.078* -0.033  0.462 
BM - -0.232 0.085*  0.104  0.012 
ANNRET -  0.002 0.477  0.016  0.137 
OPINC -  2.431 0.001***  1.549  0.011** 
LN_ASSETS +  0.862 0.000***  0.759  0.000*** 
INSTMAJ - -0.309 0.020** -0.228  0.076* 
FOROPS +  0.352 0.005***  0.394  0.006*** 
SPITEMS + -0.007 0.485  0.365  0.038** 
MERGER +  0.743 0.000***  0.340  0.026** 
RESTRUCT +  0.194 0.094*  0.363  0.013** 
DEISSUE +  0.385 0.030** -0.014  0.472 
SALESGR + -0.435 0.081*  0.043  0.190 
EMPLAN + -0.107 0.275  0.493  0.019** 
Industries  included  included  
Years  included  included  
Observations  1,881  1,793  
Adjusted 𝑅2  0.292***  0.177***  
Durbin-Watson  2.037  1.983  
The p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign and two-tailed otherwise. 










                            Regression of LOG_NAF on ACSTAWD  
                                 HIGH AND LOW CEO POWER 
 
      
  HIGH POWER 
(CEO Power > 2) 
LOW POWER  
(CEO Power < 1) 
Variable Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Intercept   2.851 0.000***  3.623  0.000*** 
ACSTAWD ?  0.887 0.002***  0.303  0.336 
ACCTPRCT -  0.061 0.404 -0.341  0.109 
FINPRCT - -0.263 0.144  0.231  0.186 
SUPERPRCT +  0.115 0.337 -0.017  0.486 
ACPCT3BDS +  0.467 0.065**  0.410  0.112 
ACMBRTEN -  0.016 0.171  0.004  0.425 
LN_MEET +/-  0.146 0.330  0.173  0.287 
NONACBDIND -  0.734 0.034** -0.423  0.178 
BIG4 +  0.994 0.000  1.480  0.000*** 
BLOCK - -0.154 0.382 -0.565  0.125 
LEV -  0.582 0.057* -0.068  0.423 
BM - -0.209 0.108  0.104  0.012 
ANNRET -  0.005 0.435  0.017  0.130 
OPINC -  2.395 0.001***  1.538  0.012** 
LN_ASSETS +  0.845 0.000***  0.752  0.000*** 
INSTMAJ - -0.287 0.029** -0.223  0.080* 
FOROPS +  0.361 0.004***  0.389  0.007*** 
SPITEMS + -0.002 0.495  0.360  0.038** 
MERGER +  0.731 0.000***  0.312  0.038** 
RESTRUCT +  0.172 0.121  0.350  0.016** 
DEISSUE +  0.401 0.025** -0.019  0.463 
SALESGR + -0.487 0.058*  0.045  0.180 
EMPLAN + -0.068 0.350  0.489  0.019** 
Industries  included  included  
Years  included  included  
Observations  1,881  1,793  
Adjusted 𝑅2  0.292***  0.177***  
Durbin-Watson  2.035  1.988  
The p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign and two-tailed otherwise. 






Comparable to other studies that have provided a general measure of CEO Power 
(Carcello et al., 2011; Cheng et al., 2014; Dhaliwal et al., 2010; Lisic et al., 2014), I 
create a variable called CEOPOWER_OVER_AC in order to capture the power 
(influence) the CEO has over the audit committee. Similar to Beck & Maulding (2014),17 
who create a measure of the relative power of the CFO over the AC, I use CEO tenure 
and audit committee tenure in order to capture the power of the CEO over the audit 
committee. The CEOPOWER_OVER_AC variable is computed as CEO tenure (in years) 
less the average audit committee tenure (in years). I use tenure as a measure of CEO 
power as prior research indicates that the higher the CEO tenure, the greater the 
managerial power over the board (Ryan & Wiggins, 2004). 
I partition the data into two samples: 1) CEO Power over audit committee is 
greater than or equal to 1 (CEO_POWEROVER_AC >1) where the CEO tenure is greater 
than the average audit committee tenure and 2) CEO Power over AC is less than or equal 
to minus 1 (CEO_POWEROVER_AC < -1) where CEO tenure is less than average audit 
committee tenure. There are 1,494 firm-years in the sample with CEO power over audit 
committee greater than or equal to 1, and 1,693 firm-years in the sample where CEO 
power over audit committee is less than or equal to minus 1. Tables 59 to 67 present the 
regression results on the sample of CEO Power over AC >1. Using FEERATIO as a 
measure of the purchase of NAS, stock option compensation is positive and significant 
(LN_STOPT, p=0.000, ACSTOPT, p=0.035), the ratio of cash compensation   
                                                          
17 The authors create a measure of CFO power over the AC by taking audit committee tenure quartiles less 
quartiles of CFO tenure. The authors use tenure as the primary proxy for relative power suggesting that the 








   Regression of FEE RATIO and LOG_NAF on LN_TOTCOMP 
(Sample: CEOPOWER_OVER_AC GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 1) 
 
      
  FEERATIO LOG_NAF 
Variable Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Intercept   0.038 0.520 -0.769  0.576 
LN_TOTCOMP ?  0.008 0.104  0.325  0.003*** 
ACCTPRCT - -0.014 0.133 -0.150  0.309 
FINPRCT - -0.023 0.036** -0.272  0.181 
SUPERPRCT +  0.002 0.466  0.521  0.154 
ACPCT3BDS + -0.001 0.469  0.175  0.323 
ACMBRTEN -  0.000 0.455  0.017  0.231 
LN_MEET +/- -0.019 0.014**  0.152  0.684 
NONACBDIND - -0.009 0.329  0.884  0.038** 
BIG4 +  0.011 0.183  1.077  0.000*** 
BLOCK - -0.050 0.023** -0.403  0.241 
LEV -  0.045 0.009** -0.437  0.165 
BM - -0.007 0.200 -0.257  0.105 
ANNRET -  0.000 0.368  0.006  0.350 
OPINC -  0.140 0.000***  3.297  0.000*** 
LN_ASSETS +  0.006 0.022**  0.790  0.000*** 
INSTMAJ - -0.022 0.002*** -0.445  0.006*** 
FOROPS +  0.009 0.114  0.608  0.000*** 
SPITEMS + -0.015 0.059* -0.030  0.448 
MERGER +  0.032 0.000***  0.644  0.000*** 
RESTRUCT +  0.007 0.186  0.209  0.129 
DEISSUE +  0.022 0.013**  0.601  0.005*** 
SALESGR + -0.033 0.013** -0.402  0.126 
EMPLAN + -0.005 0.326 -0.003  0.495 
Industries  included  included  
Years  included  included  
Observations  1,494  1,494  
Adjusted 𝑅2  0.072***  0.255***  
Durbin-Watson  2.062  1.953  
The p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign and two-tailed otherwise. 









   Regression of FEE RATIO and LOG_NAF on LN_CASHCOMP 
(Sample: CEOPOWER_OVER_AC GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 1) 
 
      
  FEERATIO LOG_NAF 
Variable Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Intercept   0.093 0.012***  1.394  0.112 
LN_CASHCOMP ?  0.003 0.238  0.139  0.013** 
ACCTPRCT - -0.015 0.126 -0.150  0.289 
FINPRCT - -0.022 0.042** -0.231  0.220 
SUPERPRCT + -0.001 0..475  0.510  0.160 
ACPCT3BDS + -0.001 0.481  0.195  0.305 
ACMBRTEN -  0.000 0.468  0.016  0.248 
LN_MEET +/- -0.019 0.014**  0.154  0.402 
NONACBDIND - -0.009 0.328  0.875  0.039** 
BIG4 +  0.012 0.160  1.119  0.000*** 
BLOCK - -0.050 0.023** -0.432  0.233 
LEV -  0.042 0.014** -0.308  0.246 
BM - -0.008 0.170 -0.301  0.071 
ANNRET -  0.000 0.381  0.007  0.328 
OPINC -  0.138 0.000***  3.190  0.000*** 
LN_ASSETS +  0.007 0.006**  0.839  0.000*** 
INSTMAJ - -0.022 0.001*** -0.470  0.004*** 
FOROPS +  0.009 0.119  0.599  0.000*** 
SPITEMS + -0.016 0.053* -0.006  0.489 
MERGER +  0.032 0.000***  0.643  0.000*** 
RESTRUCT +  0.008 0.150  0.259  0.080* 
DEISSUE +  0.022 0.016**  0.568  0.008*** 
SALESGR + -0.032 0.015** -0.379  0.140 
EMPLAN + -0.006 0.275 -0.071  0.386 
Industries  included  included  
Years  included  included  
Observations  1,494  1,494  
Adjusted 𝑅2  0.071***  0.254***  
Durbin-Watson  2.068  1.961  
The p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign and two-tailed otherwise. 









      Regression of FEE RATIO and LOG_NAF on LN_STOPT 
(Sample: CEOPOWER_OVER_AC GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 1) 
 
      
  FEERATIO LOG_NAF 
Variable Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Intercept   0.107 0.000***  2.685  0.000*** 
LN_STOPT +  0.002 0.000***  0.001  0.498 
ACCTPRCT - -0.015 0.113 -0.158  0.299 
FINPRCT - -0.023 0.037** -0.256  0.197 
SUPERPRCT + -0.003 0..453  0.447  0.191 
ACPCT3BDS +  0.000 0.491  0.195  0.305 
ACMBRTEN -  0.000 0.440  0.015  0.256 
LN_MEET +/- -0.020 0.012**  0.160  0.386 
NONACBDIND - -0.005 0.412  0.923  0.032* 
BIG4 +  0.011 0.179  1.147  0.000*** 
BLOCK - -0.046 0.033** -0.295  0.309 
LEV -  0.044 0.009***  0.333  0.229 
BM - -0.006 0.229 -0.285  0.083 
ANNRET -  0.000 0.320  0.007  0.336 
OPINC -  0.145 0.000***  3.220  0.000*** 
LN_ASSETS +  0.008 0.003***  0.851  0.000*** 
INSTMAJ - -0.023 0.001*** -0.475  0.003*** 
FOROPS +  0.009 0.118  0.601  0.000*** 
SPITEMS + -0.016 0.050**  0.024  0.458 
MERGER +  0.032 0.000***  0.656  0.000*** 
RESTRUCT +  0.007 0.173  0.245  0.093* 
DEISSUE +  0.023 0.011**  0.610  0.005*** 
SALESGR + -0.033 0.013** -0.384  0.138 
EMPLAN + -0.004 0.356 -0.001  0.428 
Industries  included  included  
Years  included  included  
Observations  1,494  1,494  
Adjusted 𝑅2  0.078***  0.250***  
Durbin-Watson  2.063  1.958  
The p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign and two-tailed otherwise. 









       Regression of FEE RATIO and LOG_NAF on LN_STAWD 
(Sample: CEOPOWER_OVER_AC GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 1) 
 
      
  FEERATIO LOG_NAF 
Variable Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Intercept   0.116 0.000***  2.503  0.000*** 
LN_STAWD ?  0.001 0.151  0.069  0.000*** 
ACCTPRCT - -0.014 0.129 -0.159  0.297 
FINPRCT - -0.022 0.039** -0.252  0.199 
SUPERPRCT + -0.001 0..477  0.368  0.236 
ACPCT3BDS + -0.001 0.483  0.201  0.298 
ACMBRTEN -  0.000 0.405  0.025  0.138 
LN_MEET +/- -0.019 0.013**  0.144  0.433 
NONACBDIND - -0.011 0.295  0.740  0.069* 
BIG4 +  0.012 0.167  1.093  0.000*** 
BLOCK - -0.049 0.025** -0.409  0.244 
LEV -  0.041 0.015**  0.277  0.268 
BM - -0.009 0.158 -0.331  0.053 
ANNRET -  0.000 0.383  0.007  0.321 
OPINC -  0.135 0.000***  2.995  0.001*** 
LN_ASSETS +  0.007 0.008***  0.819  0.000*** 
INSTMAJ - -0.022 0.001*** -0.459  0.004*** 
FOROPS +  0.009 0.110  0.620  0.000*** 
SPITEMS + -0.015 0.063*  0.053  0.409 
MERGER +  0.032 0.000***  0.628  0.000*** 
RESTRUCT +  0.007 0.202  0.168  0.182 
DEISSUE +  0.022 0.015**  0.567  0.008*** 
SALESGR + -0.032 0.016** -0.355  0.156 
EMPLAN + -0.006 0.291 -0.047  0.423 
Industries  included  included  
Years  included  included  
Observations  1,494  1,494  
Adjusted 𝑅2  0.093***  0.240***  
Durbin-Watson  2.067  1.957  
The p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign and two-tailed otherwise. 









     Regression of FEE RATIO and LOG_NAF on LN_EQUITY 
(Sample: CEOPOWER_OVER_AC GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 1) 
 
      
  FEERATIO LOG_NAF 
Variable Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Intercept   0.109 0.001***  2.134  0.004*** 
LN_EQUITY ?  0.001 0.286  0.073  0.011** 
ACCTPRCT - -0.014 0.133 -0.145  0.315 
FINPRCT - -0.023 0.035** -0.284  0.172 
SUPERPRCT + -0.001 0..481  0.385  0.226 
ACPCT3BDS + -0.002 0.461  0.149  0.348 
ACMBRTEN -  0.000 0.443  0.019  0.203 
LN_MEET +/- -0.020 0.012**  0.129  0.716 
NONACBDIND - -0.010 0.322  0.846  0.045** 
BIG4 +  0.012 0.171  1.089  0.000*** 
BLOCK - -0.048 0.027** -0.350  0.277 
LEV -  0.043 0.012**  0.365  0.208 
BM - -0.008 0.175 -0.293  0.077* 
ANNRET -  0.000 0.384  0.007  0.319 
OPINC -  0.139 0.000***  3.238  0.000*** 
LN_ASSETS +  0.007 0.006***  0.834  0.000*** 
INSTMAJ - -0.022 0.001*** -0.472  0.004*** 
FOROPS +  0.009 0.113  0.612  0.000*** 
SPITEMS + -0.015 0.060*  0.035  0.440 
MERGER +  0.032 0.000***  0.632  0.000*** 
RESTRUCT +  0.007 0.183  0.203  0.137 
DEISSUE +  0.022 0.012**  0.610  0.004*** 
SALESGR + -0.033 0.013** -0.435  0.108 
EMPLAN + -0.005 0.310 -0.015  0.475 
Industries  included  included  
Years  included  included  
Observations  1,494  1,494  
Adjusted 𝑅2  0.092***  0.211***  
Durbin-Watson  2.067  1.962  
The p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign and two-tailed otherwise. 








         Regression of FEE RATIO and LOG_NAF on ACCASH 
(Sample: CEOPOWER_OVER_AC GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 1) 
 
      
  FEERATIO LOG_NAF 
Variable Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Intercept   0.137 0.000***  3.109  0.000*** 
ACCASH ? -0.037 0.032** -0.901  0.027** 
ACCTPRCT - -0.014 0.134 -0.150  0.315 
FINPRCT - -0.024 0.031** -0.292  0.166 
SUPERPRCT + -0.000 0..499  0.434  0.199 
ACPCT3BDS + -0.002 0.452  0.172  0.327 
ACMBRTEN -  0.000 0.410  0.019  0.209 
LN_MEET +/- -0.020 0.012**  0.145  0.420 
NONACBDIND - -0.009 0.332  0.901  0.035* 
BIG4 +  0.012 0.167  1.121  0.000*** 
BLOCK - -0.048 0.028** -0.288  0.314 
LEV -  0.044 0.010**  0.432  0.170 
BM - -0.007 0.213 -0.252  0.111 
ANNRET -  0.000 0.367  0.006  0.346 
OPINC -  0.133 0.000***  3.263  0.000*** 
LN_ASSETS +  0.007 0.010**  0.832  0.000*** 
INSTMAJ - -0.021 0.003*** -0.449  0.006*** 
FOROPS +  0.009 0.099*  0.614  0.000*** 
SPITEMS + -0.015 0.065* -0.038  0.435 
MERGER +  0.032 0.000***  0.643  0.000*** 
RESTRUCT +  0.007 0.191  0.211  0.127 
DEISSUE +  0.023 0.011**  0.629  0.003*** 
SALESGR + -0.034 0.012** -0.428  0.113 
EMPLAN + -0.004 0.334 -0.001  0.498 
Industries  included  included  
Years  included  included  
Observations  1,494  1,494  
Adjusted 𝑅2  0.072***  0.253***  
Durbin-Watson  2.070  1.964  
The p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign and two-tailed otherwise. 









       Regression of FEE RATIO and LOG_NAF on ACSTOPT 
(Sample: CEOPOWER_OVER_AC GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 1) 
 
      
  FEERATIO LOG_NAF 
Variable Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Intercept   0.111 0.000***  2.833  0.000*** 
ACSTOPT +  0.027 0.035** -0.483  0.088* 
ACCTPRCT - -0.015 0.125 -0.157  0.301 
FINPRCT - -0.023 0.036** -0.243  0.209 
SUPERPRCT + -0.003 0..438  0.424  0.205 
ACPCT3BDS + -0.002 0.460  0.198  0.303 
ACMBRTEN -  0.000 0.481  0.018  0.221 
LN_MEET +/- -0.019 0.014**  0.160  0.387 
NONACBDIND - -0.006 0.381  0.900  0.036** 
BIG4 +  0.013 0.153  1.153  0.000*** 
BLOCK - -0.047 0.029** -0.324  0.293 
LEV -  0.042 0.014**  0.299  0.254 
BM - -0.007 0.209 -0.314  0.064 
ANNRET -  0.000 0.358  0.007  0.322 
OPINC -  0.133 0.000***  3.117  0.000*** 
LN_ASSETS +  0.008 0.003***  0.848  0.000*** 
INSTMAJ - -0.022 0.002*** -0.473  0.004*** 
FOROPS +  0.009 0.109  0.607  0.000*** 
SPITEMS + -0.016 0.055*  0.029  0.450 
MERGER +  0.032 0.000***  0.656  0.000*** 
RESTRUCT +  0.009 0.136  0.237  0.100 
DEISSUE +  0.023 0.011**  0.594  0.006*** 
SALESGR + -0.033 0.013** -0.348  0.162 
EMPLAN + -0.006 0.291 -0.063  0.399 
Industries  included  included  
Years  included  included  
Observations  1,494  1,494  
Adjusted 𝑅2  0.099***  0.251***  
Durbin-Watson  2.063  1.959  
The p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign and two-tailed otherwise. 









       Regression of FEE RATIO and LOG_NAF on ACSTAWD 
(Sample: CEOPOWER_OVER_AC GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 1) 
 
      
  FEERATIO LOG_NAF 
Variable Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Intercept   0.127 0.000***  2.840  0.000*** 
ACSTAWD ?  0.001 0.946  1.007  0.002*** 
ACCTPRCT - -0.015 0.126 -0.143  0.318 
FINPRCT - -0.022 0.040** -0.271  0.183 
SUPERPRCT + -0.001 0..480  0.349  0.248 
ACPCT3BDS + -0.001 0.470  0.185  0.314 
ACMBRTEN -  0.000 0.461  0.024  0.151 
LN_MEET +/- -0.019 0.014**  0.145  0.433 
NONACBDIND - -0.008 0.351  0.838  0.046** 
BIG4 +  0.013 0.147  1.130  0.000*** 
BLOCK - -0.049 0.027** -0.326  0.290 
LEV -  0.040 0.018**  0.379  0.200 
BM - -0.009 0.165 -0.299  0.073 
ANNRET -  0.000 0.377  0.007  0.318 
OPINC -  0.130 0.000***  3.147  0.000*** 
LN_ASSETS +  0.008 0.004***  0.820  0.000*** 
INSTMAJ - -0.022 0.002*** -0.449  0.006*** 
FOROPS +  0.009 0.108  0.618  0.000*** 
SPITEMS + -0.016 0.059*  0.049  0.416 
MERGER +  0.032 0.000***  0.644  0.000*** 
RESTRUCT +  0.008 0.150  0.193  0.149 
DEISSUE +  0.022 0.014**  0.606  0.005*** 
SALESGR + -0.032 0.017** -0.378  0.141 
EMPLAN + -0.006 0.267 -0.022  0.464 
Industries  included  included  
Years  included  included  
Observations  1,494  1,494  
Adjusted 𝑅2  0.090***  0.272***  
Durbin-Watson  2.073  1.960  
The p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign and two-tailed otherwise. 
(***), (**), (*) denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.                                 
                              









      Regression of FEE RATIO and LOG_NAF on ACEQUITY 
(Sample: CEOPOWER_OVER_AC GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 1) 
 
      
  FEERATIO LOG_NAF 
Variable Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Intercept   0.100 0.000***  2.208  0.003*** 
ACEQUITY ?  0.037 0.032**  0.907  0.027** 
ACCTPRCT - -0.014 0.133 -0.145  0.315 
FINPRCT - -0.024 0.031** -0.292  0.166 
SUPERPRCT + -0.001 0.499  0.434  0.199 
ACPCT3BDS + -0.002 0.452  0.172  0.327 
ACMBRTEN -  0.000 0.410  0.019  0.209 
LN_MEET +/- -0.020 0.012**  0.149  0.420 
NONACBDIND - -0.009 0.332  0.901  0.035** 
BIG4 +  0.012 0.167  1.121  0.000*** 
BLOCK - -0.048 0.028** -0.288  0.313 
LEV -  0.044 0.010**  0.432  0.170 
BM - -0.007 0.213 -0.252  0.111 
ANNRET -  0.000 0.367  0.006  0.346 
OPINC -  0.133 0.000***  3.263  0.000*** 
LN_ASSETS +  0.007 0.010**  0.832  0.000*** 
INSTMAJ - -0.021 0.003*** -0.449  0.006*** 
FOROPS +  0.009 0.099*  0.614  0.000*** 
SPITEMS + -0.015 0.065*  0.038  0.435 
MERGER +  0.032 0.000***  0.643  0.000*** 
RESTRUCT +  0.007 0.191  0.211  0.127 
DEISSUE +  0.023 0.011**  0.629  0.003*** 
SALESGR + -0.034 0.012** -0.428  0.113 
EMPLAN + -0.004 0.334 -0.001  0.498 
Industries  included  included  
Years  included  included  
Observations  1,494  1,494  
Adjusted 𝑅2  0.093***  0.270***  
Durbin-Watson  2.070  1.964  
The p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign and two-tailed otherwise. 






(ACCASH, p= 0.032) is negative and significant, and equity compensation 
(ACEQUITY) is positive and significant (p=0.032). The remaining compensation 
measures are not significant. 
Using LOG_NAF as an alternate measure of the purchase of NAS, 
LN_TOTCOMP (p=0.003) and LN_CASHCOMP (p=0.013) are positive and significant 
and ACCASH is negative and significant (p=0.027). Additionally, stock award 
compensation (LN_STAWD, p=0.000, ACSTAWD, p=0.002) is positively and 
significantly related to LOG_NAF while ACSTOPT is negative and marginally 
significant (p=0.088). Finally, equity compensation (LN_EQUITY, p=0.011, 
ACEQUITY, p=0.027) is positive and significantly related to LOG_NAF. In summary, 
results with both measures of NAS clearly indicate that when the CEO has power to 
influence the audit committee, and the audit committee is compensated with equity, 
greater levels and proportions of NAS are purchased from the auditor. 
The results for the regression on the sample where CEO tenure is less than the AC 
tenure (CEO Power over AC < -1) are presented in Tables 68 through 76. In this sample, 
since the CEO tenure is less than audit committee tenure, I expect the audit committee to 
have more power and be able to mitigate the CEO’s influence. Using FEERATIO in the 
regression model, I find none of the compensation variables are significant with the 
purchase of NAS. Using LOG_NAF as the measure of NAS, only LN_TOTCOMP is 
significant (p=0.008) and positively related to the purchase of NAS. The insignificance of 
the majority of the results, particularly stock option compensation, with FEERATIO and 
LOG_NAF suggests that when the CEO has less power to influence the audit committee, 








 Regression of FEE RATIO and LOG_NAF on Total Compensation  
  (Sample: CEOPOWER_OVER_AC LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO -1) 
 
      
  FEERATIO LOG_NAF 
Variable Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Intercept   0.076 0.391 -0.299  0.875 
LN_TOTCOMP ?  0.000 0.983  0.458  0.008*** 
ACCTPRCT - -0.012 0.152 -0.185  0.239 
FINPRCT - -0.003 0.378  0.020  0.467 
SUPERPRCT +  0.003 0.445 -0.333  0.236 
ACPCT3BDS + -0.018 0.104  0.231  0.223 
ACMBRTEN - -0.001 0.137 -0.013  0.225 
LN_MEET +/- -0.005 0.516  0.017  0.911 
NONACBDIND - -0.012 0.261 -0.301  0.233 
BIG4 +  0.041 0.001***  1.218  0.002*** 
BLOCK - -0.067 0.001*** -0.712  0.067* 
LEV - -0.009 0.286  0.430  0.100* 
BM -  0.004 0.029**  0.113  0.003*** 
ANNRET -  0.001 0.185  0.017  0.252 
OPINC -  0.069 0.012**  0.997  0.065* 
LN_ASSETS +  0.009 0.001***  0.689  0.000*** 
INSTMAJ -  0.005 0.221  0.485  0.375 
FOROPS + -0.007 0.155  0.053  0.358 
SPITEMS + -0.007 0.209  0.259  0.082* 
MERGER +  0.037 0.004***  0.525  0.000*** 
RESTRUCT +  0.000 0.490  0.258  0.040** 
DEISSUE +  0.018 0.024** -0.128  0.260 
SALESGR +  0.002 0.211  0.024  0.300 
EMPLAN +  0.017 0.028**  0.186  0.171 
Industries  included  included  
Years  included  included  
Observations  1,693  1,693  
Adjusted 𝑅2  0.057***  0.225***  
Durbin-Watson  1.965  2.041  
The p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign and two-tailed otherwise. 
(***), (**), (*) denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.                                 









 Regression of FEE RATIO and LOG_NAF on LN_CASHCOMP 
(Sample: CEOPOWER_OVER_AC LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO -1) 
 
      
  FEERATIO LOG_NAF 
Variable Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Intercept   0.027 0.541  3.720  0.000*** 
LN_CASHCOMP ?  0.005 0.166  0.080  0.272 
ACCTPRCT - -0.012 0.152 -0.181  0.163 
FINPRCT - -0.004 0.352 -0.012  0.319 
SUPERPRCT +  0.004 0.425 -0.322  0.162 
ACPCT3BDS + -0.018 0.101  0.275  0.122 
ACMBRTEN - -0.001 0.126 -0.014  0.137 
LN_MEET +/- -0.005 0.510  0.058  0.234 
NONACBDIND - -0.012 0.256 -0.247  0.183 
BIG4 +  0.042 0.001***  1.296  0.084* 
BLOCK - -0.067 0.001*** -0.588  0.071* 
LEV - -0.010 0.251  0.384  0.084* 
BM -  0.004 0.026**  0.102  0.004*** 
ANNRET -  0.001 0.196  0.014  0.197 
OPINC -  0.070 0.011**  1.117  0.030** 
LN_ASSETS +  0.008 0.001***  0.755  0.000*** 
INSTMAJ -  0.004 0.220  0.487  0.371 
FOROPS + -0.007 0.154  0.075  0.202 
SPITEMS +  0.007 0.222  0.252  0.058* 
MERGER +  0.036 0.004***  0.530  0.000*** 
RESTRUCT +  0.000 0.490  0.263  0.025** 
DEISSUE +  0.019 0.022** -0.138  0.163 
SALESGR +  0.002 0.216  0.025  0.193 
EMPLAN +  0.017 0.027**  0.130  0.168 
Industries  included  included  
Years  included  included  
Observations  1,693  1,693  
Adjusted 𝑅2  0.058***  0.222***  
Durbin-Watson  1.965  2.042  
The p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign and two-tailed otherwise. 









   Regression of FEE RATIO and LOG_NAF on LN_STOPT 
(Sample: CEOPOWER_OVER_AC LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO -1) 
 
      
  FEERATIO LOG_NAF 
Variable Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Intercept   0.073 0.012**  4.527  0.000*** 
LN_STOPT +  0.000 0.310  0.000  0.498 
ACCTPRCT - -0.013 0.148 -0.182  0.244 
FINPRCT - -0.003 0.380  0.001  0.498 
SUPERPRCT +  0.002 0.455  0.341  0.231 
ACPCT3BDS + -0.018 0.100*  0.278  0.180 
ACMBRTEN - -0.001 0.136 -0.013  0.218 
LN_MEET +/- -0.005 0.502  0.059  0.701 
NONACBDIND - -0.012 0.264 -0.243  0.278 
BIG4 +  0.041 0.001***  1.288  0.000* 
BLOCK - -0.066 0.001*** -0.580  0.221 
LEV - -0.008 0.251  0.413  0.111 
BM -  0.004 0.028**  0.101  0.007*** 
ANNRET -  0.001 0.181  0.015  0.284 
OPINC -  0.070 0.011**  1.111  0.046** 
LN_ASSETS +  0.009 0.203  0.765  0.000*** 
INSTMAJ -  0.005 0.218  0.480  0.350 
FOROPS + -0.007 0.157  0.075  0.303 
SPITEMS +  0.007 0.203  0.258  0.083* 
MERGER +  0.037 0.004***  0.533  0.000*** 
RESTRUCT +  0.000 0.487  0.263  0.038** 
DEISSUE +  0.019 0.023** -0.143  0.238 
SALESGR +  0.002 0.210  0.026  0.285 
EMPLAN +  0.018 0.026**  0.129  0.253 
Industries  included  included  
Years  included  included  
Observations  1,693  1,693  
Adjusted 𝑅2  0.057***  0.221***  
Durbin-Watson  1.966  2.043  
The p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign and two-tailed otherwise. 











   Regression of FEE RATIO and LOG_NAF on LN_STAWD 
(Sample: CEOPOWER_OVER_AC LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO -1) 
 
      
  FEERATIO LOG_NAF 
Variable Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Intercept   0.068 0.016**  4.418  0.000*** 
LN_STAWD ?  0.000 0.285  0.020  0.223 
ACCTPRCT - -0.013 0.149 -0.179  0.247 
FINPRCT - -0.004 0.352  0.020  0.466 
SUPERPRCT +  0.002 0.467 -0.313  0.247 
ACPCT3BDS + -0.018 0.100*  0.285  0.174 
ACMBRTEN - -0.001 0.130 -0.012  0.230 
LN_MEET +/- -0.005 0.516  0.058  0.706 
NONACBDIND - -0.011 0.281 -0.273  0.255 
BIG4 +  0.042 0.001***  1.268  0.000* 
BLOCK - -0.065 0.001*** -0.627  0.093* 
LEV - -0.008 0.312  0.385  0.126 
BM -  0.004 0.029**  0.102  0.006*** 
ANNRET -  0.001 0.210  0.017  0.251 
OPINC -  0.070 0.011**  1.100  0.048** 
LN_ASSETS +  0.009 0.000***  0.756  0.000*** 
INSTMAJ +  0.005 0.219  0.485  0.350 
FOROPS + -0.007 0.166  0.067  0.322 
SPITEMS -  0.007 0.196  0.249  0.091* 
MERGER +  0.037 0.000***  0.516  0.000*** 
RESTRUCT +  0.001 0.457  0.249  0.047** 
DEISSUE +  0.019 0.022** -0.149  0.229 
SALESGR +  0.002 0.211  0.026  0.285 
EMPLAN +  0.017 0.027**  0.131  0.250 
Industries  included  included  
Years  included  included  
Observations  1,693  1,693  
Adjusted 𝑅2  0.057***  0.221***  
Durbin-Watson  1.966  2.043  
The p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign and two-tailed otherwise. 










   Regression of FEE RATIO and LOG_NAF on LN_EQUITY 
(Sample: CEOPOWER_OVER_AC LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO -1) 
 
      
  FEERATIO LOG_NAF 
Variable Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Intercept   0.086 0.004***  4.492  0.000*** 
LN_EQUITY ? -0.002 0.205  0.004  0.866 
ACCTPRCT - -0.013 0.148 -0.181  0.244 
FINPRCT - -0.004 0.357  0.003  0.495 
SUPERPRCT +  0.003 0.448 -0.341  0.231 
ACPCT3BDS + -0.018 0.102  0.279  0.180 
ACMBRTEN - -0.001 0.136 -0.013  0.218 
LN_MEET +/- -0.004 0.714  0.058  0.707 
NONACBDIND - -0.012 0.272 -0.245  0.277 
BIG4 +  0.043 0.000***  1.283  0.000* 
BLOCK - -0.065 0.001*** -0.585  0.108 
LEV - -0.009 0.273  0.415  0.109 
BM -  0.004 0.030**  0.102  0.007*** 
ANNRET -  0.001 0.224  0.015  0.279 
OPINC -  0.070 0.011**  1.109  0.046** 
LN_ASSETS +  0.009 0.000***  0.764  0.000*** 
INSTMAJ -  0.007 0.210  0.480  0.347 
FOROPS + -0.007 0.156  0.075  0.250 
SPITEMS +  0.007 0.214  0.259  0.082* 
MERGER +  0.037 0.000***  0.532  0.000*** 
RESTRUCT +  0.000 0.481  0.263  0.038** 
DEISSUE +  0.018 0.025** -0.142  0.239 
SALESGR +  0.002 0.209  0.026  0.286 
EMPLAN +  0.017 0.032**  0.131  0.250 
Industries  included  included  
Years  included  included  
Observations  1,693  1,693  
Adjusted 𝑅2  0.058***  0.221***  
Durbin-Watson  1.966  2.043  
The p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign and two-tailed otherwise. 
(***), (**), (*) denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.                                 











     Regression of FEE RATIO and LOG_NAF on ACCASH 
(Sample: CEOPOWER_OVER_AC LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO -1) 
 
      
  FEERATIO LOG_NAF 
Variable Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Intercept   0.060 0.051*  4.470  0.000*** 
ACCASH ?  0.022 0.181  0.088  0.807 
ACCTPRCT - -0.012 0.155 -0.181  0.178 
FINPRCT - -0.004 0.346  0.003  0.495 
SUPERPRCT +  0.004 0.419 -0.336  0.235 
ACPCT3BDS + -0.017 0.112  0.281  0.178 
ACMBRTEN - -0.001 0.133 -0.013  0.217 
LN_MEET +/- -0.004 0.540  0.060  0.695 
NONACBDIND - -0.012 0.268 -0.241  0.280 
BIG4 +  0.044 0.000***  1.297  0.000* 
BLOCK - -0.065 0.001*** -0.574  0.112 
LEV - -0.011 0.249  0.406  0.114 
BM -  0.004 0.034**  0.101  0.007*** 
ANNRET -  0.001 0.223  0.014  0.293 
OPINC -  0.073 0.008**  1.126  0.045** 
LN_ASSETS +  0.009 0.000***  0.767  0.000*** 
INSTMAJ -  0.007 0.212  0.475  0.345 
FOROPS + -0.007 0.159  0.076  0.301 
SPITEMS +  0.007 0.216  0.258  0.083* 
MERGER +  0.037 0.000***  0.535  0.000*** 
RESTRUCT +  0.000 0.490  0.263  0.038** 
DEISSUE +  0.018 0.025** -0.144  0.236 
SALESGR +  0.002 0.214  0.026  0.286 
EMPLAN +  0.017 0.032**  0.127  0.257 
Industries  included  included  
Years  included  included  
Observations  1,693  1,693  
Adjusted 𝑅2  0.058***  0.221***  
Durbin-Watson  1.964  2.043  
The p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign and two-tailed otherwise. 











    Regression of FEE RATIO and LOG_NAF on ACSTOPT 
(Sample: CEOPOWER_OVER_AC LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO -1) 
 
      
  FEERATIO LOG_NAF 
Variable Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Intercept   0.075 0.009***  4.615  0.000*** 
ACSTOPT + -0.004 0.388 -0.420  0.109 
ACCTPRCT - -0.012 0.155 -0.169  0.259 
FINPRCT - -0.003 0.379  0.003  0.494 
SUPERPRCT +  0.003 0.438 -0.301  0.259 
ACPCT3BDS + -0.018 0.105  0.289  0.171 
ACMBRTEN - -0.001 0.138 -0.013  0.223 
LN_MEET +/- -0.005 0.518  0.064  0.673 
NONACBDIND - -0.013 0.257 -0.262  0.263 
BIG4 +  0.042 0.001***  1.307  0.000* 
BLOCK - -0.067 0.001*** -0.594  0.104 
LEV - -0.009 0.274  0.352  0.149 
BM -  0.004 0.030**  0.099  0.008*** 
ANNRET -  0.001 0.186  0.014  0.290 
OPINC -  0.070 0.011**  1.134  0.043** 
LN_ASSETS +  0.009 0.000***  0.763  0.000*** 
INSTMAJ -  0.007 0.218  0.467  0.467 
FOROPS + -0.007 0.195  0.071  0.312 
SPITEMS +  0.007 0.214  0.244  0.095* 
MERGER +  0.037 0.000***  0.526  0.000*** 
RESTRUCT +  0.000 0.496  0.255  0.043** 
DEISSUE +  0.018 0.024** -0.145  0.312 
SALESGR +  0.002 0.210  0.026  0.284 
EMPLAN +  0.017 0.028**  0.118  0.272 
Industries  included  included  
Years  included  included  
Observations  1,693  1,693  
Adjusted 𝑅2  0.057***  0.222***  
Durbin-Watson  1.965  2.042  
The p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign and two-tailed otherwise. 











 Regression of FEE RATIO and LOG_NAF on ACSTAWD 
(Sample: CEOPOWER_OVER_AC LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO -1) 
 
      
  FEERATIO LOG_NAF 
Variable Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Intercept   0.066 0.018**  4.458  0.000*** 
ACSTAWD ? -0.012 0.388  0.262  0.382 
ACCTPRCT - -0.013 0.147 -0.175  0.251 
FINPRCT - -0.004 0.359  0.014  0.477 
SUPERPRCT +  0.003 0.452 -0.333  0.237 
ACPCT3BDS + -0.018 0.104  0.277  0.181 
ACMBRTEN - -0.001 0.133 -0.013  0.225 
LN_MEET +/- -0.005 0.512  0.059  0.701 
NONACBDIND - -0.013 0.274 -0.261  0.264 
BIG4 +  0.042 0.001***  1.275  0.000* 
BLOCK - -0.065 0.001*** -0.605  0.101 
LEV - -0.008 0.303  0.396  0.119 
BM -  0.004 0.029**  0.102  0.007*** 
ANNRET -  0.001 0.202  0.016  0.264 
OPINC -  0.071 0.010**  1.081  0.051* 
LN_ASSETS +  0.009 0.000***  0.758  0.000*** 
INSTMAJ -  0.007 0.215  0.017  0.453 
FOROPS + -0.007 0.161  0.071  0.313 
SPITEMS +  0.007 0.199  0.252  0.088* 
MERGER +  0.037 0.000***  0.525  0.000*** 
RESTRUCT +  0.000 0.475  0.258  0.041** 
DEISSUE +  0.018 0.024** -0.141  0.240 
SALESGR +  0.002 0.213  0.026  0.282 
EMPLAN +  0.017 0.027**  0.130  0.252 
Industries  included  included  
Years  included  included  
Observations  1,693  1,693  
Adjusted 𝑅2  0.057***  0.222***  
Durbin-Watson  1.965  2.042  
The p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign and two-tailed otherwise. 










    Regression of FEE RATIO and LOG_NAF on ACEQUITY 
(Sample: CEOPOWER_OVER_AC LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO -1) 
 
      
  FEERATIO LOG_NAF 
Variable Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Intercept   0.082 0.005**  4.557  0.000*** 
ACEQUITY ? -0.022 0.181 -0.088  0.807 
ACCTPRCT - -0.012 0.155 -0.181  0.244 
FINPRCT - -0.004 0.336  0.003  0.495 
SUPERPRCT +  0.004 0.419 -0.336  0.235 
ACPCT3BDS + -0.017 0.112  0.281  0.178 
ACMBRTEN - -0.001 0.133 -0.013  0.217 
LN_MEET +/- -0.004 0.540  0.060  0.695 
NONACBDIND - -0.012 0.268 -0.241  0.280 
BIG4 +  0.044 0.001***  1.297  0.000* 
BLOCK - -0.065 0.001*** -0.574  0.112 
LEV - -0.011 0.249  0.406  0.114 
BM -  0.004 0.034**  0.101  0.007*** 
ANNRET -  0.001 0.223  0.014  0.293 
OPINC -  0.073 0.008**  1.126  0.045** 
LN_ASSETS +  0.009 0.000***  0.767  0.000*** 
INSTMAJ -  0.005 0.221  0.006  0.485 
FOROPS + -0.007 0.159  0.076  0.301 
SPITEMS +  0.007 0.216  0.258  0.083* 
MERGER +  0.037 0.000***  0.535  0.000*** 
RESTRUCT +  0.000 0.490  0.263  0.038** 
DEISSUE +  0.018 0.025** -0.144  0.236 
SALESGR +  0.002 0.214  0.026  0.286 
EMPLAN +  0.017 0.027**  0.127  0.257 
Industries  included  included  
Years  included  included  
Observations  1,693  1,693  
Adjusted 𝑅2  0.058***  0.221***  
Durbin-Watson  1.964  2.043  
The p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign and two-tailed otherwise. 






Such findings suggest audit committees may be able to mitigate the potential influence of 
the CEO when the audit committee rather than the CEO has more relative power. 
Non-Linear Tests. An implicit assumption of multiple regressions is that there is a 
linear relationship between the independent and dependent variables. It is therefore 
important to examine any departures from linearity that may affect the strength and 
nature of the relationship between the variables and the predictive accuracy of the models 
in this study (Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2010). I therefore test for non-linear 
effects on compensation by squaring each of the independent variables (total 
compensation, cash compensation, stock option compensation, stock award 
compensation, and equity compensation), and then including the squared terms in each of 
the regression models using FEERATIO, LOG_NAF and NAF_TO_AF, as measures of 
NAS, similar to the method used by Rickling and Sharma (2013). Comparing the 
significance of the squared values to the compensation variables in the regression models 
allows for identification of non-linear relationships. If the squared variable is statistically 
significant then a non-linear relationship exists. For FEERATIO, of the nine tests 
performed only one test indicates potential non-linear effects (LN_EQUITY) while for 
LOG_NAF, three of the nine compensation measures (LN_TOTCOMP, LN_STAWD 
and LN_EQUITY) indicate potential non-linear effects. Lastly, for the various regression 
models using NAF_TO_AF as a measure of NAS, only two of the nine tests 
(LN_EQUITY and LN_TOTCOMP) indicate potential non-linear effects. Overall, there 
is little evidence to suggest the presence of a non-linear relationship between the audit 







DISCUSSION, LIMITATIONS, CONCLUSION AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
Discussion 
Despite some evidence that the form of audit committee members’ compensation 
can affect financial reporting quality, there is no guidance to date on how audit 
committee members should be compensated.  To exacerbate the situation, audit 
committees are responsible for pre-approving the purchase of NAS, which the regulators 
such as the SEC and the PCAOB deem has the ability to impair auditor independence. In 
an effort to understand the audit committee’s role in managing the impairment of auditor 
independence this study examines whether the compensation paid to the audit committee 
members is associated with the purchase of NAS.  
When examining the effect of total audit committee members’ compensation on 
the purchase of NAS, the results provide some evidence that the amount of total audit 
committee members’ compensation impacts the NAS purchase decision. When NAS are 
procured below the 5 percent threshold, audit committee members purchase greater 
amounts of NAS, however, as the proportion of NAS purchases increases, greater 
amounts of total compensation do not affect the audit committee’s purchase decision. 
One explanation for purchasing larger amounts of NAS may be that firms need these 
types of services in order to enhance audit quality or financial reporting quality. 
Alternatively, the audit committee may be purchasing higher levels of NAS in order to 





or due to influence being exerted by the CEO. Irrespective of these two viewpoints, 
differing amounts of total compensation seem to have varying effects on the audit 
committee’s NAS purchase decision.  
Compensating audit committee members with cash seems to be associated with 
audit committee members being more objective. Main test results as well as those using 
alternative measures of NAS indicate that cash compensation encourages the audit 
committee to purchase more NAS. However, further analyses of quartiles of FEERATIO 
indicate that the audit committee is sensitive to the proportions of NAS that are 
purchased. When firms purchase low proportions of NAS (Quartile1), cash compensation 
paid to the audit committee members is positively related to NAS. However, when firms 
procure higher proportions of NAS (Quartile 4), cash compensation is not related to 
NAS. These results suggest the audit committee may be purchasing some minimum level 
of NAS but do not increase the purchase beyond this minimum level when the audit 
committee is paid in cash.  
These findings are consistent with the view that audit committee members 
compensated with cash are more objective and concerned with mitigating the threat to 
auditor independence associated with the purchase of NAS. Consistent with prior 
research (Magilke et al., 2009; Rickling & Sharma, 2013), this form of compensation also 
appears to align better with the interests of shareholders as it motivates the audit 
committee member to make decisions that are in the best interests of the firm.  
Stock option compensation, in contrast, is associated with greater purchases of 
NAS. The results reveal that stock option compensation is positively associated with 





positively associated with the purchase of NAS, suggesting that as the amount and 
proportion of stock option compensation increases, greater amounts of NAS are being 
purchased. Additional testing through quartiles of FEERATIO supports this view, with 
audit committee members purchasing greater amounts of NAS in the highest quartile 
(Q4).  
Consistent with prior research indicating that stock option compensation is 
associated with aggressive financial reporting and ineffective monitoring (Archambeault 
et al., 2008; Keune & Johnstone, 2010; Rickling & Sharma, 2013), stock options may be 
motivating audit committee members to aggressively purchase greater amounts of NAS. 
This form of compensation, therefore, is detrimental for good governance as it 
encourages audit committee members to aggressively purchase NAS at the risk of 
impairing auditor independence, and does not align the interests of the audit committee 
with those of shareholders, as suggested by the NACD (2001). 
The findings on stock award compensation provide some interesting implications 
in reference to this form of compensation. Both LN_STAWD and ACSTAWD are 
positively associated with LOG_NAF, suggesting stock awards motivate audit committee 
members to purchase greater levels of NAS that can threaten auditor independence. 
Supplemental analyses through quartiles of FEERATIO however, reveal that stock award 
compensation motivates the audit committee to reduce the purchase of NAS when higher 
proportions of NAS are procured by the firm. These results therefore seem to provide 
some support to the argument that stock award compensation may not pose a threat to 





Lastly, the findings on equity compensation, through analyses of quartiles of 
FEERATIO, are interesting. When low levels of NAS are purchased, equity 
compensation is associated with the audit committee aggressively purchasing NAS, but 
when high proportions of NAS are purchased, this form of compensation becomes 
insignificant. The main implication of this finding is that equity compensation does not 
lead to a reduction in NAS purchases and is therefore not effective for managing the 
impairment of auditor independence. Thus, the NACD’s recommendation to remunerate 
directors with at least 50 percent in the form of equity compensation may not be 
conducive for objective decision making as it does not motivate the audit committee to 
reduce the purchase of NAS.  
Further analysis of the various types of NAS (audit related, tax related and other 
related NAS) reveals that total compensation, stock option compensation and stock award  
compensation are positively associated with the purchase of tax NAS. Together they 
indicate that when audit committee members are paid with greater amounts of total 
compensation or with equity compensation (stock options and stock awards) they 
purchase more tax consulting services. The increase in more tax NAS may be consistent 
with firms wanting to enhance tax planning or increasing financial reporting quality 
(Kinney et al., 2004). Alternatively, the increase may be due to equity compensation 
influencing the audit committee member to purchase greater levels of tax NAS, in order 
to meet expected earnings, and thus, increase the value of their equity holdings.  
Sensitivity tests in which the sample was partitioned into firms with FEERATIO 
greater than five percent and FEERATIO less than or equal to 5 percent reveal that the 





reduce the purchase of NAS. The results reveal that when firms purchase NAS beyond 
the five percent threshold, stock option compensation encourages the audit committee to 
purchase more NAS, while stock award compensation encourages the audit committee to 
reduce purchases of NAS. In contrast, when firms purchase NAS below the five percent 
threshold, cash compensation motivates the audit committee member to purchase less 
NAS while stock award compensation encourages more purchases of NAS. 
Consequently, requiring pre-approval of NAS fees greater than five percent may not be a 
deterrent to reducing the impairment of auditor independence. Rather, the form of 
compensation may be a more appropriate instrument to control threats to auditor 
independence associated with the purchase of NAS. 
Testing of the effect of CEO power on the purchase of NAS revealed that the 
CEO does have the ability to influence the level of NAS being purchased. When CEO 
power is high, the audit committee purchases greater levels of NAS, regardless of the 
form of compensation provided to the audit committee. In contrast, when CEO power is 
low, stock option compensation is the only form of compensation that is significant and 
positively associated with the purchase of NAS. These findings reveal that although the 
form of compensation can impact the purchase decision (specifically stock option 
compensation), when the CEO has a high level of power, he/she has the ability to 
undermine the audit committee’s NAS purchase decision.  
This study also examines whether the CEO has the power to specifically influence 
the audit committee’s purchase decision of NAS by developing a measure using CEO 
tenure and audit committee tenure. Results indicate that when the CEO has power over 





compensated with stock options or stock awards, the audit committee purchases greater 
amounts of NAS. When the audit committee is compensated with cash, less NAS are 
procured. Together, the results demonstrate that the CEO has the ability to exert influence 
over the audit committee’s NAS purchase decision but that the form of compensation can 
act as a deterrent or catalyst to impairing auditor independence. When the CEO has 
power over the audit committee and the audit committee is compensated with cash, this 
form of compensation promotes objectivity as the audit committee mitigates the CEO’s 
influence by purchasing fewer amounts of NAS. Alternatively, when compensated with 
equity, the audit committee acts aggressively, perhaps as a result of the CEO’s influence, 
and purchases more NAS, thereby increasing the risk of impairment of auditor 
independence. 
The insignificant results related to cash, stock option and stock award 
compensation with the purchase of NAS when the CEO does not have power over the 
audit committee (CEOPOWER< -1) are quite interesting. They suggest that when the 
audit committee has greater power than the CEO, the audit committee is more objective 
and makes purchase decisions, thus reducing the CEO’s ability to influence the NAS 
purchase decision. More importantly, these results highlight the importance of the audit 
committee’s power in mitigating the CEO’s influence and providing effective monitoring 
and objective decision-making. 
Finally, a review of the control variables revealed some interesting findings 
related to audit committee expertise. Consistent with prior research (Naiker et al., 2013), 
accounting expertise (ACCTPRCT) is negatively associated with the purchase of NAS in 





support that audit committee members with accounting expertise purchase less NAS as 
they perceive it impairs auditor independence. However, additional testing of NAS reveal 
that when firms purchase NAS below the five percent threshold of FEERATIO, audit 
committee members with finance expertise purchase greater amounts of NAS. This is 
inconsistent with prior NAS literature (Naiker et al., 2013; Zaman et al., 2011) and 
suggests that audit committee members with finance expertise may not perceive NAS as 
impairing auditor independence, when low proportions of NAS are procured by the firm. 
 
Limitations 
 In performing this study there are some potential limitations that need to be 
considered. First, the sample consists of U.S. publicly traded companies from public 
databases in the U.S., therefore, the results obtained may not be generalizable to smaller 
public companies and private organizations in the U.S. nor to firms domiciled in other 
countries. Second, the proxy for NAS may not properly capture non-audit fees; 
consequently, I use additional measures of NAS consistent with prior research 
(LOG_NAF, NAF_TO_AF, and UNEXP_NAF). Third, stock option compensation is 
examined in this study using the average dollar value of stock options since the 
component of short-term versus long-term stock options is not readily available in the 
public databases. In addition, information on exercisable versus un-exercisable stock 
options is not provided by the public databases so this information is also not readily 
available. Finally, a review of a sample of proxy statements for firms within the sample 
further revealed firms use different methods to value stock options and in some cases do 





sample of firms with exercisable and un-exercisable stock options provides an 
opportunity to further explore this form of compensation in the future. 
A further limitation in this study is the inability to examine stock holdings as 
initially hypothesized. Although the Corporate Library database provides information on 
the number of common shares owned, a review of the proxy statement revealed that the 
number of shares reported does not always match the information in Corporate Library. 
In addition, firms do not provide a breakdown of the number of common shares held as a 
result of having exercised their stock awards or stock options. This information would 
need to be hand collected and presents an opportunity for future research, along with 
examining the relationship between the various forms and structure of audit committee 
member compensation and several measures of audit quality, financial reporting quality, 
and investors’ perceptions of firm’s financial reporting. 
Finally, a review of the information in the public databases indicates that the 
information provided may be incomplete or inaccurate. For example, verification of the 
data provided in Execucomp and Corporate Library was initially performed in order to 
ensure reliability of the data. The process revealed that the information on director 
compensation in the Execucomp database matched the information provided in the proxy 
statement for a random sample of firms. In contrast, the compensation information 
provided in the Corporate Library database could not always be matched to the data 
provided in the proxy statement. In order to manage this issue, I use compensation data 







Conclusion and Contributions 
This study answers the call to further examine the relationship between economic 
incentives and the effectiveness of the audit committee (Carcello et al., 2011; Sharma & 
Iselin, 2012; Sharma & Sharma, 2011) as well as on the factors and processes that are 
involved in the NAS pre-approval process by audit committees (Beasley et al., 2009; 
Naiker et al., 2013).  It also provides several contributions to the audit committee 
compensation and NAS literature and has practical implications for the auditing 
profession and regulators. This is the first study to examine how the form of 
compensation influences the audit committee’s purchase decision of NAS, and provide 
insight as to how the form of compensation can manage the impairment of auditor 
independence associated with these types of services. Results reveal that the form of 
compensation paid to the audit committee does affect the amount of NAS purchased from 
the auditor. Of larger significance is the effect equity compensation has on the purchase 
of NAS. Stock option compensation motivates audit committee members to purchase 
greater levels of NAS therefore this form of compensation is not conducive for objective 
decision making or attempting to minimize potential impairment of auditor 
independence. 
Stock award compensation seems to also result in greater purchases of NAS 
however not as aggressively as stock option compensation since members choose to 
purchase less amounts of NAS as the proportions of NAS increase. In light of these 
findings, it is important that the NACD review its recommendation of compensating 
directors with at least 50% equity, as this form of compensations does not seem to align 





behavior and potentially impairs auditor independence as a result of the audit committee 
procuring greater NAS. Cash compensation seems to be a better tool for motivating audit 
committee members to be objective, as the findings indicate that greater proportions of 
cash compensation encourage them to purchase less NAS.   
This study also contributes to the corporate governance literature by developing 
another measure of CEO power over the audit committee. I examine whether the audit 
committee can resist the CEO’s influence when making NAS purchase decisions. The 
results reveal that when the CEO has power over the audit committee, equity 
compensation encourages the audit committee to purchase more NAS potentially in 
accordance to the CEO’s demands. When compensated with cash, however, the audit 
committee seems to mitigate the CEO’s influence by purchasing fewer amounts of NAS. 
Alternatively, when the audit committee has greater power over the CEO, it is able to 
impartially assess how much NAS will be procured, irrespective of the form of 
compensation. In summary, these findings highlight the importance of the audit 
committee having greater power over the CEO in order to provide effective governance. 
Finally, the results of this study have important implications for policy makers as 
it suggests that banning NAS or establishing thresholds for approval of NAS may not 
lead to a reduction in threats to the impairment of auditor independence. An alternative 
for managing impairment of auditor independence, associated with the purchase of NAS, 
may be to regulate the form of compensation that is paid to the members on the audit 
committee. Issuing guidelines for the compensation structure offered to audit committee 
members could be considered. For example, the NACD recommends at least 50 percent 





should take. The results of this study suggest that stock award compensation seems to be 
better aligned with the interests of shareholders, while stock option compensation appears 
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